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


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Geopolitics of Health and the Coronavirus Pandemic

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Abstract

Geopolitics of health represents a pioneering subdiscipline in the context of geopolitics as a synthetic science that we have defined in order to adequately problematize and analyze the Covid-19 pandemic that the entire world has faced. The research field of health geopolitics refers to the influence of socio-geographical, economic and political factors on endangering people's health as a public good. Therefore, using the example of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is possible to monitor the aforementioned impacts and further relate them to the consequences that have already been proven. In addition, by adequately analyzing the known facts, it is possible to anticipate future consequences, both of the pandemic itself, and of health, political, economic and other measures prescribed by competent institutions. Therefore, in the first part of the paper, we ask batteries of questions related to the Covid-19 pandemic, so that in the second part of the paper, relying on relevant and available scientific and professional sources, we offer answers to the questions. The aim of the work is to show the scientific problematic, media manipulativeness and health destructiveness of announcements and decisions related to the Covid-19 pandemic. In our work, we use the method of analysis and synthesis, the method of deduction and the geopolitical method, in order to adequately respond to the research problem, laying the foundation for further research in the context of the geopolitics of health.

Keywords: Geopolitics of health, geopolitics, Covid-19, coronavirus, pandemic, new reality

Geopolitics of Health and the Coronavirus Pandemic

Introduction

At the moment of writing these words (end of July 2022), the *Covid-19* pandemic is still ongoing, the number of infected is still on the rise and the end of the pandemic cannot be seen on the horizon. It might be that exactly this process is suitable for gaining further insight into the increasingly important circumstances of its outbreak and duration, as well as for attempting to implement the theoretical-explicative framework of the defined subdiscipline – *geopolitics of health*, in the most objective manner. The fact that we are speaking of a typical geopolitical dimension of the said process is proven by the stance on Neo-Euroasians when commenting the basic goals of the “Big Reset” agenda, presented in the context of the *Covid-19* pandemic. “...the control of public awareness on a global level, which is, at the same time, the epicenter of “the culture of suppression” – is an introduction into censorship in social networks under the control of the globalists...” (Gajić, 2022, p. 49).

From the mere beginning, everything that was stated regarding the *Covid-19* pandemic by the *World Health Organization (WHO)* was scientifically problematic, media-wise manipulative and health-wise destructive for a vast number of citizens throughout the globe (Schwab & Malleret, 2020). Until nowadays, the entire *batteries of questions* that determine its character and sense remained without relevant responses.

For the purpose of this paper, we will hereinafter state some of them:

- Is the virus that allegedly caused the *Covid-19* pandemic existing, or are we speaking of some other biological agent (bacteria, fungus, etc.)?
- Is the officially named *SARS-CoV-2* virus of natural origin and from the coronavirus strain, as stated by the majority of medical science, pharmaceutical industry, the ruling political elites and media, or was it in fact created by hand and designed exactly for manipulative purposes of the beforementioned categories?

– Are the widely used *PCR* tests reliable and were they designed for the purpose of the pandemic; if not, how did they mysteriously become reliable, or did they only “temporarily” take the function of detection of the newly-infected patients?

– Were there suitable protocols for treatment of infected patients; if so, why were they changed on numerous occasions throughout the course of the pandemic, and what was their real health effectiveness?

– Why did the great majority of officials stubbornly repeat that they know almost nothing about the real nature of the virus and its consequences, at the same time brutally imposing vaccination measures and other protocols of the alleged treatment?

– Were these certain treatments, especially when speaking of seriously ill patients and especially the ones on ventilators, medically adequate, despite knowing that the percentage of recovery upon such treatment was highly unfavorable for the patients?

– To what extent and why was the number of deceased patients (the ones deceased due to *Covid-19* infection or with the presence of the virus in the organism) manipulated with, especially when it was known that there were no reliable methods for determining whether their deaths were caused directly by the said virus? This especially refers to the fact that it was often reiterated that no valid autopsies of such patients were being conducted or, yet, when such procedures were followed, the data surrounding them remained unavailable to the public.

– Do surgical masks indeed reduce the risk from infection and to what extent; if not, what is their real use in the context of the said pandemic?

– Why did the *physical distancing* soon enough turn into *social distancing* and what is its true purpose, if not medical?

– Why was the use of other virus-treating medicines forbidden, even though they were used with success for many years (in veterinary and human medical practice), and what was the purpose of professional defamation and open persecution of doctors who promoted their use as additional therapies during the *Covid-19*

pandemic, especially in the poor regions of the world, where the so-called vaccines were not available to the broader public?

– Were the so-called vaccines indeed vaccines, that is, do they protect the vaccinated patients from infection and sickness after the proclaimed date of full effect (which was its older useful aim)? What is the basic content of the so-called vaccines; is it known to the broader medical profession, and especially to their users, and to what extent do they contain elements dangerous to patient health?

– Was the temporary approval for their use, given by the responsible national bodies (the so-called Agencies for medicines and other medical means) legally founded, given that it is known that the procedures normally referring to other medicines were not respected, or was it only a forced measure for their putting into circulation?

– Why the alleged vaccines, before gaining approval for the mass use, did not pass the usual mandatory and perennial clinical testing?

– Where are the suitable scientific certifications for all the measures applied during the pandemic, and why was the critical medical and other professional public brutally excluded from the public space and media discourse regarding the taken measures?

– Why was the mandatory debate, as well as presentation of opposing scientific opinions regarding this issue, absent?

– Why was there a forced media chase and public harangue on the so-called anti-vaxxers? Why were the citizens who, therefore, used their *constitutional right* to protect their territorial integrity from the unchecked health products and procedures, treated so brutally in the media and were publicly condemned?

– Why were exactly these citizens depicted as primitive, manipulated and ill-intended individuals working against their own good and violating the health of others (for the purpose of this paper, we are intentionally not using the other derogatory terms used by many official promoters of these disputed medical public policies for naming this category of individuals), given that we are speaking of individuals who have for decades been regularly vaccinated by other vaccine programs that were not disputed from the aspect of their health security and effectiveness?

– Why were lockdown and similar measures of limited contact introduced, given that they were, without any valid explanation, used by certain governments for brutal and violent violation of civil rights and freedom of movement and public gathering? Many other questions and controversies still remain deprived of a valid scientific response.

The issue in question is why and who did not completely and legally implement the *public policies*, founded on the law and the Constitution, given that they were supposed to protect the *public interest* of the citizens as a primary general good, as well as their full *health security*, at least on a national level and even in the conditions of global manipulations conducted by greedy centers of power. We will offer, let us hope, acceptable responses to just a few of these pivotal questions, being aware of the fact that their scientific and social potential is significantly limited due to intentionally created unavailability of relevant scientific research (if such research was even conducted). Therefore, we will intend to provide responses that will fixate and provide clearer, more reliable and more undisputable facts that can be used as a “capital” for creating potential for the future efficient combat against any new attempts of occupation of space of *human freedoms* and endangerment of *health* of a vast majority of people by corrupted and alienated centers of power world-wide.

The coronavirus pandemic through the view of geopolitics of health

The following pages are dedicated exactly to such examples. Many of them will be provided in an integral version that was available to us, without offering our own comments, given that the said examples deal exclusively with medical practice, and thus, as political and geopolitical scientists, we are not competent to offer any responses. Let us begin, for example, from the issue whether the virus which has caused the *Covid-19* pandemic was indeed natural or created in a lab, directed by its “makers” – principals towards clear and previously defined non-medical purposes.

From the mere beginning, that is, from the official proclamation of the emergence of coronavirus, information about its origin were various and they have compounded numerous security challenges, risks

and threats (see more: Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020a). It is interesting noting that on October 18, 2019, the Military World Games begun in Wuhan, and on the same day, in New York, begun the simulation of the global pandemic "Event 201", organized by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the World Economic Forum. On that occasion, a simulation of an outbreak of a zoonotic coronavirus, transmitted by bats to other animals, and then to people, thus leading towards a hard pandemic, was conducted (Center for Health Security, 2022; Center for Health Security, 2022 a). Even though the World Health Organization in the West was surprised by that occurrence, we believe that there wasn't much space for such a reaction, given that, at the said moment, coronaviruses were a known occurrence for several decades. Besides, let us remind ourselves that *SARS-CoV-1* emerged in 2002, was spread by droplets, and, above all, attacked lungs and caused severe clinical picture among the infected patients, of whom about 10% passed away (Cherry, 2004, pp. 262-269; Yang et al., 2020). Afterwards emerged the *MERS-CoV* in 2012 in Saudi Arabia, causing respiratory infections. The death-rate from the *MERS* coronavirus was about 34-35% (Al Hajjar et al., 2013, pp. 427-436; Alsolamy & Arabi, 2015). Finally, in that sequence appeared the *SARS-CoV-2*, which caused the *Covid-19* pandemic. The similarities between *SARS-CoV-2* and *SARS-CoV-1* are significant, given that the similarity of the genes is about 82% („The *SARS-CoV-2* genome share about 82% sequence identity with *SARS-CoV* and *MERS-CoV* and >90% sequence identity for essential enzymes and structural proteins“ (Haqvi, 2020)). However, the key difference between the previously mentioned viruses is their effect, that is, their practical-political use. Contrary to the previous viruses, which had a short period of incubation (*SARS-CoV-1*), or high mortality rate (*MERS-CoV*), *SARS-CoV-2* has a longer period of incubation and a mortality rate around 1% (WHO, 2022), which enabled its spread throughout the planet and infection of a vast number of people in a short period of time. Moreover, the virus was presented in the media as a *boogey*, headquarters suggested restrictive lockdown and restricted movement measures, while the pharmaceutical companies used their position of power to recommend medicines and therapies that were to be

prescribed to patients, neglecting the decades-old coronavirus therapies (Vlajki, 2021, pp. 6-32).

The French Nobel prize laureate Luc Montagnier said that the *SARS-CoV-2* is not of a natural origin, but created in a lab. In an interview, Montagnier said that molecular biologists inserted the DNA from the *HIV* virus into the coronavirus (The Connexion, 2022). The German scientists Roland Wiesendanger believes that the virus originated from the lab. Professor Wiesendanger denies the theory of zoonosis and believes that it is not scientifically founded. Moreover, this German scientist notices that *SARS-CoV-2* binds surprisingly well with human cell receptors, which was not the case with the previous coronaviruses, thus pointing to an unnatural origin of the pathogene. Thus, "there is abundant direct evidence of the laboratory origin of the *SARS-CoV-2* pathogen" (Wiesendanger, 2021; Abu Turab et al., 2020). The Chairman of the *Covid-19* Commission in the prestigious medical journal *The Lancet* Jeffrey Sachs states that the virus does not come from the nature but from the biotechnological laboratory (Le Cri Des Peuples, 2022). The lab origin is neither dismissed by other scientific organizations, nor by numerous medical professionals world-wide (Segreto & Deigin, 2020; Craig, 2022; Inforuss, 2020; WSJ, 2022).

When speaking of PCR (*polymerase chain reaction*) tests, there are numerous data pointing to their inaccuracy. Even the inventor of the PCR technology Kary Mullis states that the PCR as a process does not prove the fact that you are ill or that the sequence detected by the test is harmful to human health (James, 2020). PCR testing, therefore, can be used as a helping tool in the process of diagnosis, but not as a diagnostic test. "Most PCR assays are indicated as an aid for diagnosis; therefore, health care providers must consider any result in combination with timing of sampling, specimen type, assay specifics, clinical observations, patient history, confirmed status of any contacts, and epidemiological information" (Off-Guardian, 2021). In practice, it was proven that two consecutive testings of the same patient might give different results, or in fact that the tests might react to a simple cold as well (Li et al., 2020, pp. 903-908; Landeshauptstadt Schwerin, 2020; Cohen, 2020; Ryan, 2020; Reuters Staff, 2020). Doctor Anthony Fauci as well, when reminiscing the cycles of PCR tests used for acquiring the results, states that everything that is conducted in more

than 35 cycles in unreliable (see more: TWiV 641: COVID-19 with Dr. Anthony Fauci). However, the National Health Service of England defined the upper limit at 40 cycles (NHS England, 2022), which is, in the opinion of many, a too high limit, due to which the results of testing are questionable. "Any test with a cycle threshold above 35 is too sensitive, agreed Juliet Morrison, a virologist at the University of California, Riverside. "I'm shocked that people would think that 40 could represent a positive" (Hansen, 2020).

When speaking of prevention measures, that is, measures directed towards prevention of the spread of the coronavirus, such as wearing masks, physical distancing, isolation, etc., there are opposing opinions and various proofs that refute the functionality of the imposed measures. An extensive study, conducted on a pattern of 7,687 people, confirms that the use of face masks is not efficient against viral respiratory infections. "By intention-to-treat analysis, facemask use did not seem to be effective against laboratory-confirmed viral respiratory infections (odds ratio [OR], 1.4; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.9 to 2.1, $p = 0.18$) nor against clinical respiratory infection (OR, 1.1; 95% CI, 0.9 to 1.4, $p = 0.40$)" (Alfelali et al., 2020). Other numerous scientific studies also prove that the face masks (even the N95/P2 masks) have none or statistically negligible role in the prevention of respiratory infections (Bundgaard et al., 2021, pp. 335-343; Suetens et al., 2021; Fønhus & Dalsbø, 2021; Jefferson et al., 2020; Guerra & Guerra, 2021). „Masks may confuse that message and give people a false sense of security. If masks had been the solution in Asia, shouldn't they have stopped the pandemic before it spread elsewhere?" (Brosseau & Sietseme, 2020). Additionally, let's take as an example Austria, one of the most repressive European countries during the pandemic, which overtook Sweden in total mortality from Covid-19, showing that almost all government interventions were ineffective and unjustified (Swiss Policy Research, 2021). Moreover, numerous scientific studies have proven the harmful effect of wearing protective masks for longer periods of time (headache (Ramirez-Moreno et al., 2020), dizziness, bacteria, fungus (Ah-Mee Park et al., 2022), elevated level of CO₂ in the blood (Roberge et al., 2012, pp. 29-35; Roberge et al., 2010, pp. 569-77), feeling tired (Rosner, 2020), an increase of heart frequency (Yulan et al., 2005, pp. 501-509),

elevated blood pressure, different unwanted reactions on the face (Hua et al., 2020, pp. 115-121), etc.) (Kyung et al., 2020, pp. 658-664; Liu et al., 2020; Fikenzer et al., 2020, pp. 1522-1530; Stajduhar et al., 2022). Moreover, perceived from an ecological aspect, the use of face masks (which was estimated to amount to 129 million of disposable masks per month during the *Covid-19* pandemic) (Tesfaldet & Ndeh, 2022), enormously increases the quantity of plastic waste on the planet, which might lead to potential disbalance of the global ecosystem, thus leading to another endangerment of public health (Patrício Silva et al., 2021; Prata et al., 2020, pp. 7760-7765).

Restriction of movement and physical distancing measures, according to many experts and expert organizations, caused negative effects on social, psychological, physical, economic and other aspects of lives of citizens world-wide. According to the 2020 United Nations report, economic consequences of lockdowns might lead to death of hundreds of thousands of children throughout the year (Nichols, 2020). Therefore, in low and middle income countries, child mortality is, to a great extent, a result of an economic shock, disruption of food and medicine deliveries, closure of medical facilities, etc., which all occurred during the *Covid-19* pandemic (Cardona et al., 2022). The pandemic was also marked by multimillion cancellation of operational procedures when speaking of other illnesses, such as carcinoma, health conditions, etc., which impacted the increase of mortality of such patients (COVIDSurg Collaborative, 2020, pp. 1440-1449; Mehtaa et al., 2022).

When speaking of the abuse of ventilators during the course of treatment of patients with severe clinical picture of pneumonia, we find opposing opinions and statements of experts regarding the fact whether this is an adequate method for treating pneumonia. The pulmonologist Thomas Voshaar from Germany states that intubation of patients is contrary to the clinical experience with viral pneumonia ("Das widersprach unseren klinischen Erfahrungen mit viralen Lungenentzündungen" (Soldt, 2020)). Certain experts, such as pulmonologist Udit Chaddha, believe that 40 to 50% patients die on ventilators, no matter the illness they are suffering from (Brigham and Women's Hospital, 2020). In New York, the death rate of patients on ventilators amounts to 80% (Eunjung Cha, 2020; Baker, 2020), which, to some extent, might be the result of a mechanical lung damage due

to the wrong and inadequate use of ventilators (Beitler et al., 2016, pp. 633-646). On the other hand, individuals who survived through a ventilator treatment might face long-term respiratory disability, various lung infections and other injuries to the lungs, due to which there is a potential for increase of mortality among patients with respiratory damage to the lungs (Kumar & Anjum, 2022).

The issue of vaccines and vaccination drove a wide variety of discussions and opposing opinions, thus creating a confusing atmosphere, as well as insecurity when speaking of the vaccines. Professor Harald Matthes is conducting a study on side effects of vaccination on a pattern of 40,000 people in the University hospital in Berlin. One of the results shows that eight people in 1,000 vaccinated individuals suffer from serious side effects, which should not be disregarded (Toying & Gesund, 2022). Orthopedist doctor Joel Wallskog testified to the side effects of vaccination he himself encountered (Shilhavy, 2021). Doctor Vernon Coleman reviewed the work presented in a prominent medical journal entitled *Circulation* (the said journal is one of the most prestigious journals in the world in the field of heart and cardiovascular system) (Bozkurt et al., 2021; Simone et al., 2022) which testifies to the side effects of vaccines against the coronavirus (Gundry, 2021; Coleman, 2021) (See the retracted paper that proved the Covid-19 vaccine causes five times more harm than good (Kostoffa et al., 2021). There are numerous studies that prove that there is a higher percentage of infected individuals among the vaccinated population in comparison to the non-vaccinated (Watson, 2021; Bhuckory & Sguazzin, 2021), as well as that the immunity against the coronavirus diminishes in the period of two months after the vaccination (Goldberg et al., 2021), that the vaccines did not pass the necessary testing phases (Pernice, 2021), that the vaccinated transmitt the virus, etc (Ioannoua et al., 2021, pp. 876-879; Chau, et al., 2021; Redshaw, 2021). Israeli doctor Kobi Haviv told Channel 13 News: "95% of seriously ill patients are vaccinated. Fully vaccinated people account for 85-90% of hospitalizations. We are opening more and more COVID branches. The effectiveness of vaccines is declining or disappearing" (Sones, 2021). Moreover, as believed by professor Russel L. Blaylock, for the first time in the history of medical treatment, protocols are not formulated on the basis of experience of doctors who successfully treat

the majority of patients, but on the basis of opinions of individuals and the bureaucracy that never treated a single patient (Blaylock, 2022). Moreover, numerous doctors notice that the approach to the coronavirus pandemic was not based on the early treatment of patients, which prevents severe manifestations of the illness, and thus death as well (McCullough et al., 2021, pp. 16-22). To the contrary, numerous doctors who promoted early treatment measures and well-known therapies previously used in treatment of viral infections, lost their licenses and suffered media pressures (which happened even before, when the pharmaceutical companies pressured individual researchers in the field of medical science) (Ross, 2011; Albright, 2021; Saxena, 2022). When speaking of pharmaceutical companies, it is worth noting that they spent 6.58 billions of dollars on marketing of their products in 2020, of which a total of 4.58 billions of dollars was allocated to Pharma TV (Bulik, 2021). Once again we arrive to the role of mass media, whose primary focus often revolves around their own interests and substantial profits derived from advertising revenue from multinational corporations, in this case, Big Pharma (see more: Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020b).

Moreover, in the mere beginning, a law was passed in the USA thus exempting the vaccine producers (*Pfizer* and *Moderna*) from liability in case of occurrence of side effects after vaccination (Sigalos, 2020); the same is present in Europe as well (Guarascio, 2020). The confusing atmosphere was followed by apocalyptic predictions, which in return caused fear and depression among a vast majority of people (during the first year of depression, a 25% increase of prevalence of anxiety and depression was recorded) and greatly impacted the mental health of people (Wolf, 2020; Kristol, 2020; Daly & Robinson, 2022; Porter et al., 2021; WHO, 2022; Gates, 2020). Let us remember the words of one of the most powerful advisers on the US foreign policy Henry A. Kissinger, who stated in the spring of 2020 that the coronavirus might cause a global economic crash that would last for generations (Kissinger, 2020). On the other hand, speaking from the economic standpoint, *Forbes* reported that a year after the beginning of the *Covid-19* pandemic, a record of 493 new billionaires inscribed themselves on the list of the richest men on the planet, of whom at least 40 of them increased their wealth through companies

participating in the fight against the coronavirus (Tognini, 2021), whilst a total of nine new billionaires deals with the production of vaccines against the beforementioned virus (Oxfan International, 2021). This pandemic has shown, above all, the absence of a security culture in the modern world (see more: Bjelajac & Zirojević, 2014), significant levels of human alienation, and pronounced inhumanity and greed for money. The health crisis was "empowered and enhanced" by widespread corruption and money laundering (see more: Bjelajac, 2011a; Bjelajac, 2011b).

Finally, the experts of the *Pew Research Center* and *Elon University's Imagining the Internet Center* expect numerous side effects of the *Covid-19* pandemic in all aspects of human and global functioning, due to which they attempted to project the world that waits for us in 2025 and present what potentially expects us. They believe that people will relate more to technology, virtual intelligence with take primacy, economic inequality will deepen, etc.; in one world, "New Normality" awaits (Anderson et al., 2021). Therefore, according to their predictions, virtual intelligence, development of new technologies and digital reality will be the linking point and the agents of change which will make a difference of the world we live in.

Conclusion

Finally, looking at the coronavirus pandemic through the lens of geopolitics of health, we see that there are real socio-geographical, economic and political factors endangering people's health. Given that health belongs to the public good, we conclude that further multidisciplinary dealing with this topic is necessary in order to decode all the manipulative and destructive aspects directed against people's health around the world. Numerous questions raised in this paper represent clear guidelines that can be used in further research of real (geo)political problems, such as. Covid-19. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the problem may have other forms and names in the future, and that it may be accompanied by even more intense media manipulations, economic calculations and political creations. Therefore, we hope that with our original theoretical idea - the geopolitics of health, we have managed to lay the research foundations for further

understanding of the truth, with the aim of protecting citizens' health as a public good.

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Geopolitika zdravlja i pandemija koronavirusa

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Sažetak

Geopolitika zdravlja predstavlja pionirsku subdisciplinu u kontekstu geopolitike kao sintezne nauke koju smo definisali kako bismo na adekvatan način problematizovali i analizirali pandemiju Covid-19 sa kojom se suočio ceo svet. Istraživačko polje geopolitike zdravlja odnosi se na uticaje društveno-geografskih, ekonomskih i političkih faktora na ugrožavanje zdravlja ljudi kao javnog dobra. Prema tome, na primeru pandemije Covid-19 moguće je pratiti navedene uticaje i nadalje ih dovoditi u vezu sa posledicama koje su već dokazane. Osim toga, adekvatno analizom poznatih činjenica moguće je anticipirati buduće posledice, kako same pandemije, tako i zdravstvenih, političkih, ekonomskih i drugih mera koje su propisivale nadležne institucije. Stoga, u prvom delu rada postavljamo baterije pitanja u vezi sa pandemijom Covid-19, kako bismo u drugom delu rada, oslanjajući se na relevantne i dostupne naučne i stručne izvore, ponudili odgovore na postavljena pitanja. Cilj rada je da prikaže naučnu problematičnost, medijsku manipulativnost i zdravstvenu destruktivnost saopštenja i odluka u vezi sa pandemijom Covid-19. U radu koristimo metodu analize i sinteze, metodu dedukcije i geopolitičku metodu, kako bismo na adekvatan način odgovorili na problem istraživanja, postavljajući osnovu za dalja istraživanja u kontekstu geopolitike zdravlja.

Ključne reči: Geopolitika zdravlja, geopolitika, Covid-19, koronavirus, pandemija, nova realnost

Socio-structural and Cultural Determinants of Emotional Abuse of Children in Families in Rural Areas

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Summary

Emotional abuse against a child in the family can negatively affect his or her physical, mental, spiritual, moral, as well as social development. The purpose of this paper is to analyze socio-structural and cultural determinants of emotional abuse against children in rural areas, given that these groups of determinants differ in the conditions under which urban and rural abuse is more or less likely to occur. Different behaviors can be classified under emotional abuse – rejection, degradation, intimidation, different discriminatory practices, and certainly denial of emotional response. The methods of theoretical content analysis with basic methods of concretization and specialization, normative, comparative method, as well as basic quantitative analysis of tabulated data are applied in this paper. The expected results of the research should give a clearer picture of the differences in socio-structural and cultural treatment of activities that can be considered emotional abuse against children in rural areas, compared to urban areas. It is also interesting to analyze comparative data on the prevalence of emotional abuse against children in families in the Balkan region. Comparing the experiences of urban and rural areas, this paper contributes to a clearer picture of the conditionality of emotional abuse against children in rural areas and makes overarching recommendations to prevent the basic socio-structural and cultural determinants and factors in this domain.

Keywords: Emotional abuse, children, socio-structural determinants, cultural determinants, rural areas.

Socio-structural and Cultural Determinants of Emotional Abuse of Children in Families in Rural Areas

Introduction

Family as a basic social unit has considerable effect on the development and shaping of personality of each individual. If the primary family is healthy and functional, it will, through affective attachment of its members, mutual support and respect, have the effect of preventing the occurrence of any form of deviant behavior.

The first social environment in which an individual finds themselves is the family, which as such has a primary influence on personality development, and lays the fundamental groundwork for an individual's further development. It is in the family that we acquire our first experiences of people and interpersonal relations, and of life in general. In addition, in the family a child gains the basic impressions about themselves and their personal value, their position both in the family surroundings, and in the wider social community. Those first family experiences are crucial, because through them a person forms their attitudes towards themselves and life in general, building a value system which will form the basis of actions they take later in life.

Namely, each individual's socialization and the shaping of their personality begin in their family as soon as they are born. Even the prenatal phase (the effect of the mother's emotional state, wanting the child) is very often emphasized as an important factor for the further development of the family dynamics and family relations, and in turn for the development of personality.

From the earliest age, a child passes through the identification phase. In their identification, children unconsciously take adults as models, identify with them and view their actions and patterns of behavior as an adequate exemplar. Besides identification, a child also passes through the generalization phase, i.e. on the basis of individual experiences and relations of family members towards them, they draw general conclusions, which later on, as an adopted pattern of behavior, they transfer to other people they come into contact with.

The most important affective factor which influences a child's personality is a feeling of safety, a feeling they are loved and accepted by the parents who take care of them. The aforesaid indicates that the focus is not on the parents' individual decisions, but on their overall behavior and a general atmosphere in the family. It is natural that insufficient care of the child and love deprivation would lead to the development of traits such as withdrawal and passivity, or animosity towards the people surrounding us, or even aggressiveness. On the other hand, excessive lenience towards the child, as well as giving them too much freedom without supervision, can also produce negative consequences to personal development. To this we might certainly add inconsistency in the parents' behavior, especially when applying the reward and punishment principle in response to the child's behavior, so that we could say that this kind of parental attitude may have negative psychological implications for the child's further development. It is noteworthy that the presence of the internet among children hailing from rural regions is as prevalent as among their urban counterparts. Consequently, they are subject to commensurate exposure to various manifestations of digital violence and criminal activities. This phenomenon poses a distinct challenge within the context of child development (see more: Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020; Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021a; Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021b), that need to be protected not only in the real world but also in the increasingly dangerous "virtual world" (see more: Bjelajac, Matijašević & Dimitrijević, 2012).

The topic of this paper is an analysis of socio-structural and cultural determinants of emotional abuse of children, while focusing in particular on the prominence and dynamics of this form of family pathology in rural areas. It should be noted at the very beginning that any form of violence in the family against children is a "universal social problem in all countries, regardless of the degree of economic and social development" (Jovanović, 2014, p. 3).

In other words, violence against children is not a new phenomenon. Violence against children is "a historically known phenomenon, which is as old as human civilization. And a specific aspect of a child's status are their dependence and helplessness which make them susceptible to different forms of violence" (Mošković, 2014,

p. 34). In this context, Ljubojev (2008, p. 82) points out that the phenomena of abuse and neglect of children in the family "represent blatant examples of infringement and violation of their rights". On the other hand, notwithstanding the historical context of genesis of violence against children, and the fact that the phenomenon of child abuse and neglect is "the most prominent manifestation of compromising a child's wellbeing and right to good health and development, only in the last few years have experts and the general public in Serbia been discussing it as a social problem" (Žegarac, 2004, p. 1). Violence against children is nowadays viewed as a chain of "inhuman relations, ranging from disregard – inadequate care for a child's developmental needs and personality, through neglect – absence or limited possibilities of satisfaction of the developmental and basic needs and social safety of a child, to abuse – compromising the mental and physical integrity of a child's personality, and attacks on their individuality and distinctiveness" (Milosavljević, 1998, p. 21).

In view of the topic of the paper, we applied the methods of theoretical content analysis along with the basic methods of concretization and specialization, the normative, comparative method, as well as a basic quantitative analysis of tabulated data. The expected research results should give a clear idea of the differences in the socio-structural and cultural treatment of activities which belong in the domain of emotional abuse of children in families in rural areas, compared to urban areas. In addition, it is interesting to analyze the comparative data on the presence of emotional abuse of children in families in the Balkan region. By comparing experiences from urban and rural areas, the paper contributes to clarifying the picture of the causes of emotional abuse of children in families in rural areas, and gives general recommendations with the aim of preventing the basic socio-structural and cultural determinants and factors in this domain.

The definition and models of domestic abuse of children

According to provisions of the Family Law of the Republic of Serbia (National Assembly, 2005, art. 6), "everyone is obliged to comply with the child's best interest in all activities concerning the child". Article 60 stipulates that a child "has the right to live with their

parents and the right to be cared for by parents before all others". Furthermore, a child is entitled "to the provision of the best possible living and health conditions for their proper and complete development" (National Assembly, 2005, art. 62).

The causes of domestic violence, according to Bošković (2010, p. 127), "are multifactorial. Social issues and cultural factors of heredity influence the social awareness in which domestic violence becomes a daily occurrence, which is tolerated by customs and institutions alike".

There are in contemporary theory several definitions of violent behavior towards children. The term "abused child" is defined by Radovanović (1988, p. 99) as a child "whose normal growth and development are prevented and threatened". According to Hirjan and Singer (1978), an abusive relationship is, as a rule, an objective expression of a certain psychological relationship and attitude towards the child. Ljubojev (2008, p. 84) points out that violence against a child exists when "a parent, by using physical strength or a more powerful position, treats the child maliciously, threatening their life, health, or physical and emotional development. We could say as a result that this is a form of "non-parental" treatment of the child". According to Konstantinović-Vilić et al. (2009, p. 132), "domestic violence is suffered by any child whose normal growth and development are threatened and prevented, a physically abused child, a child whose physical and psychological needs are grossly neglected".

Theory differentiates between actual and potential harming of a child.

According to Išpanović-Radojković and Žegarac (2011, p. 16), "actual harming occurs when a child suffers physical, cognitive, emotional and/or developmental damage, even when evidence of such damage cannot be found at the moment of the event of abuse or neglect". The same authors also state that "potential harming refers to the danger of harming a child which could occur as a result of absence of supervision or corresponding child protection in an environment dangerous or developmentally unsuitable for them" (Išpanović-Radojković & Žegarac, 2011, p. 16).

The emotional effect of a situation should be considered separately from the physical outcome – “exposure to risk once or more times can have significant consequences for the child’s emotional wellbeing or development. It is not always easy in practice to differentiate between the consequences of actually and potentially harming a child” (Išpanović-Radojković & Žegarac, 2011, p. 16).

Domestic violence against children is manifested through the forms of physical, sexual and emotional violence, i.e. abuse. A specific form of violence which should also be mentioned is child neglect. Under this subtitle, we will briefly describe physical and sexual violence, as well as neglect, while a more detailed theoretical analysis of emotional violence will be the subject of the next subsection.

Namely, physical violence against a child is what leads to actual or potential physical harm to the child. According to Ljubojević (2008, p. 87), “physical child abuse in the family implies physical actions by parents or guardians, which intentionally, by applying physical force, with or without the use of other means, cause, or may cause physical injuries or death of the child”.

The most common forms of physical violence against children are: “hitting by hands and legs, hair pulling, hitting with a belt, stick, cord and similar objects, kicking, biting, throwing, twisting body or face parts, injuring by sharp or blunt objects, strangling, burning (with a cigarette, a match), inflicting burns by hot water, etc. However, physical violence also implies physical acts such as: tying, locking, or closing in a dark room, closing in a wardrobe, total restriction of movement, etc” (Ljubojević, 2008, p. 87).

A physical injury may also be inflicted on a child by a parent or guardian deliberately causing symptoms of a disease to develop in the child. These situations are usually called induced diseases, or Munchausen by proxy syndrome (Schreier, 2002). In these situations, “the clinical features are often unusual, which makes diagnosis more difficult. It is characteristic for the symptoms to occur only in periods when the adult person taking care of the child has access to the child, and never in situations when other persons take care of the child” (Parnell, 2002, p. 132).

From the point of view of comparative-cultural research, sexual abuse can be defined as "...prohibited sexual contact between an adult and a sexually immature child for the purpose of satisfying the adult's sexual needs, or for acquiring economic benefits through child prostitution and pornography" (Conte, 1994, p. 225). According to Ljubojević (2008, p. 88), "sexual abuse of a child implies attempts at, or performance of sexual intercourse, as well as other forms of activities with a child, which are carried out for sexual purposes, with the use of force or without it".

Victims of sexual abuse are children of both sexes and all ages, from a few months old babies to adulthood, most often between 7 and 13 years of age. Some authors emphasize that the number of abused children younger than 6 is underestimated, because children below this age rarely reveal the abuse, and later on, in adulthood, forget about the incidents (Finkelhor, 1994). According to some authors, even though sexual abuse of children is possible and happens at all ages, the usual beginning is between the fourth and eighth years of life, or in adolescence (Berliner & Eliot, 2002).

According to Žegarac (2004, p. 31), "in comparison with girls, boys experience abuse at a later age, and it is more likely that they will be abused by an unknown person".

As opposed to the aforesaid, neglect is one of the most widespread individually defined forms of violence against children. According to Konstantinović-Vilić et al. (2009, p. 132), "neglect implies disregard of the child's medical, financial, educational, emotional and developmental needs".

Žegarac (2004, p. 45) points out that a general definition of neglect can be that "neglect implies a lasting disregard of the child's basic physical and/or psychological needs, which may result in severe damage to their health and development. It implies the parents' or guardians failure to provide adequate food, housing and clothes, failure in protecting the child from physical injuries or dangers, as well as failure to provide appropriate medical care or treatment. Neglect also includes disregard of the child's basic emotional and educational needs, as well as child abandonment".

Neglect may be obvious, but may also be almost invisible, which may result in years of poor relations with the child with drastically bad

consequences. Theory distinguishes between eight basic forms of child neglect: physical neglect, educational neglect, health neglect, emotional neglect, neglect in upbringing, exploitation, inadequate supervision, and abandonment.

Domestic emotional violence against children

Within the family, a child may be "an object and a witness of violence, either directly or indirectly. In this situation, they are exposed to psychological torture and suffer stress. Through violence, the child does not only get used to pain and suffering in the family, but also learns to be violent. Continuous stress in children creates suitable conditions for them to develop into a person inclined to the use of force and conflict" (Bošković, 2010, p. 130).

There is in contemporary theory no uniform agreement and definition of the term of emotional violence against children. According to Ljubojević (2008, p. 89). "emotional violence against a child implies acts and failures to act by parents or guardians, such as rejection, insult, isolation, terrorizing, verbal abuse etc., which can cause severe and lasting disorders in the child's emotional development". According to Žegarac (2004, p. 37), "most definitions regard emotional violence as repeated forms of behavior which develop in the child the feeling they are worthless, unloved, unwanted, and only valued when serving the needs of others, or through serious intimidation which combines psychological and physical violence".

It should be noted that in emotional violence, injuries are not physically visible, but the consequences may be more severe than in any other kind of violence and abuse. Emotional violence is defined with regard to certain types of parental behavior: "1.) "rejection and degradation; 2.) intimidation; 3.) isolation; 4.) emotional exploitation and spoiling – modeling, tolerating or encouraging antisocial behavior or developmentally inappropriate behavior; 5.) coercion or encouragement of a loss of developmentally adequate personal autonomy through extreme involvement, ubiquity and/or dominance, total control of the child's life and restriction of their cognitive development; 6.) ignoring; 7.) disregard of the child's mental health and specific educational needs" (Žegarac, 2004, p. 39).

The determinants which contribute to the occurrence of emotional violence against children – a comparative analysis of rural and urban areas

The principal causes of domestic violence "stem from etiological bases provided through social factors and the distinct area of family factors of delinquency" (Bošković, 2010, p. 127).

Socio-structural, and cultural determinants within them, affect the likelihood of occurrence of any kind of violence against children. The occurrence of violence against children is "traditionally placed in the context of low socioeconomic status of families, and includes a wide range of factors related to poverty such as unemployment, limited educational status, a large number of children in the family, etc. Research, however, suggests that sexual and emotional violence display specific features in this respect, as they are not related to the socioeconomic status to the same extent as physical violence and neglect" (Žegarac, 2004, p. 63). It is a fact that violence against children "occurs more often in families which are known for criminal activities, prostitution, alcoholism, or some other, externally noticeable forms of domestic deviations. However, violence also exists in apparently "happy" urban families, which makes its detection more difficult. It would therefore be wrong to consider violence against children characteristic of the alcoholic population and other marginal groups, although their primarily detected deviation is transparent, which makes this disorder easier to detect" (Ljubojević, 2008, p. 86).

The determinants refer to "the factors at the institutional and structural levels which create conditions in which it is more or less likely for violence to occur" (Unicef, 2017a, p. 4). In the context of this topic, we can distinguish the structural determinants, which in a wider framework include all the relevant social and cultural factors. According to Unicef's (2017a, p. 4) classification, structural determinants include the following determinants: "1.) economic underdevelopment is considered an important precursor of violence against children on an international scale; 2.) social exclusion, poverty and inequality are forms of indirect, structural violence, but they also lead to interpersonal violence in various ways; 3.) wars and social conflicts represent forms of violence which affect children living in war-torn

areas, but they are also precursors which contribute to other forms of violence, even long after the conflicts are over; 4.) migrations, in particular if forced and badly organized, increase the risk of different forms of violence against children, especially when not accompanied by adults; 5.) gender regimes based on asymmetric power distribution and rooted in patriarchal values provide grounds for gender-motivated violence, and domestic violence against women and children; 6.) cultural factors appear in different forms: as a high level of tolerance to violence as a result of wars, crises, and social unrest; as discriminatory attitudes towards minorities; and as norms and values relating to gender-based roles and relations; 7.) digitalization, the development of information and communication technologies, the Internet and social networks are related to new forms of violence against children – new technologies are used as violence instruments; 8.) discriminatory attitudes towards children with developmental challenges and/or disabilities are more widespread in rural than in urban areas. While 40% of the subjects in urban areas in the Multiple Indicator Survey expressed positive attitudes towards children with physical and intellectual challenges, in rural areas such positive attitudes were recorded in 30% of the subjects; 9.) a higher rate of child marriages was recorded in rural areas, in the poorest households, as well as in households with the highest number of members. With regard to women living in Roma communities (20-49 years of age), 17% of them were married before the age of fifteen, and 57% before they were 18. In the general population, the frequency of child marriages is much lower (0.8% before the age of 15 and 6.8% before 18); 10.) a massive inflow of refugees and migrants during 2015, mainly from Syria, and from Iraq and Afghanistan as well" (Unicef, 2017a, p. 4).

According to the research of the Centre for Child Rights, „children with developmental challenges are particularly exposed to the risk of violence. One of the first investigations into occurrence of violence against children conducted in the Republic of Serbia related in particular to children with developmental challenges. According to the data obtained from surveying children in 11 facilities for children with developmental impairments: 62% of the children witnessed violence of the staff against children (8% very often, or 3% on a daily

basis); the most frequent forms of violence were insulting the child with swear words (43%) and keeping silent and deliberately ignoring the child (42%)"(Petrović, 2016, p. 8).

It should also be emphasized that the broader socioeconomic conditions are often left out of literature on violence against children. The focus is more often on the broader cultural, than on socioeconomic conditions. According to a UNICEF study, "there are in Serbia many studies on different forms of structural violence against children. They include studies on the poverty and material deprivation of children, on social exclusion and inadequate availability of resources (e.g. housing) and social services (education, health care, extracurricular activities, etc.) – especially among children from rural areas, minorities (Roma children), and the migrant population (refugees and internally displaced persons)" (Unicef, 2017b, p. 48).

The economic and social determinants on the macro-plane, which are taken into account in studies on violence against children in different contexts, include: the effects of economic development, the effects of war and social conflicts, the effects of regional differences defined by the degree of urbanization, the effects of polydimensional social exclusion (Unicef, 2017b, p. 48). In this context we should also mention the cultural determinants, the importance of which is extremely great. The main cultural determinants on the macro-plane taken into account in studies on violence against children are: "high tolerance to violence as a consequence of wars, crisis and social unrest, also including the role of the media in the "normalization" of violence; discriminatory attitudes towards minorities, especially children from the Roma population; and the norms, values and attitudes related to gender roles and relations" (Unicef, 2017b, p. 49).

It is interesting to mention the cultural determinants and factors at the meso-plane, which are significantly influenced by specific sets of norms, values and attitudes referring to the children's upbringing practices and legitimate decisions regarding child discipline, as well as the norms, values and attitudes related to specific forms of violence or specific contexts in which violence is manifested. These determinants and factors include: "attitudes to violence against children, the legitimacy of violent disciplinary methods and upbringing methods; awareness and attitudes related to sexual violence and exploitation;

and the norms and values which create a specific institutional culture, e.g. "school culture/atmosphere" in relation to violence" (Unicef, 2017b, p. 52).

Research methodology and sources

The subject of analysis in the research part of the paper is the analysis of incidence of emotional violence against children up to 14 years of age by comparing the indicators for the general and Roma populations, an analysis of the incidence of emotional violence against children up to 14 years of age according to the living area (the rural - urban area relation), and a comparative review for the year 2017 of the rates of prevalence of experienced emotional violence by comparing several selected European countries, including an overview of the percentual presentation of the number of children who reported to have experienced at least one instance of behavior which is classified as emotional violence in their whole life, by gender and country. In addition, the subject of analysis in the paper is the share of the number of adults reported in 2019 and 2020 for the criminal acts of Neglect and Abuse of a Minor and Domestic Violence, in the total criminality.

The research part of the paper is methodologically based on the quantitative analysis of statistical indicators of previously reported data. The research is based on the available data of Unicef in Serbia, and on the official statistical data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia.

Research results and discussion

The last Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey – MICS, which was conducted in Serbia on a national sample and a sample of the population of Roma settlements "reveals a high extent of psychological aggression as part of the disciplinary practice. The findings indicate that younger children (2-4 years of age) are exposed to psychological aggression more often than older children (5-14 years of age), children living in Roma communities are more so than children in the general population, and children from urban areas more often than children from rural settings" (Unicef, 2017a, p. 6). The Table 1 and Table 2 will present the data relating to the percentage of children (the general

population and the Roma settlements) from 1 to 14 years of age exposed to psychological aggression in the year 2014, as well as the data which refers to the percentage of children aged 1 to 14 exposed to psychological aggression by living areas in Serbia, also for 2014.

Furthermore, the Balkan Epidemiological Study on Child Abuse and Neglect BECAN established that "the prevalence rate of experienced psychological violence ranges from approximately 65% in Macedonia to 84% in Greece. The prevalence rate among young women in Serbia is 71%, and 66% among young men. The findings of their study entitled "Adverse Childhood Experiences among University Students in Serbia" indicated that more than one third of the subjects (36.7%) were exposed to psychological abuse at least once or two times in their lives, with the prevalence rate being considerably higher for young men, compared to young women (20% compared to 15.6%). Psychological neglect was identified in 15.7% of the subjects, while the prevalence rate was higher in young women than in young men (16.3% compared to 14.7%), and in subjects from rural, as opposed to subjects from urban areas (18.2% compared to 14.6%)" (Unicef, 2017a, p. 6).

The Table 3 presents comparative percentages for children for the year 2017, who reported to have experienced at least one instance of behavior which is classified as psychological violence during their lives, by gender and country.

Given that one study refers to the share of the number of adults reported in 2019 and 2020 for the criminal acts of Neglect and Abuse of a Minor and Domestic Violence, in the total criminality figures, we should add a few notes on the criminal-law treatment of violence against children in Serbia, which essentially includes a form of emotional violence.

Namely, criminal-law protection of marriage and the family is the *ultima ratio* of ensuring the fulfillment of family obligations. The Criminal law reaction is the most serious reaction to violation of certain family-law rules. According to Žegarac et al. (2017, p. 74), "violations of childrens' rights which are qualified as abuse or neglect may be classified according to various criteria: those punishable by criminal law regulations and those subject to family law sanctions or interventions by social services; violations committed by acting, or

those resulting from failure to act, i.e. inaction; violations committed by parents, persons entrusted with the care of the child, third parties, or institutions. The kind and extent of the legal reaction is partly dependent on the extent to which a specific behavior threatens or violates the child's essential wellbeing".

The Criminal Code of Serbia (National Assembly, 2011) in one of its parts in chapter nineteen, which relates to criminal acts against marriage and the family, defines two criminal acts the description of which includes violence against children. Those are the criminal act of Neglect and Abuse of a Minor (article 193 of the Criminal Code) and the criminal act of Domestic Violence (article 194 of the Criminal Code).

In the table 4 we analysed the comparative data for 2019 and 2020, while the data compared refers to the total criminality, the quantitative indicators relating to the group of criminal acts against marriage and the family, and in the end an analysis of the presence of individual characteristic criminal acts in this area. Analyzing total criminality at the Republic of Serbia level, we can notice that the scope of committed criminal acts was reduced by almost 20% in 2020. With regard to the numeric indicators of adults reported for the group of criminal acts against marriage and the family, total values show that there were significantly fewer criminal complaints filed in 2020. With respect to individual criminal acts, it is noticeable that the largest number of criminal complaints in both years were filed for the criminal act of Domestic Violence, while it should be noted again that the number of complaints in 2020 is far lower than in 2019.

What is somewhat surprising is the small number of adults reported for the criminal act of Neglect and Abuse of a Minor, in view of the attitudes of domestic and foreign authors alike on the significance and incidence of this form of family pathology. Modest numerical indicators may suggest that this criminal act is concealed by the victim and/or family member(s), that the local customs and cultural development and awareness of individuals are still at a low level, and that an approximately realistic number of this and similar kinds of criminal acts is hard to determine.

Conclusion

When analyzing the determinants which contribute to the occurrence of emotional violence against children, the socio-structural and cultural determinants take center stage. The institutional determinants (legislation and policies regarding accommodation of children in residential facilities, the mechanisms for detection of cases of violence and referral for further procedure, intersectoral coordination, professional and support provider capacities, etc.) are analyzed to a smaller extent in literature, taking into account the investigation into this phenomenon on macro- and micro-levels, while on the meso-level (regions or local communities) institutional determinants are even prioritized in analysis compared to the socio-structural and cultural determinants.

The effects of the urbanization degree in specific areas are rarely analyzed and described. The last Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted in Serbia on a national sample and a sample of Roma settlement population was conducted in 2014. The research in terms of differences between urban and rural communities is mainly based on analyzing cultural factors (violence tolerance degree, entrenched attitudes towards norms and values associated with gender roles and relations) and socio-economic factors (employment opportunities, living standards, education, etc.). According to available research, children from urban areas are more often exposed to emotional violence (41%) compared to children from rural areas (36%).

What can certainly be defined as a gap in research into the experiences from urban and rural areas in terms of the scope and dynamics of incidence of emotional violence against children, is the absence of continuous and precise research which would enable a better contextualization and understanding in this domain, which would in turn make possible a concretization of some overarching recommendations with the aim of preventing the factors and determinants of occurrence of emotional violence against children.

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Attachment

Table 1

The percentage of children aged 1–14 exposed to psychological aggression — the general population and Roma settlements, year 2014

Source: Unicef, 2017a, p. 6

Age	General population		Roma settlements	
	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
2-4	43%	43%	60%	69%
5-14	38%	40%	64%	68%

Table 2

The percentage of children aged 1–14 exposed to psychological aggression – by living areas, Serbia, year 2014

Source: Unicef, 2017a, p. 6

Living area

Urban	41%
Rural	36%

Table 3

The percentages of children who reported to have experienced at least one instance of behavior which is classified as psychological violence during their lives – a comparative overview

Source: Unicef, 2017a, p. 6

Country	Girls	Boys
Greece	84%	83%
Romania	77%	77%
Croatia	74%	73%
Bosnia i Herzegovina	73%	72%
Albania	71%	67%
Serbia	71%	66%
Bulgaria	69%	70%
Macedonia	64%	66%

Table 4

The share of the number of adults reported in 2019 and 2020 for the criminal acts of Neglect and Abuse of a Minor and Domestic Violence, in the total criminality

Source: Republican Bureau of Statistics, 2021: 3-4; Republican Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 3-4

Criminal act	Adults reported in 2020	Adults reported in 2019
TOTAL – all criminal acts	74,394	92,797
Criminal acts against marriage and the family	8,207	10,063
Neglect and abuse of a minor	117	119
Domestic violence	5,932	7,308

Socio-strukturne i kulturološke determinante emocionalnog nasilja u porodici nad decom u ruralnim sredinama

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Sažetak

Emocionalno nasilje nad detetom u porodici može negativno da se reflektuje na njegov fizički, mentalni, duhovni, moralni, kao i društveni razvoj. Svrha rada je analiza socio-strukturnih i kulturoloških determinanti emocionalnog nasilja nad decom u ruralnim sredinama, imajući u vidu da se upravo po ovim grupama determinanti razlikuju uslovi pod kojima je manje ili više verovatno da će doći do nasilja u urbanim i ruralnim sredinama. Različiti načini ponašanja se mogu podvesti pod emocionalno nasilje – odbacivanje, degradiranje, zastrašivanje, različiti diskriminatorski postupci, a svakako i uskraćivanje emocionalnog odgovora. U radu su primenjeni metodi teorijske analize sadržaja uz osnovne metode konkretizacije i specijalizacije, normativni, komparativni metod, kao i osnovna kvantitativna analiza tabelarno prikazanih podataka. Očekivani rezultati istraživanja treba da daju jasnu sliku o razlikama u socio-struktturnom i kulturološkom tretmanu aktivnosti koje spadaju u domen emocionalnog nasilja nad decom u porodici u ruralnim sredinama, u odnosu na urbane sredine. Takođe, zanimljivo je analizirati komparativne podatke o zastupljenosti emocionalnog nasilja nad decom u porodici na prostoru Balkana. Poredeći iskustva urbanih i ruralnih sredina, rad doprinosi sticanju jasnije slike o uslovljenosti emocionalnog nasilja nad decom u porodici u ruralnim sredinama, te daje načelne preporuke u cilju preveniranja osnovnih socio-strukturnih i kulturoloških determinanti i faktora u ovom domenu.

Ključne reči: emocionalno nasilje, deca, socio-strukturne determinante, kulturološke determinante, ruralna sredina, prevencija.

The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Video Game Development

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Abstract

In this paper, we study the vital role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the development of video games, with a focus on various aspects of AI application in this industry. In the introduction, we discuss both the development of video games and the role of AI systems in the user experience, defining the progression of AI's role in video games. In the following section, we investigate how in-game entities and AI collaborate. Here, we analyze basic concepts such as Non-Playable Characters (NPCs) and how AI enhances their intelligence and reactivity in the game. The mechanisms of AI in video games are a crucial point of consideration in the next part of the paper. We explain how various AI techniques are used for decision-making, player tracking, and adapting the game to their actions. Furthermore, we explore the use of AI in video games beyond NPC control, examining examples such as procedurally generated worlds and player experience modeling. This application of AI contributes to a deeper and more dynamic player experience. In the modern application of AI in video games, we delve into advanced uses of machine learning and deep neural networks in game development. Here, we consider how AI is used for game personalization, user data analysis, and enhancing graphics and sound. Finally, we discuss the future of video games and the role of neural networks in their development. We predict the growth of AI in various aspects of games and how it will shape the future player experience. In conclusion, we assert that artificial intelligence has become an indispensable part of video game development, and its impact will inevitably expand in the future, enabling increasingly rich, dynamic, and personalized games for players worldwide.

Key words: video game entities, video game mechanics, AI mechanisms in video games, NPCs, neural networks

The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Video Game Development

Introduction

Raison d'être of every video game resides deep within the competitive sphere of human mental constitution, particularly in its innate impulses (Russell, 2009). A video game is always a competition with someone or something: either an opponent, a rival, or an adversary. This competitiveness is sometimes perceived as an "inherent animal spirit" of humans, which ultimately leads to an "immaterial civil war" (see more: Lukić, 2010). Given that the real protagonist of a video game is necessarily homo ludens, that is, a human, either directly or through their avatar (although the first video games did not have avatars per se, and interaction between the player and the software occurred directly, as in the game Tetris), their opponent is always the software that powers the device on which the game is played, and whose software must adapt and oppose its activities in the game to compete with and often challenge or enhance the player's experience (especially in certain genres where the goal is not for the player to win but to stay in the game as long as possible, as seen in earlier games like Space Invaders) (see more: Filipović, 2022). Thus, even in rudimentary video games, we have the use of artificial intelligence in shaping gameplay. Individuals who have experienced video games have unquestionably engaged with artificial intelligence (AI). Irrespective of the video game genre, AI has consistently governed various aspects. Typically, this governance is linked to the conduct of non-player characters, be they neutral or antagonistic figures.

Software or primary artificial intelligence in video games is defined as a set of software techniques used in a game engine to simulate intelligence in the actions of computer-controlled characters reflecting one of the essential characteristics of intelligence, which is "perceiving relevant relationships in a specific situation" (Bajac & Bjelajac, 2022). The game engine that controls AI in video games, in addition to traditional AI methods, also includes algorithms from control theory, robotics, computer graphics, and computer science in general.

The implementation of AI significantly impacts the game, system requirements, and the game's budget. Game developers aim to create interesting and undemanding AI at the lowest cost possible. Artificial intelligence in video games widely employs various simplifications, emulations, and even slight deceptions, so the approach and ethics of using AI in game development differ significantly from the approach to cognitive artificial intelligence (see more: Bjelajac, Filipović & Stošić, 2022). In a broader sense, artificial intelligence, which we are witnessing a massive proliferation of applications for, brings forth challenges, risks, and threats on the internet, especially for children and young individuals. Consequently, special attention must be paid to the protection of these vulnerable population groups (see more: Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020; Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021a). This preventive approach is most effective when the principles of internet safety culture are applied (see more: Bjelajac & Jovanović, 2013), alongside the establishment of appropriate local and international regulations (see more: Bjelajac, Matijašević & Dimitrijević, 2012). It poses an additional threat for even deeper human alienation (see more: Bjelajac, 2014). On the other hand, what we refer to as artificial intelligence in the context of video game creation is significantly narrower in scope and inherently contained, thus not posing the same type of risk as narrow artificial intelligence (ANI).

Purists even argue that using the term "artificial intelligence" in the context of "artificial intelligence in video games" is scientifically unfounded (Uofa, 2023) since AI in video games does not conform to the scientific definition of AI and only uses a few branches of academic "artificial intelligence" science. While "true" AI refers to branches of self-learning systems and decision-making based on arbitrary data input, even to the ultimate goal of "cognitive" artificial intelligence capable of reasoning, AI in video games often consists of a few basic heuristic rules that are sufficient to provide the player with a good game, a satisfying experience, and an enjoyable game (Uofa, 2023).

Video game entities and AI

Since the earliest games, players have interacted with autonomous entities in video games, commonly referred to as non-playable characters (NPCs). The term NPC was first used for characters

in role-playing games but is now widely used for characters in almost all genres. NPCs populate the game world to provide an immersive gaming experience, and as such, they should be as realistic as possible in their appearance, movements, dialogues, and decisions. One of the most overlooked challenges in artificial intelligence (AI) for computer games is creating in-game characters (NPCs) with human-like behavior (Uludagli et al., 2023). Contemporary NPCs determine their actions in different situations using specific decision-making methods, allowing them to change the current state of the game world.

Entities in video games controlled and managed by software artificial intelligence (AI) can be diverse and include:

NPC (Non-Playable Characters): These are characters within the game that are not under direct player control. AI is used to manage their behavior to make them authentic and responsive to player interactions.

Opponents and Enemies: AI can control opponents or enemy entities in the game, determining their tactics, abilities, and reactions to the player.

Allies: AI can control player allies, providing support and assistance during the game. This includes combat strategies, navigation, and other forms of support.

Systemic Elements: AI can manage various systemic elements in the game, such as dynamic weather conditions, economies, and more, to create a realistic environment.

Procedurally Generated Entities: In some games, AI can generate randomly or procedurally created entities as part of the game, such as enemies, levels, or worlds.

Game Mechanics: Artificial intelligence can also be used to control various gameplay mechanics, such as physics, animations, and interactions with objects in the game.

Player Experience Customization: AI can analyze player behavior and adjust the game to create a personalized experience, including adjusting difficulty levels or game dynamics.

Player Behavior Analysis: AI can track and analyze player behavior to develop statistics, recommendations, or in-game challenges.

Player Assistants: AI entities can serve as guides or assistants to players, providing them with information, advice, or instructions during the game.

Interactive Dialogue: AI can control the dialogue between players and NPCs, allowing for diverse and dynamic conversations in the game.

Depending on the type of game and its objectives, AI can have different roles and functions in managing these various entities within the video game.

The mechanisms of operation of AI in video games

People tend to perceive every interaction with AI as a threat because they view AI as something superior, surpassing human capabilities in every field. Such a stance is generally correct (see more: Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021b). However, in video games, it's different. Instead of learning how to defeat human players, artificial intelligence in video games is designed to enhance the gaming experience of human players (Lou, 2017). Timur Bukharayev (2009) captures the role of software AI in video games nicely, stating that the "main task of AI in a video game is not to defeat the player but to provide a good experience."

Dr. Harbing Lou (2017) writes that designers often use tricks to make NPCs appear intelligent. One of the most commonly used tricks, known as the Finite-State Machine (FSM) algorithm, was introduced into video game design in the early 1990s (Lou, 2017). In FSM, the designer generalizes all possible situations the artificial intelligence could encounter and then programs a specific reaction for each situation. Essentially, FSM AI would immediately respond to the player's action with its pre-programmed behavior. In shooter games, artificial intelligence may attack the player but withdraw when the avatar's health is dangerously low, leading to a potential "game over." In an FSM-based game, a specific character has the capability to execute four fundamental actions in reaction to potential scenarios: seeking help, evading, wandering, and taking action. Many well-known games, such as Battlefield, Call of Duty, and Tomb Raider, include

successful examples of FSM AI design. Even the turtles in Super Mario have rudimentary FSM designs (Lou, 2017).

A more advanced method that developers use to enhance the individualized gaming experience is the Monte Carlo Algorithm (MCTS or Monte Carlo Tree Search). The MCTS algorithm was created to avoid the repetition aspect present in the FSM algorithm. The MCTS algorithm first evaluates all possible moves available to the NPC at a given moment. Then, for each of these possible moves, it analyzes all the actions the player could respond with. Afterward, it returns to assess the NPC's estimation based on the player's actions (Cowling et al., 2012). This artificial intelligence algorithm was used by IBM to create Deep Blue, the first chess supercomputer, which made history on May 11, 1997, by defeating world chess champion Garry Kasparov in a six-game match.

A similar algorithm is used in many strategy games. However, since there are far more possible moves than in chess, it's impossible to consider them all. In such games, the MCTS algorithm will randomly select some of the possible moves. As a result, NPC actions become much less predictable for players. This is crucial in games like Civilization, which have a vast number of options available to the computer opponent. Building a tree for every possible choice and scenario would take a very long time. Therefore, to avoid such extensive calculations, the MCTS algorithm randomly selects a few possible options. Consequently, the game consumes fewer system resources while still surprising players with its AI (Lou, 2017).

The use of AI in video games other than NPC control

The use of AI in game development is not necessarily limited to NPC control. Georgios N. Yannakakis (2012) highlighted, in addition to NPC control, four potential areas of AI application in video games:

Player Experience Modeling: Recognizing the abilities and emotional state of the player to adapt the game appropriately. This can include dynamically balancing the game's difficulty, adjusting the game's difficulty in real-time based on the player's abilities. AI in games can also help infer player intentions (such as motion recognition).

Procedural Content Generation: Creating game environment elements such as environmental conditions, levels, and even music automatically. Artificial intelligence methods can generate new content or interactive stories.

User Behavior Data Mining: This allows game designers to explore how people use the game, which parts they play the most, and what causes them to stop playing, enabling developers to fine-tune the game or improve monetization.

Alternative Approaches to NPC Characters: These involve changing game settings to enhance the believability of NPCs and exploring social, rather than individual NPC behavior.

Instead of procedural generation, some researchers (Goodfellow et al., 2014) have used Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to create new content. Researchers at the University of Cornwall implemented GANs in 2018 to generate a thousand levels that developers had written for the video game DOOM (1993). After training, the neural network prototype could design new levels for the game autonomously. Similarly, researchers at the University of California created a GAN prototype for generating levels for Super Mario, and in 2020, Nvidia demonstrated a GAN clone of the cult game Pac-Man. GANs learned how to recreate the game by observing 50,000 game levels, mostly generated by bots.

Contemporary application of AI in video games

Heuristic artificial intelligence algorithms in games are used across a wide spectrum in many industries within the video game industry (Korotkov, 2017). The most obvious use of AI in games is in controlling NPCs, although scripting is also a common form of control. Pathfinding is another widespread use of artificial intelligence in video games, especially in real-time strategy games. Pathfinding is a method for determining how an NPC should move from one point on the map to another, considering the terrain, obstacles, and possible fog of war. AI in video games is also associated with dynamic game balancing. The concept of AI unpredictability has been explored in games such as Creatures, Black & White, Nintendogs, and toys like Tamagotchi (Korotkov, 2017). The “pets” in these games have the ability to “learn”

from the player's actions, and their behavior changes accordingly. While these solutions are drawn from a limited set of possible solutions, they often provide the desired illusion of intelligence on the other side of the screen.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been a part of computer games for decades, but recent advances in machine learning and deep learning have ushered in a new era of "Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI)." This technology is poised to revolutionize the gaming industry by offering highly impressive, personalized, and realistic gaming experiences (Gartner, n.d.). One innovative application of artificial intelligence in games is the creation of hyper-realistic worlds and non-player characters (NPCs). Game creators can use generative artificial intelligence to train voice actors and generate dialogue in a fraction of the time it would take to write scripts by hand. This not only saves time but also allows for the creation of endless worlds populated by realistic characters. These worlds can be customized and transformed based on player actions, opening up endless possibilities for replayability. Another area where AI shines is dynamic storytelling. Traditionally, game narratives have been devised by developers, but generative AI enables unplanned narrative digressions and personalized stories. By analyzing player behavior and choices, artificial intelligence in video games can adapt and offer highly personalized stories while maintaining the overall game structure (Gartner, n.d.).

GenAI also opens up new possibilities for creating levels, missions, and side tasks. Game developers can use generative artificial intelligence to create unique missions or levels based on player skills, progress, or characteristics. This not only adds diversity to the game but also retains player interest. Music generation is another area where AI has an impact. AI-based tools can compose original music for video games based on user input. With further advances in AI, in the future, it will be able to create music that matches the style and mood created by game developers.

One of the most significant applications of AI in games is real-time image enhancement (Crider, 2023). Technologies like Nvidia Deep Learning Super Sampling (DLSS), AMD Fidelity Super Resolution (FSR), and Intel Xe Super Sampling (XeSS) have already improved graphical fidelity in video games by increasing frame rates while maintaining

graphics quality. As AI continues to advance, real-time image enhancement will continue to evolve, offering players stunning visual experiences (Archer, 2022).

AI has an essential role in the development and testing of video games. It can automate tedious tasks such as bug detection and gameplay testing, saving time and developer resources. AI enhances game testing, a critical aspect of game development. Traditional game testing, involving human testers or scripted bots, has its limitations. AI-based testing addresses these limitations by automating many aspects of game testing, reducing the need for human testers and speeding up the process (Hawk, 2023).

Predictive analysis using artificial intelligence algorithms can help identify potential issues before they become serious, providing players with a smoother gaming experience. AI can be used to improve storytelling in video games by helping to generate narrative content or enhance the overall storytelling experience. Natural language processing (NLP) techniques can be used to analyze player feedback and adapt the narrative in response, generate new content including unique character backgrounds, create new dialogue options, or even generate new stories (Hawk, 2023). AI is ready to revolutionize the gaming industry with hyper-realistic worlds, dynamic storytelling, personalized experiences, and improved game development processes. As this technology continues to evolve, players can expect even more impressive and enjoyable gaming experiences in the future.

Gartner (n.d) sees "Generative Artificial Intelligence becoming a general-purpose technology with an impact akin to that of the steam engine, electricity, and the internet. The hype will settle as the reality of implementation takes hold, but the impact of generative artificial intelligence will continue to grow as people and enterprises discover more innovative applications for the technology in everyday work and life."

Neural networks and the future of gaming

Neural networks, specifically artificial neural networks (ANN) or simulated neural networks (SNN), constitute a subset of machine learning and serve as the backbone of deep learning algorithms. They

are called “neural” because they mimic the way neurons in the human brain communicate with each other (IBM Data and AI Team, 2023). Possessing the capacity to acquire knowledge from data and formulate forecasts, they are exceptionally well-suited for tasks like image and speech recognition, processing natural language, and autonomously making decisions.

The utilization of neural networks in video games holds the promise of transforming the way games are crafted, produced, and experienced. Neural networks can be employed to create smarter and more advanced artificial intelligence systems for non-player characters (NPCs) in games. NPCs powered by neural networks will be able to react to players’ actions in a more sophisticated and realistic way, making gameplay more impressive and enjoyable (Kagan et al., 2022).

Neural networks can also enhance the player’s experience in other ways. They can be used to create procedurally generated content, such as levels, enemies, and unique weapons tailored to each player. This means that each player will have a unique gaming experience, and no two playthroughs will be exactly the same.

Another application of neural networks in games is reinforcement learning (Jones, 2017), a subfield of machine learning that focuses on training systems to make decisions based on rewards and penalties. Reinforcement learning is applied to instruct neural networks to excel in games like chess and Go, surpassing human capabilities, and it holds the potential to achieve similar results in diverse game genres, including first-person shooter games and real-time strategy games.

In most modern video games, NPC behavior is scripted; no matter how many times a player exploits an NPC’s weakness, that weakness is never improved. However, if NPCs in a game could learn through interaction with the player, their behavior could improve over the course of gameplay, keeping the game interesting. The NeuroEvolution of Augmenting Topologies (rtNEAT) method is used to develop increasingly complex artificial neural networks in real-time while the game is being played (Stanley et al., 2005). The rtNEAT technique permits agents to adapt and enhance their performance as the game progresses. In essence, rtNEAT has the potential to usher in a novel category of video games where players instruct a group of

agents through a sequence of tailored training drills. To illustrate this concept, in the NeuroEvolvingRoboticOperatives (NERO) game, players train a squad of robots for combat. Looking ahead, rtNEAT could open up possibilities for fresh educational and training applications that adjust in real-time as users acquire new skills.

Finally, neural networks can be used to create adaptive games (Redepenning et al., 2022) that change and evolve based on player behavior to enable individuals with disabilities to actively participate in gaming communities. Current adaptive gaming technology not only allows individuals to engage in games but also to compete on a level playing field with those who do not use adaptive gaming equipment. Games based on neural networks can generate unique challenges for each player based on their motor skills and gameplay style and can adjust the game's difficulty level in real-time based on the player's progress. This level of adaptability can lead to a more personalized and enjoyable gaming experience for an underserved population of players. Studies (Redepenning et al., 2022) show clear evidence of improved quality of life and social benefits from participating in adaptive gaming, strongly supporting the need to increase the availability of adaptive gaming services as part of the rehabilitation of individuals with disabilities.

Current applications of neural networks for improving the gaming experience suggest that rtNEAT technology brings immediate commercial value to modern games. Any game in which NPC behavior endlessly repeats and becomes boring can be improved by allowing rtNEAT to partially modify tactics in real-time. This is particularly useful in persistent video games like Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) that last for months or years. In these games, rtNEAT's potential is constantly adapted and optimized for NPC behavior, potentially permanently altering the gaming experience for millions of players worldwide (Stanley et al., 2005).

Incorporating neural networks into video games can inaugurate a fresh era of gaming, offering players more immersive and tailored experiences.. As technology continues to evolve and improve, it is exciting to think about what the future of gaming may look like and what role neural networks will play in shaping it.

Conclusions

It's incredible how much artificial intelligence has achieved in so many industries in such a relatively short time. However, the question arises: what do we do next? Will artificial intelligence have the capability to completely replace humans within a few decades? Or are there things that humans are capable of doing that AI will never learn? In any case, many good things can come out of this. Although we can't know exactly what will happen, we are excited to see what the future of artificial intelligence will bring.

Artificial intelligence is an swiftly progressing technology, and its possible uses in game design are striking. Game design with artificial intelligence could potentially transform the gaming industry by facilitating the development of hyper-realistic virtual environments and customizable difficulty levels. However, there are still many challenges to overcome before these potentials can be realized. Nevertheless, as artificial intelligence technology continues to improve, it is likely that AI game design will become an integral part of future games.

Video games have come a long way from Pong and Pac-Man, and with the advent of artificial intelligence, game developers can now create virtual worlds where anything is possible. But with this new technology, what kind of future can we realistically expect in terms of game design?

The potential of AI game design is impressive, but there are still several significant challenges to overcome before it can be realized. One of the biggest obstacles is cost. Designing games with artificial intelligence requires immense computational power, which can be quite expensive. Additionally, ethical and legal considerations need to be addressed, as well as potential questions about the "soul" or "mind" of AI-driven games. The development of AI game design should also be accompanied by advancements in artificial intelligence algorithms. AI algorithms are still relatively simple, and they need to be improved to unlock the technology's full potential. As AI becomes more sophisticated, more complex interactions and responses can be implemented, making games even more enjoyable. It is clear that the use of artificial intelligence in game design has the potential to revolutionize the gaming industry. AI game design has the potential to

create an entirely new type of game where players are truly immersed in virtual worlds. This technology could also enable the creation of games that continually self-improve, increasing their capacity.

However, there are still many challenges to overcome before all these ideas become applicable. More research is needed on the development and implementation of AI game design, taking into account ethical and legal implications. It is evident that AI game design is still in its infancy, and only time will tell what kind of games will emerge in the future. In the end, "to be useful, AI must fight well but lose more often than it wins. Such a role should make the player feel smart, cunning, and powerful" (Buckland, 2004).

In the future, the development of artificial intelligence in games will likely not focus on creating more powerful NPCs that seek sophisticated ways to defeat players (Lebedev, 2023). Instead, the focus will be on how to create a unique player experience for each individual. Players today pay great attention to details, including not only the appearance and quality of graphics but also how alive and interactive the game is in every possible way. Artificial intelligence is what can elevate the gaming experience to a higher level. Perhaps one day, players won't be able to tell whether a character in the game is controlled by artificial intelligence or another player.

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Uloga veštačke inteligencije u kreiranju video igara

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Sažetak

U ovom radu istražujemo ključnu ulogu veštačke inteligencije (AI) u razvoju video igara, sa fokusom na različite aspekte primene AI u ovoj industriji. U uvodu, govorimo kako o razvoju video igara, tako i o ulozi AI sistema u korisničkom iskustvu, definišući progresiju uloge AI u video igrana. U sledećem delu, istražujemo kako entiteti video igara i AI sarađuju. Ovde analiziramo osnovne koncepte kao što su NPC (Non-Playable Characters) i kako AI unapređuje njihovu inteligenciju i reaktivnost u igri. Mehanizmi delovanja AI u video igrana su ključna tačka razmatranja u narednom delu rada. Objasnjavamo kako se različite tehnike AI koriste za donošenje odluka, praćenje igrača i prilagođavanje igre njihovim akcijama. Dalje, istražujemo upotrebu AI u video igrana izvan kontrole NPC-a, istražujući primere kao što su proceduralno generisani svetovi i modeliranje iskustva igrača. Ova primena AI doprinosi dubljem i dinamičnjem iskustvu igrača. U savremenoj aplikaciji AI u video igrana, istražujemo napredne primene mašinskog učenja i dubokih neuronskih mreža u razvoju igara. Ovde razmatramo kako se AI koristi za personalizaciju igara, analizu korisničkih podataka i unapređenje grafike i zvuka. Na kraju, raspravljamo o budućnosti video igara i ulozi neuronskih mreža u njihovom razvoju. Predviđamo rast AI-a u raznim aspektima igara i kako će to oblikovati buduće iskustvo igrača. Zaključujemo da je veštačka inteligencija postala nezaobilazan deo razvoja video igara i da će njen uticaj samo rasti u budućnosti, omogućavajući sve bogatije, dinamičnije i personalizovanije igre za igrače širom sveta.

Ključne reči: Veštačka inteligencija (AI), video igre, entiteti video igre, mehanizmi AI u video igrana, NPC, neuronske mreže.

Berlin Process and the Open Balkans: Effectiveness, Complementarity and Comparative Advantages in the Process of Regional Integration in the Western Balkans

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Abstract

The Berlin Process was established in 2014 as an initiative of several member states of the European Union under German leadership to engage with six partners from the Western Balkans. The main goal is regional cooperation within the framework that should contribute to the acceleration of European integration in the Western Balkans, but also to the creation of a common regional market. The Open Balkans is an initiative launched by the leaders of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia in 2019. The main goal is to create a single market in the Western Balkans based on the principles of the EU market and the free movement of goods, people, capital and services. Paper's aim is to analyse the effectiveness of one and the other initiative, their complementarity and comparative advantages of one over the other and vice versa. Exclusively for the purpose of this, we have conducted a survey, in order to better understand the current position and the future of the two initiatives. The results show that Open Balkans initiative enjoys greater trust among respondents of the survey. We conclude that is because of faster implementation of the reached agreements and directly visible results for the economic sector and citizens in the region.

Keywords: Berlin Process, Open Balkans, Western Balkans, regional integration.

Berlin Process and the Open Balkans: Effectiveness, Complementarity and Comparative Advantages in the Process of Regional Integration in the Western Balkans

The Berlin Process – the waiting room in the process of European integration of the Western Balkans

The Berlin Process, as an initiative initiated by the member states of the European Union in which the six economies of the Western Balkans participate (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*¹, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – WB6), has caused numerous doubts from the very beginning among the regional political elites, as well as citizens in the region. The moment of its creation was actually the subject of polemization of the agenda and goal of the Berlin Process, bearing in mind the fact that at that moment the European Union de facto placed the policy of enlargement, referring to the integration of the Western Balkans, on the margins of the European political agenda. The multiple problems faced by the European Union at that time, starting from the financial crisis, through the institutional one to the migrant crisis, influenced the European leaders, respectively, the leaders of the member states of the European Union, to focus on the so-called internal issues of the Union, thereby neglecting the enlargement policy in medium term. In fact, the Berlin Process experienced a debacle at the very beginning of its existence when the President of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, announced a five-year moratorium on the admission of new members of the Union (Juncker, 2014). Immediately before Juncker's statement, the Berlin Process initiative was established under German leadership.

The aim of the initiative was the promotion of regional cooperation and the European perspective of the Western Balkans. But, the self-evident immediate temporal connection between the Berlin process and the Juncker's statement has contributed to this initiative

* All references to Kosovo in this document should be understood in the context of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

being accepted by the public with not-so-great enthusiasm, primarily in the context of European integration of the region. The first declaration adopted as part of the initiative on August 28, 2018 testifies to the fact that the initiative of the Berlin Process is not directly related to the process of European integration of the Western Balkans. It does not contradict the European heritage but in comparison to some other previous declarations, such as the one from Thessaloniki in 2003, which clearly states that the goal is the complete integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union, in this declaration the European Union is mentioned in the context of rapprochement of the region to the Union, but without single word about membership. Thus, Article 4 of the mentioned Declaration states that 'all of the countries in the Western Balkans firmly believe that their future lies in the European Union', while Article 11, which refers to democratic standards, states that 'the strengthening of democracy in societies in the countries of the Western Balkans also brings these states closer to the EU'. The similar is stated in Article 18, which refers to the pre-accession aid of the European Union (IPA Funds), in which it is once again stated precisely 'bringing the countries closer to the EU and European standards' (Transport Community, 2021).

The Berlin Process has made a number of achievements in fostering dialogue and cooperation between the WB6 and EU member states and the WB6. Some of the achievements of the Berlin Process include: promoting political dialogue, strengthening economic ties, enhancing connectivity and fostering regional cooperation. The Berlin Process has helped to promote political dialogue and cooperation between EU member states and the WB6, including efforts to promote democratic governance and respect for human rights. The Berlin Process has facilitated increased economic engagement between the EU and the Western Balkans, including greater trade and investment flows, as well as the launch of several major infrastructure projects. The Berlin Process has supported the development of transport, energy, and digital infrastructure in the Western Balkans region, helping to improve regional connectivity and promote economic growth. Also, it has supported a number of regional initiatives to address common challenges such as security, suppression of organized crime (see more: Bjelajac, 2015),

corruption and money laundering (see more: Bjelajac, 2011a; Bjelajac, 2011b), migration, and environmental issues, helping to promote greater stability and cooperation in the region. Although these results are significant, they are all just the beginning of the establishment of regional cooperation between the six countries of the Balkans, which have yet to strengthen and open many more projects. And regarding the cooperation between the EU and the WB6, these are also good initial steps that build the infrastructure of future cooperation, but not fast enough or to a significant extent.

With all its actions, dialogue and plans the Berlin Process has tried to help greater cooperation and integration between the WB6, and the EU member states and WB6, to contribute to greater stability in the region, to increase economic growth and prosperity in the region. The establishment of the RYCO is often quoted as evidence that the process has yielded tangible results. RYCO is a regionally-owned, regionally-financed organization, and the process of its establishment brought together governmental and non-governmental representatives. But it remains doubtful how RYCO will actually implement youth policies, and strong political interference in the future works should also not be ruled out (Nechev et al., 2017, p. 5). Considering the WB high unemployment rate and poor income, thousands of people, mostly highly educated youth, migrate to Western Europe each year, leading some to believe that they will only be able to join the EU if they trek there on their own two feet (Xeka and Mucaj, 2022, p. 3272).

The goal of connecting the region through infrastructure projects can be seen as a latent success primarily due to the nature of infrastructural projects and the time needed to implement them. The only visible result is the March 2017 start of construction works on a bridge connecting the Bosnian and Croatian section of a Pan-European corridor (Nechev et al., 2017, p. 6). The region connectivity started with the Trans-European Transport and Energy Networks (TEN-T and TEN-E) and then it spread through establishment of the network of new and old regional organizations such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), South-East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO) and the Energy Community Secretariat (ECS). Improving connectivity and fostering sectoral regional cooperation process proved to be slow

process and potential positive results can be measured in the medium term at the earliest

The least of the results have been achieved in the area of regional cooperation and the area of resolution of bilateral issues.

The WB6 agreed on the Declaration on the Common Regional Market (CRM) to develop deeper regional economic integration as a stepping stone towards the EU Single Market. The Action Plan for the period 2021-2024, which is based on the four freedoms of the EU, was also adopted. It is planned that the common market of the WB6 will function on the same principles as the internal market of the EU. This would represent a significantly higher level of economic integration than the currently existing CEFTA 2006 free trade zone. The problem is that the action plan to establish the CRM did not take into account the high level of corruption and the lack of the rule of law in the WB6, and exactly the two of them could be a major obstacle for the proper functioning of the CRM (Hoxhaj, 2022). 'If the Western Balkan states are supported in their efforts to achieve an energy transition and to establish the CRM, and if civil society is supported more intensively in the region, the Berlin Process can even gain relevance in the future' (Vulović, 2022).

Prolonging of the Berlin Process beyond 2018 came from the EU's reluctance and inability to reset the enlargement agenda in WB6 rather than from the Berlin Process's success. The idea behind the Berlin Process, even if temporarily, seems to be a replacement of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans.

The Berlin Process has provided a platform for supporting reforms in the WB6, including efforts to promote good governance, combat corruption, and strengthen the rule of law. Unfortunately, the results in the practice of the countries of this region have not significantly changed but have largely remained the same.

The Open Balkans: the incomplete regional integration

The Open Balkans initiative was launched at the end of 2019 by the leaders of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia, as a platform for regional economic integration which leading goals are the free movement of goods, services, people and capital according to the model

of the European Union market. The ultimate goal of the Open Balkans is creation a common regional market in the Western Balkans modelled on the EU single market pillars. However, the essential barrier on that path and the realization of that goal is the fact that the participants of the initiative are only three out of six Western Balkans economies. The Open Balkans is support for existing regional initiatives, their concretization and response to the demands of the economy, companies and real life. The initiative launched under the name Mini-Schengen has been renamed the Open Balkans, and it can be accessed by all economies in the region (CCS/PKS, n.d.). Although it is an authentically regional initiative, it did not receive the support of all six regional actors. Similar as the Berlin Process, the Open Balkans initiative has been faced with numerous contestations since, however, unlike the Berlin Process, the Open Balkans is primarily faced with political condemnations.

While Belgrade, Tirana and Skopje see this initiative as an opportunity for the regional economic integration through practical measures, and thus the development of regional economies, authorities in Podgorica, Pristina and Sarajevo believe that the initiative does not serve the goals of regional and European integration, but rather to the hidden political goals with a nationalist connotation. There is no agreement on the Open Balkans between the political elite of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The representatives of the Serbian people believe that this is an initiative that will contribute to the development of the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the representatives of the Bosniak and Croat people do not have a clear position on this initiative, explaining that the Berlin Process is an already existing initiative with the same goals. The former Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Šefik Džaferović has said that Sarajevo will insist on the implementation of what was signed by all six actors of the Western Balkans in Sofia under the auspices of the Berlin Process and that it will not accept any initiative that could be a substitute for Bosnia and Herzegovina's European path, alluding to on the initiative of the Open Balkans (Ćurčić, 2022). Foreign affairs minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina has said that the Open Balkans initiative has practically lost its conceptual importance since the moment when the Common Regional Market was signed as part of the Berlin Process,

which is also based on the four freedoms (Miladinović, 2021). When it comes to the position of Podgorica, newly formed political coalition/movement 'Europa Sad' believes that the Open Balkans initiative is a good opportunity for Montenegro and that it will contribute to the European integration path of Montenegro (Politika, 2023). On the other hand, the opposition Democratic Party of Socialists believes that the Open Balkans is an anti-European initiative that enjoys the support of pro-Serbian and pro-Russian political subjects (Vukićević, 2022). Kosovo leadership also refuses to take part in the Open Balkans, claiming that the opposition to joining the initiative is based on Belgrade's refusal to accept the Kosovo documents. Current Prime Minister of the Pristina's Institutions believes that the Open Balkans will not succeed, that it is wrong and that he believes that the Berlin process under the leadership of German Chancellor is the right path to European integration (Kosovo Online/Syri, 2022).

The Open Balkans is primarily faced with political barriers that prevent the deepening and intensification of regional cooperation and integration, which automatically contributes to the common foreign policy goal of the Western Balkans, respectively, membership in the European Union. When it comes to the European integration process and the contribution of the Berlin Process, as well as the Open Balkans on that path, Cluster 1 of the European Commission's report for candidate countries and countries in the process of accession sufficiently testifies to the importance of regional cooperation and integration on the way to joining the European Union. In fact, within the Cluster 1 there is a section 'Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation', which directly implicates the importance of regional cooperation and integrational initiatives to the European integration process of the whole region (European Commission, 2022).

In that context, there is clear correlation between the Open Balkan and European integration path of the participating actors within the initiative. But the Open Balkans currently does not have real capacities to contribute neither to the creation of a single regional market, nor to the acceleration of the European integration process. In order to promote the formation of the regional market, full regional integration is needed, that is, the inclusion of all six economies of the

Western Balkans. On the other hand, for the acceleration of European integration of the region, in addition to the involvement of all six actors in the initiative, the support of the EU member states is also required for the reaffirmation of the Union's enlargement policy.

Given that the CRM is rated by the EU as critical in increasing the attractiveness and competitiveness of the region, the advantage of the Open Balkans is that it *de facto* implements some elements of the CRM on which no formal agreement has been reached yet between the parties from the WB6 (European Commission, 2022, p. 86).

We should consider implications of the growing importance of the SME sector in the socioeconomic development of the Western Balkans countries, and these trends for the CRM of the Open Balkans initiative. Considering that the Open Balkans strives towards realization a deeper economic integration of the region the implications of these processes for smaller domestically owned firms and for the deepening of territorial inequalities that may occur due to greater economic integration are analysed in the Avlijaš 2022 paper. Although there is no automatic link between the economic strengthening of the SME sector and more balanced and inclusive economic development, research concludes that this link can be strengthened by developing cooperation and coordination between smaller businesses, both within countries and in the context of cross-border cooperation within the region (Avlijaš, 2022).

Given the already high rates of trade cooperation of these three countries, it is not surprising that they have moved on to negotiations on other higher degrees of cooperation, trying to remove obstacles to the improvement of cooperation. The public rhetoric of the heads of government of the three Open Balkans member countries seems to imply that this intra-regional endeavour contributes in the long term or indirectly to a better peaceful coexistence in the Western Balkans, although there is no direct reference in the joint declarations or memoranda signed by the founding members of the initiative (Lleshi, 2023, p. 26).

The survey

In order to better understand the current position and the future of the two initiatives, we have conducted a survey with a precise focus

group. Survey is conducted exclusively for the purpose of this research, that is, scientific paper. The survey was conducted from March 1 to March 31 2023, on a sample of 107 respondents, electronically.

The survey was conducted anonymously, so the respondents did not have the obligation to provide their personal data, which, in the opinion of the authors of this paper, opened up additional space for providing a more objective answer to the survey questions.

The focus group was defined based on the following criteria.

- mixed population (male and female)
- aged between 28 and 38 years
- education: high school, master's degree, doctoral degree'
- expertise: social sciences
- geographic criteria: Western Balkans area

Regarding the analysis of the relations between the Berlin Process and the Open Balkans initiatives, the respondents were asked six mandatory questions with four options for answers.

The questions are as follows:

1. Which initiative has a better perspective?
2. Why is the Berlin Process a better initiative?
3. Why is the Open Balkans a better initiative?
4. Which initiative will take the leading role in the EU integration process of the Western Balkans?
5. Which initiative will take the leading role in promoting regional economic integration?
6. Which initiative will take the leading role in overcoming regional disputes?

According the results of the survey about the perspective of the two initiatives (Figure 1), 54.2 per cent of the respondents have answered that the Open Balkans Initiative has a better perspective in comparison to the Berlin Process Initiative, but the fact is that almost one quarter of the respondents has answered 'do not know' or 'none'.

According to the results of the second question (Figure 2), 31.8 per cent respondents believe that the Berlin Process Initiative is a better option because it is directly connected with European integration

process of the Western Balkans, while according to the results of the third question (Figure 3) 32.7 per cent of respondents believe that the Open Balkans Initiative is a better framework because it provides direct possibilities for regional economic sector. Also, one third of the respondents believe that Open Balkans Initiative has a better perspective because it is about regionally authentic project.

Related to the question which initiative will take the leading role in the European integration process of the region (Figure 4), the opinion of the respondents is almost shared, bearing in mind the fact the 39.3 per cent of the respondents believe that the leading role of mentioned process will take the Open Balkans Initiative, while, from the other side, 33.6 per cent of the respondents consider that the leading role will be in the hands of the Berlin Process Initiative.

When it comes to the fifth question 'Which initiative will take the leading role in promoting regional economic integration?' (Figure 5) the huge majority of respondents consider that the role will be taken by the Open Balkans Initiative – 71 per cent of the respondents, while only 15 per cent believe that it will be the role of the Berlin Process Initiative. We have to point out that this is very important question bearing in mind the fact that Western Balkans is a region composed of developing economies, so, in that context, providing trust by the population, especially by the young and educated fewer than 35, to the Open Balkans Initiative represents an important factor in understanding regional political and economic flows.

Also, the respondents believe that the Open Balkan Initiative will take a leading role in the process of resolving regional disputes (Figure 6), which is a question directly connected to regional stability as a pre-condition for economic development, but also a question directly connected to the European integration of the Western Balkans, bearing in mind the Copenhagen criteria and neighbourhood relations within the region as one of the key points on the European path.

But, in order to provide a more realistic explanation of the fact why the Open Balkans initiative enjoys greater trust among respondents, we need to take into account three factors:

First, meetings and summits within the framework of the Open Balkans are more widespread and frequent compared to the level of

the Berlin Process. The leaders of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have achieved much more frequent communication and coordination within the framework of this initiative, in contrast to the communication of the leaders of economies in the Western Balkans within the framework of the Berlin Process.

Second, the Open Balkans initiative is much more represented in media reports in the Western Balkans, compared to the Berlin Process initiative, both on the economic and political levels.

And third, what makes the Open Balkans more attractive is the fact that numerous practical measures and facilitations have been achieved in a quick time frame for the economic sector that contributes to the regional development of economies and connectivity, while in the case of the Berlin Process, as an initiative that has existed since 2014, the implementation of the reached agreements is much slower and not directly visible for the economic sector and citizens in the region.

Conclusion

The Open Balkans and the Berlin Process are initiatives that have similar goals on which both are based. It is about the creation of a regional economic space, respectively, a single market based on the example of the European Union market. The key difference between these two initiatives is that all six economies in the Western Balkans are integrated into the Berlin Process, while only Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia are included in the Open Balkans. On the other hand, the difference is also that the Open Balkans is an authentic regional initiative, created on the basis of a political agreement between the leaders of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia, while the Berlin Process is an initiative initiated by Germany and led by the member states of the European Union. From the point of view of political rhetoric and the views of individual leaders in the region, it is actually about competing initiatives. However, from the point of view of efficiency and effectiveness, we are talking about initiatives that can act in a complementary way in the processes of economic integration of the region, political cooperation, as well as promoting the process

of European integration. If we look at the Open Balkans as an initiative with an economic sign, under the condition of the inclusion of all six economies in the Western Balkans, and the Berlin Process as an initiative with a political sign, we can establish that these initiatives can complement each other in achieving the strategic goals of the economies in the region, which are: economic development, overcoming regional and bilateral disputes and European integration as a key foreign policy goal of all actors in the Western Balkans.

In fact, certain politicians abuse the existence of one initiative and the other, observing from the point of view of exclusivity, respectively, that one excludes the other and vice versa. In this context, it is important to recall the first Declaration adopted within the framework of the Open Balkans, in which it is precisely stated that it builds on all existing regional formats of cooperation, and adapts its action objectives to existing regional initiatives and formats for cooperation. Viewed from the perspective of political power, the Berlin Process as an initiative can undoubtedly contribute to the acceleration of the European integration of the region. On the other hand, from the point of view of rationalism, the Open Balkans can undoubtedly contribute to the development of economic conditions in the Western Balkans, bearing in mind the logic of the potential of economic cooperation in regional frameworks, and the familiarity of economies in this region to each other.

Placing both initiatives on an equal footing on two lanes moving in the same direction, the Open Balkans and the Berlin Process may represent regional initiatives that enjoy strong political and economic support that can contribute to the achievement of regional goals if there are no any political abuse and interpretation of one in relation to the other from corner of the competition.

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
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Appendix

Figure 1


Which initiative has a better perspective?



Note. 107 responses

Figure 2

Why is the Berlin Process a better initiative?



Note. 107 responses

Figure 3

Why is the Open Balkans a better initiative?




Figure 4

Which initiative will take the leading role in the EU integration process?





Figure 5


Which initiative will take the leading role in promoting regional economic integration?



Note. 107 responses

Figure 6

Which initiative will take the lead in overcoming regional disputes?



Note. 107 responses

Berlinski proces i Otvoreni Balkan: efektivnost, komplementarnost i komparativne prednosti u procesu regionalne integracije na Zapadnom Balkanu

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Sažetak

Berlinski proces je uspostavljen 2014. godine, kao inicijativa nekoliko država članica Evropske unije pod nemačkim vođstvom, da se angažuju u radu sa šest partnera sa Zapadnog Balkana. Osnovni cilj je regionalna saradnja koja treba da doprinese ubrzanju evropskih integracija na Zapadnom Balkanu, ali i stvaranju zajedničkog regionalnog tržišta. Otvoreni Balkan je inicijativa koju su pokrenuli lideri Albanije, Severne Makedonije i Srbije 2019. godine. Glavni cilj je stvaranje jedinstvenog tržišta na Zapadnom Balkanu, zasnovanog na principima tržišta EU i slobodnog kretanja robe, ljudi, kapitala i usluga. Cilj rada je da analizira efikasnost jedne i druge inicijative, njihovu komplementarnost i komparativne prednosti jedne u odnosu na drugu i obrnuto. Isključivo u ovu svrhu sproveli smo anketu, kako bismo bolje razumeli trenutnu poziciju i budućnost ove dve inicijative. Rezultati pokazuju da inicijativa Otvoreni Balkan uživa veće poverenje među ispitanicima. Zaključujemo da je to zbog brže implementacije postignutih dogovora i direktno vidljivih rezultata za privredni sektor i građane u regionu.

Ključne reči: Berlinski proces, Otvoreni Balkan, Zapadni Balkan, regionalne integracije

Artificial Intelligence: The New Inevitability of Contemporary Society

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Abstract

Artificial intelligence is one of the most fundamental areas of science and engineering. Its urban development began after the Second World War, and the name itself dates back to 1956. Today, artificial intelligence as a universal field is relevant to all intellectual tasks that tries not only to understand, but also to build intelligent entities. Given that today is characterized by facing increasingly serious environmental problems (challenges) such as climate change, loss of biodiversity, depletion of natural resources, air and water pollution, the need for innovative approaches that will help solve these problems is becoming increasingly urgent. Therefore, in this paper, we will present some of the possible ways of solving the mentioned problems. Given that the application of artificial intelligence is increasing every day and that it enters every pore of modern society, we will also make a brief review of artificial intelligence in the legal system of the European Union.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, legal regulation, fourth industrial revolution, climate change, European Union

Artificial Intelligence: The New Inevitability of Contemporary Society

As the fourth industrial revolution accelerates, innovation is becoming faster, more efficient and more accessible than ever before. The digital revolution has impacted all segments of society and transformed the way human beings function, even on a daily basis (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021a). Also, technology is becoming connected in different spheres, especially regarding the merging of digital, physical and biological space. New technologies enable social change by influencing the economy, social values, and opportunities for future generations (Herweijer & Waughray, 2018). Concurrently with the emergence of scientific and technological advancements, a plethora of security challenges, risks, and threats manifest themselves (see more: Bjelajac, 2017; Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021b). Among other reasons, these risks and threats are generated by omnipresent human alienation (see more: Bjelajac, 2014).

Artificial intelligence is at the forefront of significant changes in the spectrum of technological innovations. In principle, it consists of two logical segments: one for maintaining and controlling the autonomous functions of artificial intelligence itself, and the other, a cognitive segment that manages the ability to process data and knowledge gathered through experience and learning (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021c). One of the fundamental characteristics of intelligence in general, and consequently, artificial intelligence, is the ability to perceive relevant connections in specific situations (Bajac & Bjelajac, 2022). Artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to the transformation of the traditional environment of industrial production, services and everyday life. New discoveries driven by AI often do not work independently, but only in combination with other technologies of the fourth industrial revolution (World Economic Forum, 2017). Entrepreneurs, companies, investors, etc. They want to exploit and extend the impact of AI on the current characteristics of technologies to create a strategic advantage.

In their work, Hunter and Hewson (2020) presented the most catastrophic threats facing humanity today, namely:

- Chemical pollution of the earth system, including the atmosphere and oceans and seas;

- Ecosystem collapse and loss of biodiversity;
- Reduction of natural resources, where the loss of water is particularly significant;
- Global warming and climate change caused by human activity;
- Human population growth;
- National and global failures in the function of understanding and preventive action on these risks;
- Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- Pandemics of new and incurable diseases;
- Growing food insecurity and lower quality of nutrition;
- The emergence of powerful and uncontrolled new technologies.

Caring for the environment and sustainable development is one of the most important topics today. Facing the increasingly serious environmental challenges mentioned above, the need for innovative approaches to help solve these problems is becoming increasingly urgent.

AI has the potential to transform climate change strategy. In the process of clean energy production and distribution, machine learning is used to balance energy production and demand in real time, realizing the potential of „smart grids“, reducing unpredictability and increasing efficiency, ergodicity of the energy balance, use and storage of energy produced by renewable sources (Word Economic Forum, 2015).

This paper will describe the concept of green AI (Green AI) as an integrated approach that combines algorithmic models of AI technology with the aim of achieving sustainability and preserving the environment, which is one of today's pressing problems. However, taking into account the fact that AI is widely used in all areas of human activity, the initiative launched by the European Commission is aimed at more intensive regulation of AI in the European Union. The road to creating a legal framework for AI in the European Union was neither quick nor easy. Both the European Parliament and the European Commission worked on that path for more than 4 years (Prlja et al., 2021).

Artificial Intelligence and its Impact on the Fourth Industrial Revolution

The fourth industrial revolution is characterized by a fusion of technologies that erases the boundaries between the physical, digital and biological spheres. Ever since Klaus Schwab and the World Economic Forum announced the arrival of the fourth industrial revolution in 2015, it has been the subject of much debate.

Given that there is no generally accepted definition of the fourth industrial revolution, Min Hwa Lee and the authors used **brainstorming** methods in their work and conducted research with the aim of answering four research questions (Lee et al., 2018):

- What is the definition of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?
- How can we respond to the Fourth Industrial Revolution in terms of institutions?
- How can we respond to the Fourth Industrial Revolution in terms of technologies?
- How can we respond to the Fourth Industrial Revolution in terms of company innovation and start-up strategy?

Although this research did not provide definitive answers to the four research questions, it produced a kind of advanced template for answering them. One of them is certainly the definition of the aforementioned authors that the fourth industrial revolution is a **co-evolution between human desire and technological innovation**, (Figure 1) (Lee et al., 2018).

There are four distinct periods of the Industrial Revolution throughout history namely:

- The first revolution: physiological needs and mechanical technology;
- The second revolution: security needs and electrical technologies;
- The third revolution: social needs and information technologies;
- The fourth revolution: the need to appreciate and intelligence technology.

AI began to develop several decades ago with periods of growth and stagnation, and in the first years of this decade, a rapid

development and expansion of application began thanks to breakthroughs in the field of deep neural networks, the increasing amount of available data suitable for machine learning, as well as the increasing availability of microprocessors suitable for extensive numerical calculations. Many of the effects of AI are already visible, so this technology is expected to shape the development of all segments of the economy and society (Russell & Norwig 2010).

Green AI can have a significant impact on the fourth industrial revolution, which we also call the fourth scientific and technological revolution, in terms of:

- Optimization of the use of resources;
- Improvement of sustainable technologies;
- Reductions in negative impact on the environment.

Green Artificial Intelligence in Climate Change Mitigation

Scientists have identified nine processes and systems that regulate the stability and resilience of the Earth system, and say four of the nine are:

- climate changes;
- loss of biosphere integrity;
- change of the land system;
- changed cycles in the chemistry of the globe;
- the most pressing critical planetary boundaries, (Figure 2) (Steffen et al., 2015).

Regarding climate change, we can say that due to the human factor, we have reached the limit line of the deterioration of the globe (Word Economic Forum, 2018).

As planet Earth continues to warm, the impacts of climate change are becoming more pronounced. In the year 2000, there were 342 weather disasters, while in 2022 there were as many as 421 natural disasters, which means that in the last 20 years, the number of natural disasters has increased by 21%, (Figure 3) (Steffen et al. ., 2015; Alves, 2023). Twenty percent of species currently face extinction, and that number could rise to 50% by 2100. Even if all countries keep their pledges to stop global warming by 2100, average

global temperatures are likely to be 3 °C higher than in pre-industrial times (Steffen et al., 2015).

According to the World Meteorological Organization report on greenhouse gases, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations increased at a record speed in 2021 to the highest level in relation to a period of 800,000 years (Alves, 2023). Global average CO₂ concentrations reached 415.7 ppm in 2021, up from 414.72 ppm in 2020.

The rate of increase in atmospheric CO₂ over the past 70 years is almost 100 times greater than at the end of the last ice age. As far as direct and indirect observations can tell, such sudden changes in atmospheric CO₂ levels have never been seen before (World Meteorological Organization, 2017). Rapidly increasing levels of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have the potential to initiate unprecedented changes in climate systems, leading to severe ecological and economic disruption. These observations help monitor changing levels of greenhouse gases and serve as an early warning system for changes in the key atmospheric drivers of climate change.

Figure 4 shows the sharp increase in the concentration of greenhouse effects in the period from 1985 to 2020 (World Meteorological Organization, 2020).

Guided by such statistics, we can present the objectives of AI in preventing the large impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change through the following processes of predicting climate change and modeling it. This can be done by analyzing the following parameters of climate change such as: temperature, rainfall, humidity and greenhouse gas emissions. These analyses are carried out for the purpose of predicting future changes and modeling their effects on global, regional and local level. With this process, you can identify the most vulnerable areas affected by climate change. It can also help in making decisions in order to develop appropriate strategies for adaptation and mitigating all effects that contribute to major climate change (Xin et al., 2022).

AI can optimize the processes of using global resources such as: energy, water, agricultural land and forest land. To reduce the impact of the greenhouse effect, AI can use weather data as well as data on conditions pollution, which can optimize irrigation and servicing

processes agricultural lands. This is all done in order to reduce energy consumption, sources, as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, where they can analyse data on energy production and consumption in order to identify areas in the use of renewable energy sources (Oliver, 2020).

By promoting sustainable mobility, AI can analyze data on traffic, transport routes, vehicle emissions and many other mobility factors in order to identify reductions in transport emissions. In this process, AI proposes to us the optimization of routes for public transport or the use of vehicles by the maximum number of passengers (car sharing), in order to successfully reduce the number of vehicles on the roads, and thus reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions (Oosthuizen, 2022). Combining the action of AI with other technologies can be crucial in solving this global challenge.

Artificial Intelligence in the Legal System of the European Union

In February 2017, the European Parliament adopted the Resolution on Civil Law Rules for Robotics, which opened up many issues related to the use of AI in products that appear on the market, especially their safety issues (European Parliament, 2017).

On April 25, 2018, the European Commission adopted the strategic document AI for Europe. In this first strategic document, attention is directed towards strengthening the technological and industrial capacities of the European Union and the introduction of AI into the entire economy, towards the preparation of social and economic changes due to the development of AI, towards the creation of an appropriate ethical and legal framework for the use of technologies based on AI and towards joint action and mutual exchange of experiences of European Union countries in relation to the development and use of AI (European Commission, 2018a).

This strategy states that AI has become an indispensable part of our daily life. Its use ranges from virtual assistants for organizing the working day, to autonomous vehicles and mobile phones that suggest activities and help organize each day. In a document analyzing this topic, AI is defined as „a system that exhibits intelligent behavior

by analyzing its environment and taking actions – with a certain degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals.“ These systems can be exclusively software, so they operate in a virtual environment (e.g. a system for image, speech and face recognition), but they can also be embedded in hardware devices such as robots, drones, autonomous vehicles and others (Prlja et al., 2021). With the expansion of AI, the possibilities for numerous abuses increase, which suggests the importance of establishing effective standards for combating high-tech crime (see more: Bjelajac, Matijašević, Dimitrijević, 2012).

The strategy of the European Union in area AI is based on:

- Strengthening the technological and industrial capacities of the European Union and introducing AI into the entire economy;
- Prepare for social and economic changes;
- Creating an appropriate ethical and legal framework;
- Joining forces and exchanging experiences.

Over time, the legal framework for AI has progressed and a number of resolutions have been adopted, such as the Resolution on the Ethical Aspects of AI, Robotics and Related Technologies (European Parliament, 2020a), the Resolution on the Civil Liability Regime for AI (European Parliament, 2020b) and the Resolution on Intellectual Property Rights in regarding the development of AI (European Parliament, 2020c).

By signing the Declaration on cooperation in the field of AI in 2018, the European Union highlighted the importance of AI in a political sense and placed it at the top of the agenda. This means that significant investment will be made in research and innovation to develop the next generation of AI systems, modernize education to adapt to changes in the labor market, address legal issues related to liability and biased decision-making, and other issues.

The most important members of the European Union worked on developing the AI strategy. In March 2018, France was the first to present its national strategy for AI, followed by Germany and Finland, followed by many other members of the European Union. By combining the best practices, harmonized actions of different strategies were created and the actions for Strategy AI in the European Union followed.

In December 2018, the European Commission adopted the Coordinated Plan for AI (European Commission, 2018a). The

coordinated plan was adopted on the basis of the Strategy for AI, which was accepted by the European Commission in April 2018, and on the basis of the Declaration on cooperation in the field of AI, which was signed by the EU member states. These initiatives represent a key step towards the creation of a European framework for AI and encourage the establishment of European strategic autonomy in this area.

In 2019, the Republic of Serbia adopted the AI Development Strategy for the period 2020-2025. (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2019) which is aligned with the European initiative on AI, and in 2021 founded the Institute for the Development of AI and became a member of the Global Partnership for AI. The European Union and Serbia have a strong partnership in research and innovation, as evidenced by the grants awarded to the Institute for AI of Serbia. The project „It takes two to tango“, funded by the Horizon Europe 2022 program, aims to develop a synergistic approach to human-machine decision-making (European Parliament, 2020c).

Noting that AI brings numerous advantages, but also potential risks, the European Commission adopted the White Paper on AI in February 2020, which builds on the previously adopted Strategy for AI from April 2018 and represents a European approach to achieving excellence and trust in this area (European Commission, 2020).

Discussing the lack of a common regulatory framework, the White Paper points out that this could lead to fragmentation in the European Union's internal market and undermine legal certainty. That is why it is necessary to have a solid regulatory framework for AI at the European level, which will minimize the risks related to fundamental rights, safety and responsibility.

The White Paper also supports the ethical guidelines for reliable AI adopted by the High-Level Expert Group: human control, technical resilience and security, privacy and data management, transparency, diversity, non-discrimination and fairness, preservation of the human environment and society, responsibility.

The need to adopt, in addition to the non-binding guidelines of the High-level Expert Group, a binding legal regulatory framework that will be harmonized with the legislation, principles and values of the European Union (Prlja et al., 2021) was highlighted.

Conclusion

Artificial intelligence can and should help build a more sustainable world and deal with climate change. AI is a driver of innovation in many industries, enabling the development of new technologies, solutions and approaches in the fight against climate change.

As we have presented in this paper, AI plays a key role in mitigating climate change. AI is used to predict and monitor climate change where it can analyze large amounts of data to predict changes in climate patterns and provide a better understanding of climate change and its causes. Next, AI is used to optimize energy efficiency where it can optimize energy use, providing suggestions for more efficient energy use in industry, transport and buildings, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It can also identify the best locations for renewable energy sources, optimize their production and management, helping to increase the share of sustainable energy in the energy mix. Of course, AI is also of great importance in the optimization of the use of resources in agriculture and forestry, the optimization of the waste management process, and the management of water resources.

The role of green AI is to use AI principles to address environmental challenges and support environmental sustainability. Green AI can be applied in various ways to contribute to environmental protection and reduce the negative human impact on the planet.

Therefore, over time, AI will experience an increasing involvement in various spheres of everyday life. AI itself will also become smarter with each passing year, not only more productive, but developing intelligence that is not yet available to humans, accelerating human learning and innovation. As we think about benefits, efficiencies, business and everyday life, we must also think about how to maximize the benefits to society and our environment. Therefore, it is necessary to have a solid regulatory framework for AI at the European level, which will minimize the risks related to fundamental rights, safety and responsibility. It is for these reasons that European Union legislators reached an agreement and submitted a draft law on AI, called the Artificial Intelligence AI Act, which will be the first of many laws to regulate the field of AI.

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Appendix

Figure 1

The relationship between Maslow's hierarchy of needs and the evolution of the industrial revolution




Figure 2

Nine planetary boundaries




Figure 3

Total number of natural disasters worldwide from 2000 to 2022





Figure 4

A sudden increase in the concentration of greenhouse effects



Veštačka inteligencija: Nova neminovnost savremenog društva

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Sažetak

Veštačka inteligencija je jedna od najosnovnijih oblasti nauke i inženjerstva. Njen urbani razvoj je počeo posle Drugog svetskog rata, a sam naziv datira od 1956. godine. Danas je veštačka inteligencija kao univerzalno polje relevantna za sve intelektualne zadatke koja pokušava ne samo da razume, već i da izgradi inteligentne entitete. S obzirom da današnjicu karakteriše suočavanje sa sve ozbiljnijim ekološkim problemima (izazovima) kao što su klimatske promene, gubitak biodiverziteta, iscrpljivanje prirodnih resursa, zagađenje vazduha i vode, potreba za inovativnim pristupima koji će pomoći u rešavanju ovih problema postaje sve hitnija. Stoga ćemo u ovom radu prikazati neke od mogućih načina rešavanja navedenih problema. S obzirom da je primena veštačke inteligencije svakim danom sve veća i da ulazi u sve pore savremenog društva, napravićemo i kratak osvrt na veštačku inteligenciju u pravnom sistemu Evropske unije.

Keywords: veštačka inteligencija, pravna regulativa, četvrta industrijska revolucija, klimatske promene, Evropska unija

Inadequacy of Application of Sentencing Policy for Perpetrators of Domestic Violence

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Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of domestic violence in Serbia, with a focus on the judicial treatment of perpetrators of this criminal offense and the position of women as the most common victims. The aim of the paper is to examine whether the judicial treatment is lenient and inadequate, thus violating the principle of equality before the law and jeopardizing the protection of victims and children. The paper relies on quantitative analysis of official statistical data on domestic violence in Serbia over a period of 18 years (2002-2020), obtained from reports of relevant institutions. Additionally, the authors analyze verdicts of the basic courts of the Republic of Serbia using a random sampling method, investigating aspects related to circumstances considered as mitigating factors. The paper demonstrates that a significant number of reports of domestic violence are dismissed or the proceedings are halted, and the sentences imposed are mostly conditional and lenient. The authors conclude that the judicial treatment of domestic violence perpetrators in Serbia is inefficient and discriminatory, leading to inadequate protection of victims and children and the perpetuation of violent patterns. The paper also highlights the urgent need for comprehensive intervention by the state and society to prevent and combat domestic violence. The authors propose possible measures to improve the situation, such as strengthening the legal framework, providing support to victims and perpetrators, and conducting qualitative research on the motivations, attitudes, and experiences of both perpetrators and victims of domestic violence.

Keywords: domestic violence, legal framework, prescribed penalties, sentencing policy.

Inadequacy of Application of Sentencing Policy for Perpetrators of Domestic Violence

"We know the solutions; what we need is political will."
(Obaid, 2005)

Introduction

"Looking at the family as a primary sociological category, it is evident that social crises (social, economic, political, etc.) significantly affect relationships and processes within this community in a fundamental sense" (Počuča, 2014). Due to the widespread alienation of people from each other in the era of scientific and technological development and globalization (Bjelajac, 2014), the number of dysfunctional families has increased, and the family environment, which traditionally implies a place of "closeness, warmth, and harmony," has become a modern threat for many individuals (Bjelajac, 2017). Violence in the family as a phenomenon at first glance "is very clear, specific, extremely obvious and recognizable. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that phenomena, at first glance simple, are in reality very complex. Accordingly, domestic violence is a far more complex phenomenon. There is no unified view of the range of behaviors that are considered violent" (Matijašević Obradović & Stefanović, 2017). In Serbia, 52% of women are exposed to violence within the family home, where they should feel the safest: one woman is physically abused every 3 minutes, one woman is raped every 5 minutes, and one girl is abused every 10 minutes (Petrušić, 2006).

In Serbia, 90% of women attempt to resolve the issue of domestic violence on their own without institutional support (Babović et al., 2010, p. 82), so the number of reported cases represents only the tip of the iceberg. Low trust in state institutions reflects both the past handling of domestic violence cases and the overall state of society regarding the principles of equal treatment under the law, the rule of law, and the independent functioning of state bodies.

A legal system that fails to provide adequate protection to victims of violence and fosters an environment in which violence is tolerated leads to silence on the matter.

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the sentencing policy towards perpetrators of the crime of domestic violence in Serbia is lenient and if it violates the principle of equality before the law, particularly concerning women as the most common victims of family violence. The paper analyzes the legal framework regulating this criminal offense, along with statistical data on the number of reports, charges, and judgments related to domestic violence in Serbia from 2002 to 2020. It also explores possible causes and consequences of lenient sentencing policies and the need for their strengthening and alignment with international standards for the protection of women from violence.

The methodology employed in this paper is quantitative, as it relies on the analysis of numerical data on domestic violence in Serbia. The data are sourced from reports of the Republic Statistical Office and the organization Women Against Violence, which are accessible on their respective websites. Additionally, the authors analyze verdicts of the basic courts of the Republic of Serbia using a random sampling method, investigating aspects related to circumstances considered as mitigating factors.

Following the introduction, the paper examines the legal framework regulating the crime of domestic violence in Serbia, with a specific focus on its historical evolution and alignment with international documents. Subsequently, it presents a statistical analysis of data on domestic violence in Serbia from 2002 to 2020, illustrating trends and distributions of reports, charges, and judgments related to this crime. Possible causes and consequences of lenient sentencing policies towards perpetrators of domestic violence are then discussed, along with their relationship with societal and cultural factors. The paper emphasizes the need for stricter sentencing policies and alignment with international standards for the protection of women from violence, concluding with recommendations for improving practices in the field of combating domestic violence. In the final section, the main findings and implications of the paper are summarized.

Criminal Legal Framework of the Republic of Serbia

Some criminal acts exist in all societies and times; what differs is the response to them – from retaliation to resocialization. Thoughts

on the manner and purpose of punishment are as old as human communities (Prelević, 2012, p. 104, 101).

In domestic literature, one of the most comprehensive criminological definitions was provided by Konstantinović-Vilić and Petrušić, who state that family violence represents the continuous use of physical and psychological force against family members, endangering and injuring the domains of safety and trust relationships, and expressing control and power over family members, regardless of whether it is defined as a criminal offense in current legislation and whether the perpetrator of violence is reported to law enforcement authorities (according to Matijašević, Dragojlović, 2022, p. 94).

The legal system of the Republic of Serbia first recognized domestic violence as a criminal offense in 2002. Under the influence, primarily of non-governmental organizations, amendments to the Criminal Code in 2009 led to a tightening of sentencing policies. Interestingly, in 2009, the range of prison sentences for the crime of murder still varied from 5 to 15 years, while if a death occurred due to domestic violence within the family, the perpetrator could be sentenced to imprisonment ranging from 3 to 15 years. Moreover, within the context of the crime of family violence, no distinction was made regarding the victim, whether it was a child, as was the case with the crime of murder, which stipulates a minimum of ten years in prison for the killing of a child. After ten years, the legislator recognized this inconsistency. We will see in a later analysis whether the courts, out of inertia, retained the lenient sentencing policy towards perpetrators of domestic violence.

The last amendment to Article 194 of the Criminal Code was made in 2019 in paragraph 4, aiming to increase penalties for offenses resulting in death.

The prescribed penalties for the crime of domestic violence in our legislation are presented in Table 1.

Sentencing Policy for the Crime of Domestic Violence

Since the introduction of the criminal offense of domestic violence in 2002, there has been a trend of increasing reports, as depicted in Graph 1. Thus, from 192 reports in 2002, sixteen years later, in 2018,

there were forty-one times more reports, totaling 7,916 filed reports of the criminal offense of domestic violence across the territory of the Republic of Serbia. These data do not indicate an increase in gender-based violence but rather a shift in awareness and cultural patterns, recognizing that violence against women occurring within the family home is not a private matter but socially unacceptable and punishable behavior by law. We can observe that the sharp increase begins in 2015, and the trend continues with the enactment and implementation of the Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2016). However, data for 2020, as the year the pandemic began, show a decrease which, in line with global and European data and the findings of domestic non-governmental organizations, does not reflect the true picture but rather the lack of institutional response to the new circumstances in terms of adapting and facilitating access to protection systems for victims of domestic violence (UN Women, 2020; Ignjatović, 2021).

Graph 1 illustrates the number of reports of the criminal offense of domestic violence from 2002 to 2020. In addition to the number of reports, another important indicator of the sentencing policy towards perpetrators of the criminal offense of domestic violence is the number of charges and judgments issued for this crime, as well as the type and severity of sanctions imposed, which are presented in Table 2. Graphs 2 and 3 depict the relationship between the number of reports of the criminal offense of domestic violence and convicted adult individuals from 2002 to 2020. Over the 18-year period following the introduction of the criminal offense of domestic violence into the legal system of the Republic of Serbia, on average, more than half of the filed reports result in case dismissals, acquittals, or charges being rejected. In cases where adult individuals are found guilty, the distribution of imposed sanctions is shown in Graph 4.

In the observed period of fifteen years, courts, in most cases, impose conditional sentences for the criminal offense of domestic violence. The mentioned structure of imposed criminal sanctions aligns with the structure of sanctions in judgments obtained through the random sampling system from basic courts in the Republic of Serbia in 2015, 2018, and 2020.

Perpetrators of domestic violence are predominantly men, often in an intoxicated state. However, the number of safety measures requiring mandatory treatment for alcohol addiction is disproportionate to the number of offenders of the crime of domestic violence committed under the influence of alcohol. In some cases, the fact that the act was committed in a state of significantly reduced sanity is considered a basis for mitigating the sentence, even though the perpetrator's use of alcohol led to a condition in which their ability to comprehend the significance of their actions and manage their behavior was substantially impaired. Cases of sentence mitigation, considering various mitigating circumstances, are common in practice. Phrases like "family man" or "father of two children" are valued as mitigating factors, as well as "appropriate behavior during the criminal proceedings, as he did not contribute to any delays," "a critical attitude towards the committed crime," "expressed remorse," and the fact "that, according to the Social Welfare Center, the defendant's return to the family could lead to positive changes for all family members." We believe that the fact that the perpetrator lives in a household with children (especially minors) should be considered an aggravating factor due to the secondary victimization of children and the risk of them becoming victims themselves, as well as the enduring trauma and the possibility of generational transmission of violence, which, it seems, is often not taken into account when imposing sanctions. There is an opinion that prison sentences are imposed less frequently due to the lack of sufficient prison capacity in accordance with international standards (Pravni skener).

The most attention, however, is drawn to the prosecutor's withdrawal from prosecution when the victim refuses to testify or when witnesses exercise their right to be released from the duty to testify as guaranteed by Article 94 of the Criminal Code, which, in the author's opinion, is a flaw and is not in line with the opinions and recommendations of international institutions that prioritize the safety of the victim and take into account the specific circumstances in which victims find themselves (state of fear), trying in every way to ease their position in the proceedings. It is considered unacceptable for the prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution in cases where the victim refuses to testify, as domestic violence is not a private matter but

behavior that is harmful to the broader community (Istanbul Convention, 2011). In eleven and a half years, from January 2010 to June 2021, in Serbia, 503 children were left without mothers as a result of domestic violence, of which approximately 200 children had not yet reached the age of eighteen (Žene protiv nasilja, 2010-2021). Children who witness violence, or those who are effectively exposed to indirect violence (Dabic, et al., 2023, p. 114), are not recognized as victims, even though growing up in a family where the father abuses the mother in 30% of cases leads to the transgenerational transmission of violent patterns (according to Nikolić-Ristanović, 2002). Exposure to family violence during early childhood also increases the likelihood of violent criminal behavior in later life (Stevković, 2013). The Istanbul Convention obliges states to take all necessary measures to ensure that the criminal prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of violence against women and domestic violence is not based solely on the statement or consent of the victim but is based on an adequate risk assessment and the need for victim protection. Furthermore, the Istanbul Convention prescribes that states should ensure that effective, proportionate, and deterrent penalties are imposed on perpetrators of domestic violence, taking into account the seriousness of the situation and the possible repetition of the offense. Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from prosecution when the injured party or witnesses do not wish to testify against the accused for the criminal offense of domestic violence and to strengthen the punitive policy against the perpetrators of this offense.

The European Court of Human Rights has taken the position that the more serious the offenses or the greater the risk of recurring violence, the more necessary it is to continue with criminal prosecution in the public interest, even when the victim withdraws the complaint. Therefore, law enforcement authorities should not rely on the victim's stance if they assess that failure to take adequate measures could lead to threats to the physical integrity of the victim, especially considering that victims of domestic violence often remain in contact with the perpetrators after filing a report, which is accompanied by pressure to withdraw the report (Logar, 2005, p. 29). As Edward Gondolf emphasizes, the most important instrument in assessing danger is

careful listening to and believing the victim (Gondolf, 2012). In this context, we find it unacceptable that a small percentage of victims participate in the development of individual protection and support plans.

Conclusion

In our research, we analyzed the criminal policy for domestic violence in Serbia. We concluded that the current criminal policy is not stringent enough, leading to insufficient protection for victims and potentially contributing to the transmission of violent patterns to future generations. We examined three hypotheses: (1) that prosecution is often dropped in cases where victims or witnesses refuse to testify, (2) that lenient and conditional sentences are imposed, and (3) that there is discrimination against women in the judicial system.

We utilized data on reports, charges, and verdicts for domestic violence in Serbia, obtained from the reports of the Republic Statistical Office and case analyses, as well as reports from the Women against Violence network. Our analysis confirmed all three hypotheses, indicating the need for amendments to legal regulations to ensure better protection for victims and stricter penalties for perpetrators of domestic violence.

This research has also highlighted the need for qualitative studies to gain a deeper understanding of the perspectives of victims, offenders, and justice actors. Future studies should employ various methods and data sources to provide a more comprehensive picture of the issue of domestic violence in Serbia.

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Table 1. *Prescribed Penalties for the Crime of Domestic Violence*


	Criminal Code, 2002, Article 118a	Criminal Code, 2005, Article 194
Basic form of the criminal offense	Fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years	Fine or imprisonment for up to 1 year
If a weapon or dangerous tool was employed	Imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years	Imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years
If severe bodily harm or the victim is a minor occurred	Imprisonment from 2 to 10 years	Imprisonment from 1 to 8 years
If death occurred	Imprisonment for a mini- mum of 10 years	Imprisonment from 3 to 12 years
Violation of protective measures		Fine or imprisonment for up to six months
	Amendments to the Criminal Code, 2009, Article 194	Amendments to the Criminal Code, 2019, Article 194
Basic form of the criminal offense	Imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years	Imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years
If a weapon or dangerous tool was employed.	Imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years	Imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years
If severe bodily harm or the victim is a minor occurred	Imprisonment from 2 to 10 years	Imprisonment from 2 to 10 years
If death occurred, and the victim is a minor	Imprisonment from 3 to 15 years /	Imprisonment from 5 to 15 years Imprisonment for a minimum of 10 years
Violation of protective measures	Imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years and a fine	Imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years and a fine

Table 2. *Adults convicted of the crime of domestic violence and imposed sanctions from 2003 to 2020.*

Year	Total convicted	Prison sentence	Monetary fine	Conditional sentence	Community Service	Judicial Warning	Rehab. Measures	Found guilty, released from punishment
2003	157	37	25	95				
2004	374		57	211				
2005	574			339				
2006	1059	303	102	627				
2007	1312	239	148	887	1	19	4	14
2008	1681	310	186	1162	-	14	4	5
2009	1850	372	171	1265	3	26	4	9
2010	1059	236	55	745	4	8	2	9
2011	1616	360	75	1135	23	10	3	10
2012	1472	436	33	970	15	9	6	3
2013	1532	533	8	977	7	1	3	3
2014	1712	634	13	1041	14	4	4	2
2015	1778	483 59*	8	1193	27	2	2	4
2016	2065	620 102*	17	1301	15	2	-	8
2017	2713	808 145*	6	1736	12	2	-	4
2018	2974	768 166*	8	1998	19	4	4	7
2019	2627	628 146*	12	1827	12	-	-	2
2020	2337	669 138*	6	1508	12	1	3	-


Note. The table was created based on data from the report of the Republic Statistical Office. Data for the period from 2003 to 2006 were not processed using the same system as from 2007 onwards. *house arrest

Graph 1. Reports of the Crime of Domestic Violence from 2002 to 2020




Note. The graph was created based on data from the report of the Republic Statistical Office from 2002 to 2020.


Graph 2. Relationship between the number of reported cases of domestic violence and convicted adults from 2002 to 2011.



Graph 3. *Relationship between the number of reported cases of domestic violence and convicted adults from 2012 to 2020.*



Graph 4. *Relationship between imposed sanctions: imprisonment, fines, and conditional sentences from 2006 to 2020.*



Neadekvatnost u primeni kaznene politike prema učiniocima krivičnog dela porodičnog nasilja

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Sažetak

Rad se bavi problemom nasilja u porodici u Srbiji, sa fokusom na pravosudni tretman učinilaca ovog krivičnog dela i položaj žena kao najčešćih žrtava. Cilj rada je da ispita da li je pravosudni tretman blag i neadekvatan, te da li se time krši načelo jednakosti pred zakonom i ugrožava zaštita žrtava i dece. Rad se oslanja na kvantitativnu analizu zvaničnih statističkih podataka o nasilju u porodici u Srbiji u periodu od 18 godina (2002-2020), koji su dobijeni iz izveštaja nadležnih institucija. Autori, takođe, metodom slučajnog uzorka analiziraju presude osnovnih sudova Republike Srbije istražujući aspekte koji se tiču okolnosti koje su uzimane u obzir kao olakšavajuće. Rad pokazuje da je značajan broj prijava za nasilje u porodici odbačen ili je, pak, postupak obustavljen, a da su izrečene kazne uglavnom uslovne i niske. Autori zaključuju da je pravosudni tretman učinilaca nasilja u porodici u Srbiji neefikasan i diskriminatoran, što dovodi do nedovoljne zaštite žrtava i dece, kao i do reprodukcije nasilnih obrazaca. Rad takođe ukazuje na potrebu hitne i sveobuhvatne intervencije države i društva kako bi se sprečilo i suzbilo nasilje u porodici. Autori predlažu moguće mere koje bi mogle da poboljšaju situaciju, kao što su jačanje zakonskog okvira, podrška žrtvama i učiniocima i sprovođenje kvalitativnih istraživanja o motivima, stavovima i iskustvima učinilaca i žrtava nasilja u porodici.

Ključne reči: porodično nasilje, zakonski okvir, predviđene kazne, kaznena politika

Judicial protection of employment rights during the COVID pandemic on the territory of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina

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Abstract

Based on the collected case law of the basic courts in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (hereinafter: APV) from 2016 to 2022, the authors examine the frequency and reasons for initiating employment disputes, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, and assess the extent of the negative impact the pandemic had had on the world of work and the degree of violation of employees' rights. The authors also suggest ways to improve and supplement the existing labour law framework, which contains numerous legal gaps. Notable among these is the lack of definition and type of disputes that arise on the basis of the employment relationship. The aforementioned gaps facilitate illegal practices, especially regarding flexible forms of employment and generally frequent cases of illegal dismissal by the employer. The research has confirmed that courts of general jurisdiction are commonly overloaded with labour disputes. Therefore, establishing special basic and appellate labour courts merits further consideration. The authors conclude, with certain reservations, that the pandemic conditions did not cause an additional increase in pending cases in the labour disputes section. The disputes related to payment of the employee's monetary claim against the employer are the exception since these disputes were the most frequent and significantly increased in number during 2020 and 2021.

Keywords: judicial protection, labour disputes, pandemic, APV, employee rights.

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Introduction

The coronavirus pandemic, the introduction of a state of emergency, restrictive epidemiological measures that often included bans or restrictions on movement, association, and business, together with a major economic crisis, have fundamentally changed the way people live and work worldwide (Gajinov, 2022, p. 154), exacerbating numerous security challenges, risks and threats (Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020). These tectonic shifts have had a major impact on the world of work and influenced its partial transformation and flexibility (Rajić Čalić, 2020, pp. 88-89). The labour market in Serbia during the pandemic exhibited significant differences in the position of employees (Rajić Čalić, 2021, p. 106). Due to the nature of some jobs, some employees had to work at the employer's premises, while other groups of employees were allowed to work from home. The economic collapse caused the loss of many jobs or income due to forced vacations, while many workers saw their wages significantly reduced. During the state of emergency, some employees found themselves on the "front line of battle", working longer hours or changing shifts, with the health and safety rules at work inadequately observed.

The right to work is a fundamental human right, and all democratic constitutions guarantee this right and the freedom to work (See more: Bjelajac, 2003). The protection of this right is increasingly viewed in the broader context of human security through the prism of human rights and contemporary threats. Human security, although broadly defined as "freedom from fear and freedom from want," is still not entirely as a concept "rounded." Today, it encompasses much more than access related to protecting people from violence and crime. The security of individuals can be approached, for example, from the perspective of unemployment, the economy, food, the environment, social exclusion, or health insurance, etc. Human security is such a flexible concept that it can be adapted to different contexts and various

circumstances in the lives and work of modern humans (Bjelajac, 2017). Nonetheless, the aforementioned circumstances proved to be a major cause of employment rights violations. These challenging issues prompted the authors to collect and analyze the practice of the basic APV courts from 2016 to 2022, focusing on the pandemic period,¹ in order to gain insight into the frequency and reasons for instigating disputes due to the violation of rights from employment relationship by the employer, especially during the pandemic. The authors have also examined the broader impact of the pandemic on the state of the labour market in the APV. In comparison with the pre-pandemic period, the results obtained indicated the violation of regulations in the field of labour law, a number of legal gaps, and the vagueness of legal norms. Thus, we gain a clearer idea of the competence of the Serbian legal system to respect one of the basic human rights even in extraordinary circumstances – the right to work. This, in turn, emphasizes the need to affirm social dialogue and develop anti-discrimination regulations, as key factors in the pre-accession negotiations (Mijatović, 2019, pp. 91–93).

Analysis of the practice of basic courts in the APV

The Labour Law (hereinafter: LL) does not contain a definition of labour disputes or list the reasons for initiating them (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2005). The Law on Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes, however, contains a list of possible individual and collective labour disputes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2004, Art. 3). In this sense, individual labour disputes include disputes regarding the following: employment contract termination, working hours, the right to annual leave, payment of wages/salary, compensation of wages/salary and minimum wage mandated by law, meal and transport allowances, vacation leave and other expense reimbursements mandated by law, payment of severance

¹ The analysis of court decisions from the basic courts from the territory of Novi Sad, Subotica, Zrenjanin, and Sremska Mitrovica allows an insight into the court practice in all the APV regions (Bačka, Banat, and Srem). The protection of the rights of employees before commercial courts in bankruptcy proceedings, where they have the status of creditor, will be the subject of another research by the same authors.

pay upon retirement, jubilee award and other benefits mandated by law. Individual labour disputes also include disputes concerning discrimination and abuse at work.

Labour disputes are resolved in litigation governed by the specific rules of the Labour Law, the *lex specialis* rules for certain types of work, and the specific rules of the Law on Civil Procedure (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2011, Art. 436–441). The general rules of civil procedure, however, are applied to disputes brought by the employer.

The jurisdiction of courts to resolve labour disputes is regulated by the Law on Civil Procedure and the Law on the Organization of Courts (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2023). As a rule, courts of first instance are basic courts, except for disputes concerning protection against discrimination and abuse at work, where higher courts take jurisdiction. Higher courts also take jurisdiction in disputes concerning strikes, collective agreement if the dispute is not settled before arbitration, and mandatory social insurance contributions if the Administrative Court is not competent. Basic courts in the first instance try disputes that concern the establishment, existence, and termination of the employment relationship, the rights, obligations, and responsibilities from the employment relationship, compensation for damage suffered by the employee at work or in work-related circumstances, as well as disputes concerning housing allowances. In the second instance, the appellate court tries the appeal.

The official annual reports on the work of the courts of general jurisdiction in Serbia state that the P1 category (i.e., labour disputes) is constantly increasing, resulting in the courts of general jurisdiction becoming overloaded with new cases and the total number of pending cases. Another consequence of this situation is the increasing number of cases that remain unresolved at the end of the calendar year (Statistics on the work of courts of general jurisdiction in the Republic of Serbia 2021-2012). Therefore, establishing special courts for labour disputes is an idea that merits further consideration (Reljanović & Misailović, 2021, pp. 135–136).

The investigation into the work of the basic courts in the seats that are the centers of the South Bačka, North Bačka, Middle Banat, and Srem districts has confirmed the presence of the issues mentioned

above. The number of pending cases in the Novi Sad Basic Court at the end of 2021 was 2,392, while only a year earlier it was 1,495, approximately the same amount as in previous years. At the end of 2021, there were a total of 593 pending cases in the Basic Court in Sremska Mitrovica and 285 in 2020. In the Basic Court in Subotica, the number of pending cases from 2018 to 2021 increased dramatically, amounting to 1,000, whereas in 2016 and 2017 it was considerably smaller (148 and 187).

According to the data obtained from the Basic Court in Novi Sad, despite the increased number of cases, labour disputes were typically resolved in a period ranging from eight to twelve months. The 2021 data is especially interesting, as the average duration of disputes was only 227 days, which is the best result in the past six years. However, in the Basic Court in Sremska Mitrovica, the duration of labour disputes ranged from 211 to 538 days (2021 data). In the Basic Court in Subotica, disputes were typically resolved in five to twelve months, with the longest dispute lasting 359 days in 2021.

Disputes concerning the establishment, existence, and termination of the employment relationship

Examining the employment disputes tried by certain basic courts in the APV in the past six years, we will first focus on cases concerning the violation of the rights of employees in terms of establishment, existence, and termination of employment. Although the LL does not contain a specific provision that would provide for protection regarding the establishment of an employment relationship, the Constitution is a guarantee against the violation or denial of the right of every individual to any job available under equal conditions (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2006). Therefore, an individual can initiate legal action upon starting work without concluding an employment contract or concerning violations of their rights during the recruitment and selection process (Reljanović & Misailović, 2021, p. 73).

The research shows a relatively low number of disputes related to the establishment of an employment relationship. From 2016 to 2021, only five cases were tried in all four courts. This indicates that

the incidence of undeclared work, i.e. work without a contract, is in decline. Employers have often resorted to this in order to reduce expenses; however, employees are denied the right to work, while the basic principles of social justice and solidarity, and trust in the legal system are violated (Kovačević, 2019, p 268). For the most part, undeclared work has been effectively reduced with the help of legislation such as the equalization of actual work with an employment relationship², the employer's obligation to keep the employment contract or other contracts, which facilitates the inspection supervision (Lipovčić, 2019, p. 109).

LL does not contain provisions on judicial protection of participants in the recruitment process, except for the right to protection against discrimination and priority when re-employing redundant workers. These legal gaps may be the likely reason for a low number of disputes regarding the establishment of an employment relationship in the APV, since the candidates in the recruitment process are often unaware of the possibility of protection based on the Constitution, even if they do not meet the conditions for the establishment of an employment relationship (Kovačević, 2020, pp. 264–265). In addition, LL does not recognize the two-stage decision-making process for the selection of prospective employees, except in cases of special selection processes, such as the one for civil servants. Therefore, some authors (Kovačević, 2020, p. 279; Jovanović, 2015, p. 198) propose *de lege ferenda* that the two-tier system should be reintroduced to the parent law. This amendment would guarantee the uniformity of protection for all participants in the recruitment and selection process (Kovačević, 2020, p. 279).

The next point of interest was the lawsuits concerning the exercise of employment rights and the return of an employee to work. In the Basic Court in Sremska Mitrovica from 2016 to 2021, ten such disputes were tried; in 2020, during the pandemic, there were two, while in 2021 there were none. The records of the Basic Court in Zrenjanin show that nineteen cases were tried; ten of these were tried in the last two research years. Only four lawsuits of this type were tried before the Basic Court in Subotica, while during and after the pandemic, there was

² This requires the willingness of both employer and employee.

not a single dispute regarding the exercise of employment rights. However, the Basic Court in Novi Sad tried as many as 129 of these disputes, especially during the pandemic, when their number rose significantly. The completed surveys show that the most common reason for initiating a lawsuit was work after the expiration of a fixed-term contract, work based on contracts for temporary and occasional jobs, and undeclared work.

The law stipulates that the employer may conclude one or more contracts on the basis of which the employment relationship with the same employee is established for a period of time that, with or without interruption, cannot exceed 24 months (National Assembly, 2005, Art. 37, Par. 2). However, due to the provision stating that "an interruption lasting less than 30 days is not considered an interruption", the employer is allowed to terminate the contract for 30 days after the two years have expired, and then renew it again, even several times. The employers often also use contracts on a temporary basis or contracts paid at the completion of a project. Unfortunately, courts in general fail to recognize this type of employers' behavior as a violation of the law, but as the absence of an intention to establish an employment relationship (Jašarević & Obradović, p. 2021).

Although temporary work is rare on the whole, the share of workers thus employed in APV is 20%, which is significantly higher than the average in EU countries. Precarity, as a form of disciplining workers, negatively affects the labour market in many ways (Bradaš, 2019, p. 44). During the pandemic, temporary employees, as well as those hired through agencies, were an extremely vulnerable category that mostly suffered in the second wave of layoffs. Future activities must therefore focus on the measures to prevent the abuses of legal provisions related to fixed-term employment, with the introduction of possible restrictions and prohibitions. In addition, any additional flexibilization of work must not negate the fact that a fixed-term contract is an exception, under justified short-term circumstances, without any possible legal extension of the period on which it can be based.

There are also frequent abuses of the provisions that regulate work on temporary and occasional jobs. This type of work may not last longer than 120 days a year, since it is mostly seasonal work. The law

also mandates this type of work if there is an increase in the volume of work or there is a lack of workers. It is not entirely clear whether the limit of 120 working days refers to the duration of one or all individual contracts, i.e., whether the employer can, after one contract expires, conclude the next one with the same person for a new period of 120 days, but for another temporary job. Since this type of engagement is far more convenient for employers, a person may spend several years performing tasks in this way. If there is a need for certain jobs to be performed for longer than 120 working days, they must be stipulated by the act on systematization, based on the employment relationship with a certain person. Otherwise, this is treated as the case of the so-called simulated contracts (Judgments of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Rev 2 601/2015 and Rev 2 2738/2019).

Protection against unlawful dismissal constitutes the essence of employment security; employers, however, see it as an obstacle to quickly responding to market changes and technological challenges (Misailović, 2019, 187). Unsurprisingly, based on the available data, in the previous six-year period most disputes concerned the termination of the employment relationship: the Basic Court in Novi Sad tried 92, Sremska Mitrovica 45, Zrenjanin as many as 174, and Subotica 59. The reasons were the annulment of the unlawful decision on dismissal due to the cessation of the need to perform the employee's duties due to economic and organizational changes or the employee's health problems. There was a significant increase in the number of lawsuits conducted due to unlawful dismissal in the Basic Court in Novi Sad during 2021, when their number doubled compared to 2016 and 2017, due to extraordinary circumstances on the labour market. In the basic courts in Sremska Mitrovica and Subotica, there was no significant increase in the number of these lawsuits. In Zrenjanin, however, the number of these disputes dropped during the pandemic. The main reasons for the judgment of unlawful dismissal were the lack of objectively justified and well-structured reasons as part of the dismissal decision, and inadequate application of affirmative and eliminatory criteria to solve the issue of technological, economic, or organizational redundancies.

The 2014 amendments to the Labour Law aimed to reduce the number of lawsuits. These amendments stipulate a single litigation

process against the employer's decision to terminate the employment contract with three components: cancellation of the decision, return to work, and compensation for damages. However, this can cause certain procedural problems; the expert examination for damages claim, for instance, is a particularly complex one (Simović, 2017, p. 78).

Disputes concerning rights, obligations, and responsibilities arising from the employment relationship

Due to their nature and complexity, it is impossible to make a comprehensive list of labour-based rights violations. In the course of the research, the authors tried to record and process only the most common violations that were the subject of disputes in the basic courts in Novi Sad, Subotica, Zrenjanin, and Sremska Mitrovica.

The P1 category disputes in the basic courts are for the most part instigated for the payment of a certain claim of the employee against the employer. These most commonly include unpaid wages, increased wages for overtime work, work on public holidays, severance pay, jubilee awards, and meal, holiday, and transport allowances. Next are disputes concerning the determination of certain rights from the employment relationship (determination of the transformation of a fixed-term employment relationship into an indefinite-term employment relationship, compensation for damages due to unused vacation leave, unpaid contributions and benefits, etc.). Lastly, there are disputes concerning termination of employment and return to work.

In the absence of a legal distinction between special types of labour disputes regarding rights, obligations, and responsibilities from labour relations, the data are presented using the system provided by the Court Rules (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2009) and in accordance with the records kept in court registers.

Disputes concerning specific rights arising from the employment relationship

The research results show that the disputes concerning specific rights arising from the employment relationship are relatively infrequent in the total number of labour disputes. Almost all courts have recorded

a single-digit number of these cases yearly, with the exception of the Basic Court in Novi Sad, where their number ranged from 296 (2016) to 119 (2021).

The most common claims filed by employees concerned the right to payment of contributions, the right to a jubilee award, the right to compensation for damages due to non-use of annual leave, as well as the request to determine the nullity of the concluded employment contract. These claims also include restoring the title, erasing disciplinary punishment from personnel records and recognition of beneficial service (Basic Court of Sremska Mitrovica), determining the transformation of a fixed-term employment relationship into a permanent employment relationship (Basic Court of Subotica), and the right to payment of joint aid (Basic Court Zrenjanin).

Due to the unclear normative distinction of labour disputes, there are dilemmas concerning their classification, which are evident in the court registries and judges' internal records, and in the surveys that they completed. Therefore, the data obtained for this group of cases should be taken with a grain of salt.

Disputes concerning return to work

At the employee's request, the court may determine that his or her employment has been unlawfully terminated. In this case, the court will bring the judgment of reinstatement, payment of damages, and payment of the corresponding contributions for mandatory social insurance for the period in which the employee was out of work (National Assembly, 2005, Art. 191, Par. 1). If the employee does not insist on returning to work, the court will order the employer to compensate the employee for damages in the amount of a maximum of 18 wages, depending on the time spent in the employment relationship with the employer, age, and the number of dependent family members (National Parliament, 2005, Art. 191, Par. 5).

The disputes concerning return to work make up roughly 1-2% of total P1 category cases. During the period of intensive anti-Covid measures, no significant increase was recorded. The number of these disputes in the Basic Court in Novi Sad ranged from 14 (2018) to 28

(2020). In the other basic courts, the figures are similar: in Subotica, there were 4 (in 2020 and in 2021) and as many as 21 in 2016, and in Zrenjanin, 4 in 2021 and 20 in 2019. In Sremska Mitrovica, there were almost no disputes of this type during the research period – only 1 dispute in 2017, 2020, and 2021 respectively.

Disputes concerning payments

Disputes concerning the payment of a certain amount of money for work make up the largest part of the P1 category in basic courts and include more than 90% of total labour law cases. Most often, these include lawsuits for unpaid wages, increased wages, compensation for wages, meal, transport, and holiday allowances, compensation for overtime work, night work, work on a public holiday, jubilee bonus, and severance pay. During the research period, a constant increase in these lawsuits was recorded. Thus, in the Basic Court in Novi Sad in 2021, the number of such disputes amounted to 2,323, while only a year earlier it was 1,086, which was the average in the previous period. In 2021, the Basic Court in Sremska Mitrovica also recorded the highest number of disputes for the payment of monetary claims from the employment relationship for the past six years, as many as 338 (previously, the number was usually around 100). Data from the Basic Court in Subotica also indicate an increase in the number of these disputes, from 135 in 2016 to 922 in 2021. The Basic Court in Zrenjanin records show that there were as many as 1,032 disputes in 2020 and 1,006 in 2021, whereas in 2016 there were only 182.

Other disputes

Other disputes not mentioned in the previous discussion include disputes regarding compensation for damages due to an injury at work, which is paid according to the general rules of the Law of Contract and Torts. The practice has shown that in court proceedings, the employer may raise the objection that the injury at work was caused by the employee's own fault. In such cases, the court may rule that the work injury is a shared or even sole responsibility of the employee. Based on this ruling, an interim judgment on the grounds can first be delivered,

and then the percentage of responsibility and the amount of damage can be determined (Šarkić, Vavan, 2020, p. 73).

Conclusion

Since the parent law that regulates rights, obligations, and responsibilities in the field of work does not regulate the concept or types of disputes that arise based on the employment relationship, the authors presented their research and results as classified and recorded by the courts. Therefore, the data collected should be taken with a grain of salt. Due to the aforementioned legal gaps, the authors advocate for revising and improving the legislation that regulates disputes regarding the protection of rights from the employment relationship. The legislation should include more specific and precise definitions and regulations of numerous important issues in this area.

The frequency and characteristics of labour disputes regarding the establishment, existence, and termination of an employment relationship before the basic courts in the APV indicate that some LL provisions are challenging to apply. On the other hand, they imply that the subsequent amendments and additions to the LL brought certain improvements. The proof of this is the low number of lawsuits initiated due to the absence of an employment contract. However, the authors have suggested making further amendments to the current text, such as adding the provision on judicial protection of participants in the recruitment and selection process and on the general two-stage decision-making process for candidate selection.

The P1 category disputes concerning rights, obligations, and responsibilities arising from the employment relationship are the most frequent and are usually initiated for the payment of a specific monetary claim. Next are the lawsuits regarding the determination of individual rights from the employment relationship, the return of employees to work, and compensation for damages due to an injury at work. Frequent lawsuits concerning flexible forms of work and unlawful dismissal are proof that current legislation is still slow to respond to changes in the world of work, caused by globalization, economic crisis, and digitalization, especially after the pandemic. In conclusion, it can be said

that the number of unresolved disputes is constantly increasing; however, this trend has been present for some time now and has not been much affected by the pandemic. The labour disputes regarding the payment of an employee's monetary claim against the employer are undoubtedly predominant, evidenced by the fact that only these disputes significantly rose in number even during the pandemic, i.e., in 2020 and 2021.

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Sudska zaštita prava iz radnog odnosa tokom Kovid pandemije na teritoriji Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine

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Sažetak

Na osnovu prikupljene sudske prakse osnovnih sudova u APV u periodu od 2016. do 2022. godine autori sagledavaju učestalost i analiziraju razloge pokretanja sporova iz radnog odnosa, posebno tokom pandemije, ocenjujući u kolikoj se meri ona negativno odrazila na svet rada i stepen kršenja prava zaposlenih. Ujedno su dati predlozi za unapređenje i dopunu postojećeg radnopravnog okvira u kojem postaje brojne pravne praznine, među kojima je dominantno odsustvo određenja pojma i vrste sporova koji nastaju po osnovu radnog odnosa, ali i značajan prostor za zloupotrebe, naročito kada su u pitanju fleksibilne forme zapošljavanja i generalno česte slučajevne nezakonitog otkaza od strane poslodavca. Istraživanje potvrđuje konstantnu opterećenost sudova opšte nadležnosti sporovima iz radnog odnosa, uz potrebu daljeg razmatranju ideje o formiraju posebnih osnovnih i apelacionih radnih sudova. Ipak, opšti zaključak autora, uz određene rezerve, je da pandemijski uslovi nisu prouzrokovali dodatan porast nerešenih predmeta u referadi radnih sporova, osim povodom isplate novčanog potraživanja zaposlenog prema poslodavcu koji predstavljaju najučestalije, dominantne i jedine sporove koji beleže značajnije uvećanje tokom 2020. i 2021. godine.

Ključne reči: sudska zaštita, radni sporovi, pandemija, APV, prava zaposlenih.

Analysis of the Impact and Actuality of Challenges, Risks and Threats to the Security of the Republic of Serbia

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Abstract

Challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia are defined by the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia. However, the concept of security at the global level can be considered before and after beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Consequently, the question arises of the need to analyze the relevance of the existing interpretation of challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia. The goal of the work was stated, and for this purpose the research was conducted using: survey methods (survey technique) and statistical methods, with the fact that in the research process it was inevitable to implement the methods of expert evaluations, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction. Respondents (experts) in the research were retired and active members of the military and civilian security services, members of the Committee for Defence and Security and the Committee for Control of Security Services of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Serbia and members of the academic community whose sphere of interest is security science. The research, at the level of scientific description, resulted in the following outcome, an expert analysis of the list of dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia from the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia was performed, and on the basis of which observed deficiencies can be eliminated. The analysis consisted of: checking the list of dangers according to changes in the strategic environment, determining their impact and selection by groups.

Key words: security, danger, challenge, risk, threat.

Analysis of the Impact and Actuality of Challenges, Risks and Threats to the Security of the Republic of Serbia

Introduction

Today, security is a key function in the development of any society (Seniutiene, 2020, p. 352). Globalization has complicated numerous security challenges, risks, and threats (See more: Bjelajac, 2017), and, among other things, has led to the increase and diversity of organized crime that undermines contemporary society. It is becoming increasingly difficult to combat this crime due to its mobility, inventiveness, and "invisibility" (See more: Bjelajac, 2015; Bjelajac, 2011). The modern world is characterized by unpredictability, interdependence, as well as extremely complex dangers to the security of the state, i.e. its constituents. In order to predict, prevent and limit occurrences of this kind, and control their impacts, special attention is needed from the competent institutions of the state, that is, permanent monitoring of the strategic environment and security trends. The basis for strategic analysis of the environment and security trends is the existence of a security conceptual-categorical apparatus (the paper presents one type of apparatus used in the Security Sciences).

In the modern age security from the organizational aspect can be analytically interpreted through separate coherent units: cognitive (theories), vertical (sectors: military, political, social, economic and ecological) and horizontal (levels: individual, national, regional and global) (Ejdus, 2012, p. 33). The basic concepts of security grammar are: danger (what threatens), reference object of security (what is threatened) and security means and measures (the way to protect) (Ejdus, 2012, p. 36). Depending on the probability of occurrence and the severity of the consequences, dangers are divided into challenges, risks and threats.

Challenge represents the least harmful form of danger in terms of content and consequences, and in terms of time it is the most distant danger from the safety reference object (Sheehan, 2022, p. 203). It is about the apparent phase of the danger which may or may not be

realized and which consists in the possible intention of its bearer (Pamučar et al., 2016, p. 24).

Risk is defined as a set of different processes, factors and relationships that independently or in interaction may or may not lead to the consequences of endangering the safety reference object. A risk contains a higher degree of danger compared to a challenge, a higher probability of causing some damage, it is untimely detection very quickly turns into a clear threat. (Herring, 2022, p. 48).

Threat is a conscious intention to cause harm to the security reference object in order to force it to comply with the imposed behavior. Security threat is a synonym for a form of security threat. It is concrete phenomenon whose occurrence is the least uncertain, while the harmful effects are the greatest and indisputable (Ejdus, 2012, p. 37).

Challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia are defined by the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy) (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, 2020). The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which actually represents a "proxy" conflict between the NATO alliance and the Russian Federation, i.e. the People's Republic of China, has led to changes in the concept of security at the global level (NATO-Official text, 2023). Consequently, there is a need to analyze the positions in the Strategy that relate to dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. to check the list of challenges, risks and threats according to changes in the strategic environment of the Republic of Serbia, determine their impact and selection by groups.

Consequently, for the purposes of the work, a research¹ was carried out whose goal, at the level of scientific description, is to answer the research question: "Is there a need to redefine the challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia?". The research question is also the subject of research in the paper.

¹ The research was conducted in order to prepare a doctoral dissertation entitled "Specificity of the intelligence-security function of the political system of the Republic of Serbia" at the University of Defense in Belgrade, candidate Antonio Mak.

Research Method

The research method used in the work is a combination of several methods, of which the examination method and the statistical method are the basic methods, with the fact that in the research process it was inevitable to implement the method of expert evaluations, methods of analysis and synthesis, and induction and deduction. The goal of applying the research method and the statistical method is to determine the dominant attitudes from the subject of the research work, as well as to summarize the existing information on the subject of the research, while at the same time avoiding implementation the analysis of dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia according to the free discretion and expectations of the researcher (Rietjens, 2006, pp. 8–9). The research approach that was applied in the paper includes three phases: (1) planning the research, (2) conducting the research and (3) reporting the results (Pamučar, 2020, p. 1).

Measurements and Research Procedures

In order to realize the analysis of dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia, a research protocol has been defined, with the following elements: research objective; research question that will be answered by analyzing the security risks of the Republic of Serbia; formation of a potential expert group; creation of a survey; filling in questionnaires by experts; analysis and processing of data obtained from experts; in the case of impossibility of forming a general group opinion of experts, the survey procedure is repeated in the necessary number of iterations, but only for issues for which there is no general opinion; in the event that after receiving the general group opinion there is a drastic deviation from it, an interview is also conducted with the experts (preparation of the basis for the discussion, conducting the interview and analysis of the data obtained through the interview and their implementation in the previously processed data); formation of an expert group (calculation of experts' competence scores); extraction of data and synthesis of extracted data (analysis of agreement of expert ratings – in case there is no agreement of expert's ratings, the opinions of individual experts that deviate are rejected, and then the

procedure of calculating the average rating of the expert group competence is repeated) (Kovačević, 2021, pp. 123–124). Here, it is important to point out that the dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia (defined by the Strategy) were examined as independent variables from the point of view of the factors that determine the strategic environment of the Republic of Serbia and security trends. As dependent variables were examined: the probability of occurrence and the severity of the consequences of the danger, i.e. their impact on the security of the Republic of Serbia.

The aim of the research is to analyze the strategic environment of the Republic of Serbia from the point of view of security dangers at the level of scientific description, in order to determine whether there is a need to redefine the challenges, risks and threats determined by the Strategy.

Before forming a potential expert group, it is necessary to determine the number of experts, that is, the sample size of the population being examined. In order to determine the size of the sample, the size of the population to be examined through the lens of the sample should first be defined. Taking into account the fact that a part of the population consists of retired and active members of the military and civilian security services, diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Serbia, the publication of this data would represent the leakage of secret data, accordingly the size of the population cannot be determined. In order to determine the size of a representative sample for a population of unknown size with a reliability coefficient of 0.95, the method explained by Svetozar Vukadinović is applied (Vukadinović, 1990, pp. 239–242). By applying the mentioned method, the minimum size of the expert group is determined, which is 16 people.

Viewed from the aspect of knowledge of the strategic environment of the Republic of Serbia, persons who possess the characteristics that determine them as "general education experts" were consulted. The potential expert group was formed using the mutual recommendation method, that is, the "snow avalanche" method (Milićević, 2014, p. 84). The potential expert group consisted of 34 experts.

Results

Survey questionnaire consisted of two parts, the first one related to questions regarding the assessment of expert's competence and the second one that contained questions related to the subject of the research. Due to the volume of the work, the survey questionnaire will not be shown here. The survey procedure itself was carried out by submitting the questionnaire in written form (directly to the experts) and in electronic form (via electronic addresses). The time for filling out the questionnaire was given for one working day, professional help during the survey was provided by the researchers.

The analysis and processing of the data obtained from the experts consisted of two parts: (1) formation of the expert group and determination of the expert's competence rating and (2) analysis of the expert ratings results. Formation of the group and the assessment of the expert's competence was carried out using the combined method of Dobrova and the Polish method (Alfares & Duffuaa, 2008, p. 127). An expert group of 18 persons was determined, which satisfied the condition regarding the reliability coefficient, and the competence rating of the group is 0.719. An acceptable coefficient of competence of a group of experts is a coefficient whose value is greater than 0.5 (Pamučar et al., 2012, p. 150).

During the first iteration of the survey, there was a general group opinion of the experts (this was confirmed based on the analysis of expert ratings), that is, there is a correlation in the answers of the experts. Consequently, other research steps defined by the research protocol were not applied.

Discussion

Processing of the collected data was carried out using the techniques of the statistical method: positional values and the chi-square test. Correlation of expert's ratings for all questions from the questionnaire (except risk analysis) were processed using the chi-square test, and the value was 30.02 for a total of 17 degrees of freedom, the table value for the specified degree of freedom $P=0.050$ is 35.70 (Petz, 1997, p. 369). Consequently, there is no statistically

significant deviation of the theoretical from the actual frequencies of expert's ratings. Expert's ratings from the part of the survey questionnaire related to the analysis of dangers were processed using the positional value – mode. The processing results showed the correlative nature of the experts' answers. Here, it is important to point out that the experts were given the opportunity to supplement the proposed threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia through the questions asked, all for the purpose of increasing the quality and coverage of the issues with their opinions.

Experts agree that the Strategy is a basic document, that is, the positions in the Strategy are the starting point for the development of other strategic-doctrinal and legislative documents that regulate the field of national security of the Republic of Serbia (Figure 1). The experts are unanimous in their opinion that the positions in the Strategy should be periodically redefined (a period of 5 to 8 years) and/or in the case of events that fundamentally change the concept of security at the global level, all for the sake of a timely review of changes in the strategic environment of the Republic of Serbia (Figure 2). The above unequivocally shows that the strategic environment of the Republic of Serbia has changed because of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and that a new strategic analysis of the environment is necessary in order to be able to define dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia. Consequently, there is a correlation between security trends, strategic analysis and security dangers determination.

Experts agree that it is necessary to introduce a conceptual-categorical apparatus into the Strategy, where the terms: safety, danger, challenge, risk and threat would be clearly separated (Figure 3). Also, it is necessary to revise the positions in the Strategy from the point of view of clearly defining which danger according to the probability of occurrence and the severity of its consequences for the security of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. its impact (effect, intensity) belongs to a certain group (challenge, risk or threat). In accordance with the above, the experts agree that the impact of a certain danger on the security of the Republic of Serbia should be determined first. The general opinion of the experts on these issues is given in Table 1. Based on their competence, the experts evaluated each danger on a

scale from 1 to 5 (1 being the lowest, 5 the highest offered value) viewed from the point of view of the impact (probability of occurrence and severity of consequences) of the specific dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia. It is important to emphasize here that the experts had the opportunity to add a danger that was possibly omitted and to evaluate it.

After that, the expert's ratings were processed using the mean positional value-mode, specifically the number in the field of a certain rating represents the number of experts who expressed their opinion with that rating regarding the impact of a certain danger on the security of the Republic of Serbia. The values in the "Size of impact" column were obtained by multiplying the number with the value of the scale division, adding them and dividing by the number 18. The values for the "Group" column were determined according to the levels of the influence value: challenge ending with 1.67; risk from 1.68 up to and including 3.33; and threat from 3.33 to 5.00. It can be seen from Table 1 that the experts agree with the existing list of dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia from the Strategy.

Consequently, it is clear that there is a need to revise the positions in the Strategy regarding the strategic environment and challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia. Also, all of the above implies the necessity of harmonizing other strategic-doctrinal and legislative documents that regulate the field of national security of the Republic of Serbia.

Conclusion

Through the determination of dangers and their impact on the security of the Republic of Serbia, the factors that determine the strategic environment and security trends were examined, with the aim of analyzing the positions in the Strategy as a basic document that governs the field of national security of the Republic of Serbia (the starting points for the preparation of the Strategy are the determination of dangers, strategic analysis and security trends). The conducted research, i.e. examination of independent and dependent variables, proved the correlation between security trends, strategic analysis and determination of danger (their impact) on the security of

the Republic of Serbia, i.e. the need to redefine positions and concepts in the Strategy.

The sample that was examined represents a wide spectrum population from the point of view of dealing with the security of the Republic of Serbia. With the aforementioned, an effort was made to avoid bias, as well as to achieve the quality of the research results.

The research results confirm that there is a need to redefine the Strategy in the first and second chapters, which refer to the strategic environment and challenges, risks and security threats. The results of the research show that there is a general opinion of experts that it is necessary to redefine positions in the Strategy cyclically, following security trends, in principle every 5-8 years (the current Strategy was adopted after 12 years), or when an event that has an enormous impact on national security. Accordingly, a change is needed in the first chapter of the Strategy.

The results of the statistical test showed that the experts agree with the existing list of dangers to the security of the Republic of Serbia from the Strategy, but they also believe that in the second part of the Strategy it is necessary to implement a conceptual-categorical apparatus to avoid the misinterpretation of certain concepts and in order to create a basis for defining challenges, risks and threats. The impact of certain danger needs to be determined in order to determine whether they are a challenge, risk or threat. Under the influence, the probability of occurrence and the severity of the consequences of a certain danger are evaluated.

As a result of the above, an answer to the research question was reached, i.e. there is a need to redefine challenges, risks and threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia, and the paper presents one of the potential solutions to this problem.

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Appendix

Figure 1

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia as a Basic Document




Figure 2

The Need to Redefine the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia




Figure 3

Term-Categorical Apparatus in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia




Table 1

Analysis of Dangers to the Security of the Republic of Serbia

Name of danger to the security of the Republic of Serbia	Evaluation					Size of impact	Group
	5	4	3	2	1		
Armed aggression	2	4	5	3	4	2,83	Risk
Separatist aspirations	7	8	1	2	-	4,11	Threat
Illegally unilaterally declared independence of the territory administratively included in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija	7	7	3	1	-	4,11	Threat
Armed rebellion	-	-	8	7	3	2,28	Risk
Terrorism	4	4	3	4	3	3,11	Risk
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	3	2	8	3	2	3,05	Risk
Ethnic and religious extremism	8	7	3	-	-	4,28	Threat
Intelligence activities	9	7	2	-	-	4,39	Threat
Organised crime	5	4	4	4	1	3,44	Threat

Name of danger to the security of the Republic of Sebria	Evaluation					Size of impact	Group
	5	4	3	2	1		
Drug addiction	-	1	8	6	3	2,39	Risk
Mass illegal migrations	6	8	3	1	-	4,05	Threat
Problems of economic development	8	8	1	1	-	4,28	Threat
Problems of demographic development	1	3	4	7	3	2,44	Risk
Epidemics and pandemics of infectious diseases	2	2	8	5	1	2,94	Risk
Energy security	4	6	7	1	-	3,72	Threat
The unfinished process of demarcation of the countries of the former SFRY	-	-	3	6	9	1,67	Challenge
Natural disasters and technical and technological accidents	-	3	6	5	4	2,44	Risk
Climate change	-	-	7	9	2	2,28	Risk
The rise of high-tech crime and threats to information and communication systems	8	9	1	-	-	4,39	Threat

Analiza uticaja i aktuelnosti izazova, rizika i pretnji na bezbednost Republike Srbije

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Sažetak

Izazovi, rizici i pretnje bezbednosti Republike Srbije definisani su Strategijom nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije. Međutim, koncept bezbednosti na globalnom nivou može se razmatrati pre i posle početka rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba. Sledstveno tome postavlja se pitanje analize postojećeg tumačenja izazova, rizika i pretnji po bezbednost Republike Srbije. Navedeno je cilj rada, i u tu svrhu je sprovedeno istraživanje primenom: metode ispitivanja (tehnika anketiranja) i statističke metoda, s tim da je u proces istraživanja bilo neminovo implementirati metode ekspertske ocene, analize i sinteze, indukcije i dedukcije. Respondenti (eksperti) u istraživanju su bili penzionisani i aktivni pripadnici vojnih i civilnih službi bezbednosti, članovi Odbora za odbranu i bezbednost i Odbora za kontrolu službi bezbednosti Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije, diplomatski predstavnici Republike Srbije i pripadnici akademske zajednice čija je sfera interesovanja nauke bezbednosti. Istraživanjem se na nivou naučne deskripcije došlo do sledećeg rezultata, izvršena je ekspertska analiza liste opasnosti iz Strategije nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, a na osnovu koje se mogu otkloniti uočeni nedostaci. Analiza se sastojala iz: provere liste opasnosti shodno promenama u strategijskom okruženju, određenja njihovog uticaja i selekcije po grupama.

Ključne reči: bezbednost, opasnost, izazov, rizik, pretnja.

Theoretical explanations of violence in marriage and partner relationships and international legislative incorporation

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Abstract

The family has always been the basic cell of social life. The aim of this research is to point out some very important theoretical issues and how and to what extent they have been implemented in positive European legislation. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the work is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with theoretical issues, starting with the consideration of the theory of sociological orientation, and at the end of this part, looking at aspects of feminist explanations. In the second part of the paper, the most important international documents on protection from violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships were considered through the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union.

Keywords: domestic violence, violence in marriage, violence in partner relationships, criminal law, international regulations

Theoretical explanations of violence in marriage and partner relationships and international legislative incorporation

Introductory review

In the conditions of increasingly pronounced alienation of people from each other and dehumanization in the era of globalization (See more: Bjelajac, 2014), various forms of sociopathic behavior come to the forefront. Widespread violence is increasingly manifesting itself in family and partner relationships, both in the real world and in the digital/virtual world. This violence generates deep and long-lasting psychophysical traumas in the victims and their children, and the number of victims increases dramatically from year to year. In most cases, women are the victims who are threatened psychologically, physically, sexually, or economically. Male violence against women often occurs, and the perpetrators lack an understanding of security culture. Victims of domestic and partner violence often remain silent and lose the opportunity to seek help and escape the violence, precisely because of the lack or absence of security culture, which also includes the "art of living" (See more: Bjelajac & Zirojević, 2014). Domestic violence, regardless of how it manifests itself (whether as violence in partner relationships, marital or extramarital violence, violence against children, violence against parents, etc.), is a phenomenon that in recent years has attracted increasingly significant doctrinal and media attention (Krstinić, Počuča & Sančanin, 2023). Violence in the family, marriage and partner relationships occasionally becomes extremely dominant in all types of professional and public discussion due to media exposure, but even when there is no such media attention, it does not subside. We emphasize that it is extremely dominant with complex causes but also with no less complex solutions. Bearing in mind the high level of the dark figure that varies in less urban and urban areas, this problem is not easily solved and requires constant theoretical and certainly practical consideration.

In support of the aforementioned, the Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence as its goal (Article 2) foresees that it regulates the organization and actions of state bodies and institutions in a general and uniform manner and thereby enables effective prevention of domestic

violence and immediate, timely and effective protection and support for victims. domestic violence.

Violence in marriage and partner relationships is a very complex phenomenon spread on several fronts. We observe it individually, as a partner, socially. The development of theoretical explanations about violence in marriage and partner relationships ranged from the search for causes in biological and neurological properties, in individual characteristics and in individual behavior, through the analysis of numerous factors of culture and the general social system, to feminist explanations.

Theories of sociological orientation

General systems theory views marital violence as a systematic, continuous element of social interaction, rather than as a product of individual pathology. Strauss, for example, relying on the results of his own research, believes that the causes of violence against women in marriage should be sought in the very structure of society and its family system. In doing so, he singles out several main factors that operate within that system. These are: the family, as a social group with a high level of conflict; high level of violence in society; family socialization, i.e. raising children with the help of violence; cultural norms; and, sexist organization of society. Children learn in early childhood that violence is connected with love and that if something is particularly important, then it justifies the use of violence. Also, the use of violence creates a moral right for them to use violence themselves. However, Strauss does not believe that these indirect lessons form a model for later behavior towards one's own children, but that they become a basic part of the personality and his worldview, which is generalized to other social relationships, especially to the relationship between husband and wife. In addition, cultural norms justify and allow the use of violence by husbands, and the sexist organization of society and its family system are one of the most important factors that influence the high level of violence against women in marriage. (Tošić, 2016, p.18)

If one person possesses numerous social, economic or personal resources, he is all the more in a position to control and issue orders,

and to use force against others. Thus, a man who performs a job for which he is paid little and is socially valued, may choose violence in order to achieve, or maintain, his dominance in the family. Women who are economically dependent on their husbands are more likely to leave, even when they suffer violence.

Bullies believe that the violence they perpetrate is justified, normal, deserved and allowed.

Feminist explanations

Feminist explanations of marital violence arose as a critique of existing theories based on feminist practice, emphasizing patriarchy as a concept that creates and maintains inequality between men and women. (Vasiljević, 2005, p.110) Therefore, the categories of sex/gender, power, influence, which are crucial for understanding partner violence (especially theories of resources, incompatible statuses and conflict) have been modified. Adopting the concept of social inequality, conflict and power and violence, as the last resource to ensure the subordination of women, feminists emphasize that it is not a conflict between equals, but a struggle for the power of unequal in advance, because the positions of women and men are socially, institutionally, ideologically and individually set asymmetrical, that is, the status of women depends on the status of men and reflects a multiple relationship of subordination. (Yello, 1996, p.51) The issue of power and control is integrated in the famous "Duluth model", according to which in the famous "point of power and control", power and control are located at the very center, and around are the techniques used to preserve power and control: coercion, intimidation, isolation, humiliation, economic violence, sexual abuse, male privilege. Feminists see a key role in understanding all forms of violence against women (they do not use the terms "violence in the family", "violence in marriage", because they divert the focus from the concept of male coercion/violence against women), in the social construction of gender, in which dominance (power) of men in the family is part of a wider system of power, which is in line with the "Duluth model". It follows from the above that the abuser takes control over the victim. The concept of control through coercion is complemented by the theory "on the cyclical nature of

violence", according to which the violent relationship between a husband and his married or extramarital partner goes through three phases: the tension phase - where minor incidents of violence occur; both partners do not take those events seriously, and the female victim denies the violence and does everything to avoid it, and often looks for the culprit of the violence within herself; in the second phase - the phase of acute violence, abuse of a physical or sexual nature occurs. The third stage - the stage of reconciliation and love, comes immediately after the abuse, the abuser expresses remorse for the violence he committed, they believe they love their victims, and the victim has a guilty conscience, a sense of guilt and fear for the future of the abuser, if she ends the relationship with him . (Walker, 1979, p.55-68)

However, the lack of this approach to looking at violence in partner relationships is primarily reflected in the fact that feminist-oriented authors do not analyze other forms of domestic violence, they do not even use that term, but concentrate exclusively on women as victims of violence. They completely ignore the individual characteristics of the actors of violence, as well as violence committed by women. (Yello, 1996, p. 83-88)

Nevertheless, the fact that feminist explanations of violence in partner relationships had a strong impact on the perception of violence against women, both on the international and national level, and on the social apparatus to take the necessary preventive measures to protect women from violence, cannot be disputed.

International documents on protection against violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships

In the continuation of the research, international documents on protection against violence in the family, in marriage and in partnerships adopted by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union will be pointed out. The implementation of the documents that will be discussed below represent the sublimate of the current legislative struggle, i.e. protection against domestic violence, and a significant part of them were conceived on certain theoretical frameworks that we discussed in the first part of the paper.

United Nations

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 guaranteed freedom and equality in dignity and rights to all people, both men and women (Articles 1 and 2), and stipulated, among other things, that everyone has the right to life, freedom and security (Art. 3). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (General Assembly UN. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights) in art. 2 prohibits discrimination, and requires States to ensure the equal right of men and women to enjoy the rights provided for in the Covenant. In art. 17 regulates the right to private and family life. This provision is particularly significant, because privacy and non-interference in family life has long been an argument for state inaction, or toleration of domestic violence. However, when the provisions of the mentioned article are analyzed, the conclusion is clearly reached that the right to privacy and family life is not inviolable. It is protected against arbitrary and illegal interference, which is the basis for intervention in a family where there is violence. Art. 23 regulates the right to family life, and defines the family as a natural and basic cell of society, which has the right to protection from society and the state. States are obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure equality in the rights and duties of spouses in relation to marriage, duration of marriage and in case of divorce. Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General Assembly UN, International convention on Economic, Social and Political Rights.) in art. 10 requires states to provide protection and assistance to the family, as the basic and natural cell of society, especially for its establishment, and while it is responsible for the upbringing and support of the children it cares for.

Namely, given that violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships is seen through the prism of violence against women, for the first time at one of the most significant and influential conferences held in Nairobi in 1985, violence against women was presented as a form of discrimination and violations of basic human rights became more visible, and within its framework more and more attention was paid to domestic violence. The conference in Nairobi was preceded by two world conferences on women: in Mexico City in 1975, which was declared by the General Assembly in 1972 as the International Women's Year, while

at the same conference the Decade for Women (1976-1985) was declared, and the other in Copenhagen in 1980. The key themes of these conferences were equality, peace, development. We should also mention the World Conference held in Vienna in 1993, which, within the framework of the concept of human rights, discussed the specifics of the realization or violation of women's rights, and also touched upon the issue of violence against women in the public and private sphere.

The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted in 1979 (entered into force on September 3, 1981). The basic motive for the adoption of this Convention was based on the fact that despite all previous international instruments for the protection of gender equality, factual inequality between men and women remained. (Pajvančić, Petrušić, and Jašarević, 2010, 37) It requires states to take all necessary measures to eliminate discrimination against women, especially in marital and family relationships, which are traditionally structured and provide a suitable basis for various forms of violence. Obligations regarding the provision of equal right to marry, equal right to choose a spouse, and marriage of free will and with full consent, equal rights and responsibilities in marriage are also foreseen. Article 5 of the Convention stipulates the obligation to take appropriate measures to change social and cultural customs regarding the behavior of men and women, in order to eliminate all prejudices, as well as common and any other practice based on the understanding of the inferiority or superiority of one or the other sex. or the traditional role of men or women. There is no doubt that the monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the Convention, the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Committee of The Elimination of Discrimination Against Women), which was established in 1982, is of great importance, which monitors the implementation of the Convention, the fulfillment of obligations, reviews national reports and makes recommendations in connection with certain issues from the Convention.

The Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women is in General Recommendation no. 19 of 1992, completed the definition of discrimination against women, adding that it includes "violence based on the difference between the sexes, i.e.

violence that is directed against women, or violence that affects women to a greater extent than men". Violence means "acts that cause physical, mental or sexual pain and suffering and threats of such acts, coercion and other forms of organizing freedom". The committee paid special attention to domestic violence, giving it the quality of "one of the most insidious forms of violence against women that prevails in all societies." Its typical manifestations are: beating, rape and other forms of sexual violence and psychological violence. States are recommended to take effective measures to combat violence against women, and when it comes to domestic violence, it is necessary to adopt specific legislation on domestic violence, providing criminal sanctions for perpetrators of violence, civil remedies, preventive and protective measures against domestic violence , as well as the provision of special protection and support services, and the training of employees in those services.

The Council of Europe and the European Union

One of the main tasks of the Council of Europe is the protection of human rights, and violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships undermines the basic values on which the Council of Europe rests.

As part of the protection of human rights (including victims of domestic violence), the most important document of the Council of Europe is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Art. 7 stipulates that everyone has the right to respect for private and family life, apartment and correspondence. Public authorities shall not interfere with the exercise of this right, unless it is lawful and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety, or the economic benefit of the country, for the prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection rights and freedoms of others. The European Convention on Human Rights allows the intervention of the state in the family, if there is violence in it, which represents a violation of the rights and freedoms of others.

On May 11, 2011, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic

Violence, which for the first time separates and determines domestic violence separately from violence against women, and in this way highlights its uniqueness and danger. The Convention stipulates that member states are obliged to conduct research, collect and support the collection of data on all types of violence provided for in this Convention. It is also planned to make the collected and processed statistical data available to the public, raise awareness about domestic violence, organize educational programs on the equality of women and men, non-violent conflict resolution in partner relationships, organize professional training for competent experts who deal with victims of violence, the organization of preventive programs and work with perpetrators, the existence of a sufficient number of safe houses for the accommodation of victims, especially when it comes to women and children, the establishment of a non-stop SOS free line, and the existence of a series of civil law measures, as well as the obligation of member states to take a series of measures to incriminate acts such as: female genital mutilation, forced marriage, forced abortion and forced sterilization, sexual harassment. Also, the Convention provides that the procedure for domestic violence must be regulated, from the very report, prosecution *ex officio*, conducting the investigation, the urgency of the procedure, the prohibition of the possibility of alternative ways of resolving disputes, the circumstances that have to be considered as aggravating, when it is passed decision on criminal sanction. The establishment of the Expert Group for the fight against violence against women and domestic violence (GREVIO) is also planned, which will monitor the implementation of the Convention by the member states.

Other documents of the Council of Europe, which are more specifically related to the prevention of violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships, are resolutions and declarations, which express the position of the members of the Council of Europe on a certain issue, or recommendations that are not binding and belong to the so-called soft law, because they contain guidelines that should be applied by the legislators of the member states, when adopting national regulations at the national level.

Recommendation R (85)4 of the Committee of Ministers of Member States on Domestic Violence defines the family as the basic

organizational unit of a democratic society, and all its members enjoy protection from domestic violence. It is emphasized that domestic violence affects women and children the most. States are recommended to inform the public about the prevalence, seriousness and specificity of domestic violence, to provide professional training for all those responsible for combating domestic violence, to organize, encourage and support the work of services whose task is to provide assistance to victims of domestic violence, to take the necessary measures to limit or bans on the freedom to physically punish children in the family. Psychosocial counseling of abusers should be a general rule, especially when the abuser agrees to undergo the supervision of social, medical-social and probation services.

With Recommendation R (90) 2 on social measures related to domestic violence, the Committee of Ministers calls on member states to take general measures (reforms of the social and health care system, work, culture and education, etc.), and special measures (information and education about the causes , the prevalence of violence, the existence of assistance and protection programs, etc.). The availability of counseling centers, "crisis centers" and therapy programs for abusers is also necessary. It is also recommended to promote the care of children and the non-application of humiliating treatments towards children. When it comes to violence against women, it is recommended to provide economic assistance, especially when dependent on the abuser, establishment of safe houses, assistance from lawyers, psychologists, experiential support groups. In case the woman returns to the abuser, the social worker should monitor the development of the situation. It is also recommended to educate officers who work with victims and abusers about domestic violence and the characteristics and needs of victims and abusers.

In Recommendation 1450 (2000) on violence against women, 1450 (2000) expressed great regret over the increase in violence against women in the member states of the Council of Europe, which violates their basic human rights, namely: the right to life, safety, dignity, physical and psychological integrity. It is proposed to adopt a law that sanctions all forms of domestic violence, criminalization of marital rape, ensuring greater flexibility in terms of access to justice, and in terms of the

availability of various procedures for the actions of state bodies *ex officio*, in camera hearings, etc., as well as organizing educational programs for members of the police, judiciary, establishing centers and shelters for victims of violence, organizing campaigns to raise awareness about the unacceptability of violence against women and promote gender equality.

Recommendation 1582 (2002) on domestic violence against women points out that domestic violence should be treated as a political and public problem, and as a violation of human rights. It is necessary for the member states of the Council of Europe to investigate, prevent and punish all acts of domestic violence and to provide protection to the victims of such violence. Also, the importance of developing strategies for community intervention at the local level is emphasized, which is aimed at coordination and cooperation between state authorities and the mobilization of financial and human resources in the fight against domestic violence, calling on people to be more responsible. It is also recommended to provide special financial support to non-governmental organizations and women's associations, which work with victims of domestic violence, improve statistics on violence, on which a clear picture of the nature and prevalence of domestic violence would be based, and create an appropriate policy to combat violence.

Recommendation Rec (2002) 5 for the protection of women from violence is the first international instrument that proposes a global strategy for the prevention of violence and the protection of victims, covering all types of gender-based violence. The establishment of research centers, including those at the university level, is also recommended. The cooperation of health, social and educational institutions is also necessary, in order to act against violence with a coordinated action. Emphasis is placed on preventive, educational activities, so that boys and girls receive upbringing and education without cultural patterns, prejudices and stereotypes about gender roles. A special section is dedicated to the media, local planning for the protection of victims, criminal and civil proceedings, and programs for the prevention and treatment of violent offenders.

One of the legally binding documents, which should improve the position of victims of domestic violence, is the Directive on the right of EU citizens and their families to move and reside freely on the territory

of the member states. (European Parliament and the Council. Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States) Article 13 paragraph 2 provides for the possibility for victims of domestic violence to retain their right to reside in the EU , in case of divorce.

From 2000 to 2003, the DAPHINE program against violence against women, children and youth was implemented. As part of the DAPHINA initiative, two reports were prepared: "Uncovering hidden data on domestic violence in the EU" and "Towards a common European framework for monitoring progress in combating violence against women". DAPHINE II program lasted from May 2004 until the end of 2008, and DAPHINE III lasted until 2013.

In 2007, the Council of the European Union adopted the Recommendation on preventing harm and promoting safety, which calls on states to take steps to prevent intentional harm, especially to women and children within the family. In April 2009, the European Parliament adopted the Declaration on the "Say No to Violence against Women" campaign. Also, the Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on April 5, 2011 on the priorities and policy of the European Union to combat violence against women is also very significant. (Resolution of 25 February 2014 with recommendations to the Commission on combating Violence Against Women) As a new segment of the European Union's policy in the fight against violence, it points out that violence against women is undoubtedly the most severe form of gender-based violence, but also that violence in partner relationships towards others victims - children, men and the elderly is also a hidden phenomenon that should be investigated and should not be ignored. The European Union continued its activity in the fight against domestic violence, as shown by the Resolution of the European Parliament of February 25, 2014 with the recommendations of the Commission for the fight against violence against women.

Concluding considerations

Bearing in mind the high level of the dark figure when it comes to violence in the family, marriage and partner relationships, this form

of socially unacceptable behavior, and therefore criminally responsible behavior, manifests itself every day in different ways and in different intensities. The goal of this research is to point out some very important theoretical issues and how and to what extent they were implemented in positive European legislation and thus indirectly in all domestic legislation in Europe. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the work is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with theoretical issues, starting with the consideration of psycho-biological explanations, then considering the theory of sociological orientation, and at the end of this part, looking at aspects of feminist explanations. In the second part of the paper, the most important international documents on protection from violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships were considered through the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union.

Bearing in mind the entire theoretical and legislative consideration of the issue of domestic violence, we can see that violence in the family, in marriage and partner relationships is a factor in the weakening of the family and society as a whole. The obligation of the state is therefore to promote family life without violence. Adequate application of the Family Law and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, monitoring of current statistical data, work to reduce the dark figure and achieve preventive action. We are of the opinion that with a certain correction of the repressive measures, a certain positive step forward can be made.

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Teorijska objašnjenja nasilja u braku i partnerskim odnosima i međunarodno zakonodavno inkorporiranje

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Sažetak

Porodica je oduvek bila osnovna celija društvenog života. Cilj ovog istraživanja je da se ukaže na pojedina teorijska veoma značajna pitanja i na koji način i u kojoj meri su ona implementirana u potitivno evropsko zakonodavstvo. Imajući u vidu pomenuto, rad je koncipiran u dva dela i to prvi koji se bavi teorijskim pitanjima i to počevši od razmatranja psihobioloških objašnjenja, zatim razmatranje teorije sociološke orientacije i na kraju ovog dela sagledavanje aspekta feminističkih objašnjenja. U drugom delu rada razmotreni su značajniji međunarodni dokumenti o zaštiti od nasilja u porodici, u braku i partnerskim vezama posmatrano kroz Ujedinje nacije, Savet Evrope i Evropsku uniju.

Ključne reči: nasilje u porodici, nasilje u braku, nasilje u partnerskim odnosima, krivično pravo, međunarodne regulative

Characteristic Forms of Child Abuse on the Internet

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Abstract

Today's life is characterized by an extremely accelerated development of information and communication technologies. This technical-technological phenomenon, like any other phenomenon, has both positive and negative social implications. Its positive aspects are well-known and are inevitably indisputable. However, as we mentioned, it also has negative sides. Within this work, the subject of analysis will be only one aspect of the negative side of the presence of information and communication technologies in today's society, i.e. we will deal with the issue of the negative impact of information and communication technologies on one of the most vulnerable groups of our society - children. In this sense, we will analyze the international regulations that regulate the issue of child abuse on the Internet. When it comes to domestic regulations, the subject of the analysis will be focused on four characteristic forms of abuse of children on the Internet (trafficking, peer violence, so-called sexual deviations and theft of personal data), and within the framework of normative regulations that combat them, although above all they prevent such phenomena.

Keywords: internet networks, abuse of children, peer violence in the virtual space, child trafficking, sexual deviations towards children in the virtual space, theft of children's personal data on the Internet

Characteristic Forms of Child Abuse on the Internet

Introduction

In the era of accelerated development of modern information and communication technologies, increasing abuses on the Internet are noticeable, and especially the youngest fellow citizens, that is, children, are affected by negative phenomena. According to Vesic and Bjelajac,

“in addition to the tremendous technological opportunities available to individuals, organizations and society as a whole, many threats evolve and are transferred in a more or less different form to the digital world until the consequences do not disappear. High technological dependence blurs the line between the virtual and the real” (Vesić & Bjelajac, 2023).

Children are spending an increasing amount of time online. While the internet offers opportunities and potential for expanding horizons and fostering creativity worldwide, it also brings significant risks (See more: Bjelajac & Filipović, 2021; Bjelajac, 2012). Various forms of digital violence can harm the psychophysical health of children and turn them into traumatized victims. Therefore, the importance of promoting internet security culture is increasingly emphasized (See more: Bjelajac & Jovanović, 2013). As the problem of child abuse on the internet takes on increasingly serious proportions, governments worldwide are making efforts to combat these negative phenomena. The problem of child abuse on the Internet is taking on increasingly serious proportions, so governments around the world are trying to suppress these negative phenomena. In this sense, on April 27, 2016, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted a regulation on the protection of natural persons (especially children) in relation to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. The provisions of the mentioned decree concerning the protection of children in this sphere will be analyzed in the continuation of the work. Also, the legislative body of the Republic of Serbia, by passing various types of legal regulations, makes efforts to protect children from abuse on the Internet. The regulations adopted by the Republic of Serbia in order to protect children from four characteristic forms of abuse on the Internet

(trafficking, peer violence, so-called sexual deviations and theft of personal data) will be analyzed in the second part of this paper.

Bearing in mind the fact that children are a very vulnerable group, it is surprising that children are the fastest growing group of victims of identity theft. In the United States alone, 500,000 children fall victim to identity theft each year. Based on a Carnegie Mellon University Sailab study of 40,000 children, children are 51 times more likely to be victims of identity theft than adults (Goodman, 2017, p. 150). According to the National Crime Prevention Council (in the USA, see authors), almost half of all teenagers are affected by cyberbullying, i.e. a form of peer violence. For young people facing persistent bullying, it seems to work out, and as a result, as many as 20 percent of high school students have admitted to seriously considering suicide due to online bullying (Goodman, 2017, pp. 151–152).

It is inevitable that we have to point out that video games are also a significant problem today. Of course, we cannot dispute the positive aspects of video games, such as: development of the child's perception and intellectual abilities, development of problem-solving skills, improvement of memorization of information, improvement of the ability to draw conclusions, and positive influence on the child's mood. However, there are also risks that children can face. This primarily refers to creating an addiction to video games (in 2018, the World Health Organization classified video game addiction as an addictive disease), which can result in problems for the child with satisfying his biological needs (nutrition, sleep), fulfilling school obligations, and difficulties with establishing and maintaining social interactions. Also, establishing an interaction with other players, often people unknown to the child, can have a risk for the child. In addition to the above, the particular threat of video games is reflected in the fact that a large number of them contain scenes of often even extreme violence, explicit content of a sexual nature, then scenes of drug consumption, gambling, which is especially problematic if we know that children often imitate what they see. So, "Video games are undeniably a very influential segment of ICT, but, as a sort of antipode, social institutions have expressed concerns regarding the potential destructive impact of violent video games on aggression and behavior of individuals" (Filipović, 2023, p. 63).

Playing video games often involves spending money, which, in addition to the known negative aspects, also includes the possibility of data theft.

As we have already stated, this paper will analyze the characteristic forms of abuse of children on the Internet, where the emphasis will be placed on trafficking, peer violence, theft of personal data, as well as the so-called sexual deviations. At the same time, the first part of the paper will discuss the most important international regulations governing the rights of children on the Internet, and the second part of the paper will focus on the regulations adopted by the Republic of Serbia in order to protect children from four mentioned characteristic forms of abuse on the Internet. The research used the normative method, as well as the legal-logical methods of induction and deduction.

International legal regulation regarding children's rights on the Internet

In addition to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which recognizes the child's right to informational privacy, special reference should be made to Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and on repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), hereinafter: GDPR. In the earlier Directive 95/46/EC did not regulate the issue of children's rights on the Internet in any way, so the provisions that apply to adults also applied to children. Things started to change only in 2006, when the European Commission adopted the corresponding Strategy on the Rights of the Child, in which it emphasized the priority importance of the rights of the child (Commision of the European Communities, 2006). After that, a special advisory working group composed of representatives of national bodies for the protection of personal data expressed the opinion that the processing of children's personal data requires special protection (Lievens & Verdoodt, 2018, p. 270).

Unlike the previous Directive, the new Regulation deals with the rights of children in the most direct way in connection with the protection

of personal data. Thus, Recital 38 of the GDPR states that children, according to their characteristics, must have special protection when it comes to the processing of their personal data, and especially when it comes to the use of such data “for the purposes of marketing or maintaining the profile of the user’s personality and collecting personal data related to children when using services that are offered directly to the child” (Regulation (EU) 679/2016, recital 38).

However, recital 75 of the GDPR states that as a consequence of the processing of personal data, there may be a risk to the rights and freedoms of physical persons, which may manifest itself in the form of “physical, material or non-material damage” (Regulation (EU) 679/2016, recital 75). However, the next, i.e. recital 76. GDPR it talks about the likelihood of a risk to the rights and freedoms of a person, as well as the degree of that risk, and it is stated that this risk depends on the nature, scope, context and purpose of data processing (Regulation (EU) 679/2016, recital 76).

The GDPR, unlike the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, does not contain a definition of “child”, which is a serious drawback, because by interpreting its provisions it cannot be concluded which protective rights contained in recital 38 of the GDPR actually refer to children. This should be interpreted in such a way as to apply the solution of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides for an age limit of up to 18 years. There was also criticism of this solution, some of which referred to the fact that such a solution puts older minors (for example, 13 or 16 to 18-year-olds) in an unequal position (Lievens & Verdoort, 2018, p. 270)). In other words, it can be argued that, by applying a fixed age limit, the GDPR does not offer children, at least in the age group up to 16, an adequate opportunity to experiment as autonomous persons, as it does not take into account the development of children’s capacities (Buitelaar, 2018, p. 300).

Particular attention should be paid to the rights of the child to Articles 6(1)(a) and 8 of the GDPR. Pursuant to Article 6(1)(a) GDPR, processing shall be lawful if the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes (Regulation (EU) 679/2016, Art. 6(1)(a)). Article 8 of the GDPR states that personal data can be processed if it is a person who has reached

the age of 16, otherwise, the consent of the person who has parental responsibility for the child is required. However, even under this condition, the age of the child cannot be below 13 years (Regulation (EU) 679/2016, Art. 8).

Article 25 of the GDPR talks about technical and organizational measures that the controller undertakes when planning the processing, and especially during the processing of personal data itself. Accordingly, it is expressly emphasized that only personal data that are necessary for each specific purpose of processing are processed, taking into account their quantity, scope of processing, storage period and availability (Regulation (EU) 679/2016, Art. 25).

This provision is significant, as it allows companies to access children's personal data relatively easily. In this regard, it is easy to imagine a situation where children (or their parents or guardians) usually give their personal information on social networks, without thinking much about the consequences of such a decision. Therefore, children's consent is required, but with the provision of appropriate mechanisms (with mandatory consideration of the child's psychological specifics), which would ensure that children fully understand how their data is managed.

The GDPR rules on the right to delete data ("the right to be forgotten") are particularly important for children's rights, which are mentioned in recital 65 of the GDPR. It is the possibility that at the request of the person who provided their personal data, they can be changed or deleted. In addition, it is particularly significant and the part of this provision that refers to the right to delete data in case of illegal processing of personal data, or on the basis of information society service offers, is particularly significant. This is important for the rights of children, given that they are not aware of all the possibilities of processing their data, especially in the light of blockchain technologies. The controller would have to inform the data processors that the data holder (who is an adult at that time) has requested their deletion, and it is necessary for them to delete personal data from their databases. This is, however, very difficult to implement when the data is processed for the purposes of profiling or marketing campaigns. Then the data holders are not even aware that their data is being processed, especially taking

into account the scandal related to the company Cambridge Analytica and the big affair related to the misuse of personal data of citizens around the world (Domazet & Skakavac, 2016, p. 71), and also children.

Characteristic forms of child abuse on the Internet from the aspect of the legal regulations of the Republic of Serbia

Examples of child abuse on the Internet are numerous and varied. However, for the purposes of analysis within this work, we will focus on four characteristic forms of child abuse on the Internet: trafficking, peer violence, so-called. sexual deviations and the theft of personal data, and within the framework of the normative regulations that suppress them, although above all they prevent such phenomena.

Theft of personal data

One of the most common forms of abuse of children on the Internet is related to the theft of their personal data, i.e. the so-called phishing. Children have been shown to be very vulnerable to this form of cybercrime. In recent years, phishing attacks targeting children have increased dramatically with the rise of very young Internet users (Alwanain, 2021, p. 128). In the initial stages of the development of phishing, perpetrators used relatively simple fraud methods, so that phishing emails were relatively easy to recognize (for example, they contained numerous grammatical and spelling errors), while today phishing has evolved and become much more complex and sophisticated, including the use of numerous advanced software solutions for concealment in order to obtain sensitive (personal) data (Domazet & Skakavac, 2019, p. 191). In particular, financial fraud is apostrophized, as one of the biggest cyber threats for children (Vodafone UK News Centre, 2021).

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia sanctions the theft of personal data under Article 146, which criminalizes the unauthorized collection of personal data. The object of protection of this incrimination are the freedoms and rights of man and citizen. The crime has three forms. First, the form sanctions the unauthorized acquisition, disclosure and use of personal data that is collected, processed and used on the

basis of the law. In the event that these data are collected against the law and used as such, elements of another form of being of this criminal offense will be realized. If the first form of this criminal offense is committed by an official, it will be its third qualified form.

The protection of personal data is also guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, in Art. 42, i.e. the highest legal act. Also, the Law on the Protection of Personal Data is fully devoted to this issue.

Sexual deviations (Sexual violence on the Internet)

Children, very simply, and thus very often, become victims of sexual violence on the Internet. As is generally known, insufficient psychological development contributes to this, which, after a child becomes a victim of this type of violence, has a further, deeper destructive effect on that same child. Namely, when children find themselves in this problem, they often see the only way out is to take their own life.

How dangerous this phenomenon is for an individual (specifically a child victim of sexual violence on the Internet), the child victim's family, and of course, the entire society, it is clear to us even if we have just "started" this topic. The legislator of the Republic of Serbia, with the aim of primarily preventing, but also suppressing, among other things, this type of violence against children on the Internet, prescribes two incriminations (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2019, Art. 185 and 185b).

The first indictment sanctions the display, acquisition and possession of pornographic material and the exploitation of a minor for pornography (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2019, Art. 185). Being the first form of this incrimination sanctions making pornographic material available to a minor, i.e. a child (the third qualified form of this criminal act). The second (serious) form of this criminal offense sanctions the exploitation of minors for the production of pornographic material, and if the object of the action is not a minor but a child, there will be a third qualified form of this criminal offense. The act of the fourth form will be carried out in the event that the

pornographic material created in this way is acquired for oneself or another, possessed, or generally made available. The fifth form of this incrimination will exist if, with the help of information technologies, pornographic material created by the exploitation of minors is consciously accessed. The term "child pornography" means "any material that visually depicts a minor engaging in real or simulated sexually explicit behavior, as well as any depiction of a child's sexual organs for sexual purposes" (National Assembly, 2019, Art. 185).

In connection with the issue of sexual violence against children on the Internet, the legislator criminalizes the use of a computer network or communication by other technical means to commit crimes against sexual freedom against a minor (National Assembly, 2019, Art. 185b). The existence of this incrimination, related to the issue of sexual violence against children on the Internet, exists in the event that someone "using a computer network or communication by other technical means arranges a meeting with a minor and appears at the agreed place for the purpose of the meeting" and in order to commit one of the criminal offenses from the group against sexual freedom.

Human Trafficking

Almost anyone can become a victim of trafficking (trafficking in human beings) today, especially a child. Everyone who chats online, leaves photos and expresses their views on social networks is at risk. According to some data, "the victims are mostly female, aged between eleven and twenty-five"¹. On the other hand, human traffickers are not easy to trace, on the contrary. They are well organized, have globally developed networks, which is logical because it is a very lucrative business, while on the other hand, they can even "be in contact with the victim for several years in order to gain her trust", in which case they "success" almost guaranteed.

¹ According to the law of the Republic of Serbia, a person who has not reached the age of fourteen is considered a child. A minor is a person who has reached the age of fourteen, but has not reached the age of sixteen. A person who has reached the age of sixteen and has not reached the age of eighteen is an older minor.

The Republic of Serbia, in order to prevent such phenomena, but also to suppress them, criminalizes human trafficking (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2019, Art. 388). The first form of this criminal offense is committed by "who, by force or threat, misleading or maintaining a delusion, abuse of authority, trust, dependence, difficult circumstances of another, withholding personal documents or giving or receiving money or other benefits, recruits, transports, transfers, hands over, sells, buys, mediates the sale, hides or keeps another person, and with the aim of exploiting his work, forced labor, committing criminal acts, prostitution or other types of sexual exploitation, begging, use for pornographic purposes, establishing a slave or similar relationship, for the removal of organs or parts of the body or for use in armed conflicts. The second form of this offense exists when the first form is committed against a minor, completely unrelated to the method of execution. The third form exists in the situation when the first form of the act (including the prescribed act of its execution) is committed against a minor. The fourth form exists in the event that the execution of the first, second or third form of the act resulted in serious physical injury to a minor. In the event that the death of one or more persons occurs as a result of the execution of the offense from the first and third form, there will be a fifth form of this criminal offense. The sixth form exists in the event that someone engages in the first, second or third form of this criminal offense, or if the offense was committed by a group. The seventh form exists if the first, second or third form was committed by an organized criminal group. The eighth form of the offense will exist in the event that someone "knows or could have known that a person is a victim of human trafficking, so he takes advantage of her position or allows someone else to take advantage of her position for the purpose of exploitation provided for" by the first form of this criminal offense. The ninth form exists in the event that the act from the eighth form is "committed against a person whom the perpetrator knew or could have known was a minor." The tenth form of this criminal offense excludes the consent of the person (victim) "to exploitation, or to the establishment of a slave or similar relationship" which provides for the first form of the offense, in the sense that this consent will not affect the existence of the first, second and sixth forms of the criminal offense of human trafficking.

Peer violence

Unfortunately, like the previous three forms of child abuse on the Internet, this one is not at all harmless. Namely, the violent behavior of children on the Internet (in the digital world) is much more dangerous than that which is carried out in the classic form (in the real world), because the victim is first of all constantly (24 hours) exposed to violence. Second, the abuser has no real insight into the victim's suffering, but only an assumed one, which often results in the continuation and intensification of violence by the abuser towards the victim. The consequences for the victim of this type of violence are often disastrous.

And the legislator of the Republic of Serbia tries to prevent (but, when there is a need for it, suppress it), by criminalizing violent behavior (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2019, Art. 344). This incrimination has two forms. The first, basic form will exist if someone "by grossly insulting or abusing another, committing violence against another, causing a fight, or by insolent or reckless behavior significantly endangers the tranquility of citizens or more seriously disturbs public order and peace." The second, qualified form of this criminal offense will exist if the basic form of this criminal offense was committed "in a group, or during the execution of the offense, a minor physical injury was inflicted on a person, or there was serious humiliation of citizens."

Conclusion

The issue of child abuse on the Internet is therefore not harmless, and it is not a rare phenomenon either. We can look for the reason for this in the level of insufficient psychological maturity of the child. However, this is a well-known, unchangeable fact that the legislator also recognized, and considers a person who has reached the age of eighteen to be an adult. But, as psychological maturity does not occur in every individual upon reaching this number of years of life, the law also recognizes the category "younger adult" (a person who has reached the age of eighteen and not reached the age of twenty-one).

Accordingly, it is clear that we cannot change the biological basis, but first of all we must focus on the social aspect of protecting this very

vulnerable category of the human community. Therefore, it is necessary to establish legal mechanisms for the protection of children on the Internet, i.e. in the so-called virtual space. We can state that on the international, as well as the national level, legal regulation is relatively well established. Another issue is its application, ie. implementation. Namely, this issue was not the subject of our analysis, but it is a well-known fact that the community of European nations, as well as the institutions of our country, make extraordinary efforts in implementing the regulations that regulate this area. As it is a relatively new phenomenon in our society (the mass use of the Internet in our country only dates back to 2008), it is logical to encounter difficulties in its prevention and suppression. In addition to legal regulations, we consider strengthening the social ties of children and minors, first of all with the family, but also with the environment, of extreme importance, above all for the prevention of this phenomenon, which is important because the closest environment of the child, if he has developed trust in the same, can in time recognize the problem that the child has or the possibility of the child getting into a problem. In addition to legal regulations, the family, the close environment of the child, which are extremely important in the prevention of abuse of children on the Internet, and the remediation of its consequences, it is necessary to include professional services. The synergy of all the above can certainly significantly improve the situation in this field.

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Karakteristični oblici zloupotrebe dece na internetu

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Sažetak

Današnjicu karakteriše izrazito ubrzan razvoj informaciono-komunikacionih tehnologija. Ova tehničko-tehnološka pojava, kao u ostalom i svaka druga pojava, ima i pozitivne i negativne društvene implikacije. Njene pozitivne strane dobro su poznate i neizostavno su nesporne. Međutim, ona, kao što smo pomenuli, poseduje i negativne strane. U okviru ovog rada predmet analize biće samo jedan aspekt negativne strane prisutnosti informaciono-komunikacionih tehnologija u današnjem društvu, tj. bavićemo se pitanjem negativnog uticaja informaciono-komunikacionih tehnologija na jednu od najranjivijih grupa našeg društva – na decu. U tom smislu, analiziraćemo međunarodne propise koji regulišu pitanje zloupotrebe dece na internetu. Kada je reč o domaćoj regulativi predmet analize biće fokusiran na četiri karakteristična oblika zloupotrebe dece na internetu (trafiking, vršnjačko nasilje, tzv. seksualne devijacije i krađu ličnih podataka), a u okviru normativnih propisa kojima se suzbijaju, mada pre svega preveniraju ovakve pojave.

Ključne reči: internet mreže, zloupotreba dece, vršnjačko nasilje u virtuelnom prostoru, trafiking dece, seksualne devijacije prema deci u virtuelnom prostoru, krađa ličnih podataka dece na internetu

The US Trade and Technology War Against China and the Resulting Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Potential Implications and Risks for the Global Economy

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to assess the possible consequences and risks for the global economy due to the increasingly pronounced geo-economic fragmentation, dominantly determined by the trade and technological war of the US against China. Based on benchmark studies' findings, we reason that decoupling and trade fragmentation could manifest through several main channels. These are, among other things: the slowdown in the growth of global trade, reduced migration, decreased FDI, and bans on the transfer of certain high technologies. In order to achieve the primary goal of the study, we suggested pragmatic ways to preserve as many of the benefits as possible resulting from trade openness, that is, international economic cooperation. First of all, in addition to more intensive communications of the main global economic actors, in which additional efforts would be made for compromise solutions along the lines of argumentation of the academic community and experts in relevant international institutions, the work of leading multilateral organizations should be revitalized, giving greater importance in their leadership to developing countries, especially China. In the end, we argue that, despite all the risks, it is not realistic that geo-economic fragmentation will lead to a significant decline in most types of economic cooperation at the global level since there are no valid (geopolitical) reasons why Western countries would stop importing price- and qualitatively competitive products from China. Instead, collaboration will primarily be reduced to a limited number of high-tech sectors, perceived in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing as strategically important.

Key words: geo-economic fragmentation, decoupling, trade-technological war, China, USA.

The US Trade and Technology War Against China and the Resulting Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Potential Implications and Risks for the Global Economy

The trend of relative economic decline in the West

According to one of the leading contemporary economic thinkers, Martin Wolf, claims, today neither global cooperation (through the G20 – a group of the twenty largest economies in the world) nor Western domination (through the G7) seems feasible, while the risk of global fragmentation or “anarchy” is growing (Wolf, 2023). According to him, both the “unipolar” moment of the US and the economic dominance of the G7 (consisting of: France, Germany, Italy, Britain, Canada, USA, and Japan) has been overcome. Although the G7 is still the most powerful and cohesive economic block in the world, among other things, because G7 members control practically all the world’s leading reserve currencies, the new reality is the substantial rise of the “rest” of the world, primarily China. Namely, between 2000 and 2023, the share of the G7 in GDP by purchasing power parity fell from 44% to 30%, with the portion of all developed countries decreasing to 41% (from 57%). As Wolf sees it, the G7, with 10% of the world’s population, cannot continue its dominance much longer.

At the same time, China, which became an economic superpower, increased its share of global GDP from 7% to 19%. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (“Silk Road”), Beijing has become a major investor (and creditor) of developing countries (now IMF is using something different term - Emerging Market and Developing Economies – to encompass all developing countries, which are defined as ones at a lower level of economic development compared to developed – industrialized – countries). For many developing countries and G20 members, China is a more important economic partner than the G7 (Brazil is an indicative example).

China, which is the leading trading partner for two-thirds of the world’s countries, dominates international trade even more than the US did at its peak after World War II, and this is a fact that the West’s geo-

economic strategy needs to face up to. By eventually displacing Germany from the Global Value Chains (GVC), Beijing would “seal” its dominant strategic position. The tripolar global trade structure appears to be on the way to a unipolar one, with Beijing as the main actor, effectively carrying out a hostile takeover of the existing “trading blocs”.

China is actually the “world manufacture”, since it makes up about 30% of the global manufacturing industry, practically supplying the whole world with relatively cheap products in a wide assortment. Therefore, despite the efforts of the West to slow down China’s growth, industrialized countries, and especially the US, continue to supply China with the most important “component” that it cannot create on its own - the demand for the products of its manufacturing industry, where the Chinese surplus exceeded 10% of its GDP in 2022. Even with the rising prices of its products, China’s total merchandise surplus is approaching its peak before the global financial crisis. Expressed in current dollars, that surplus, and especially its dynamics, looks much more impressive (paradoxically, after Trump’s tariffs, the surplus of the manufacturing industry even increased, despite Washington’s intentions). On the other hand, imports of the manufacturing industry, as a share of China’s GDP, have decreased since 2000, by as much as five percentage points (and amounted to about 9% of GDP in 2022), which is a good argument for those who talk about de-globalization (Setser, 2023). When imports used as input in exports are excluded (semi-final, i.e. intermediate products), the (net) export of the processing industry is as much as 14% of its GDP, and the (net) import is below 4% of China’s GDP. It is clear that Beijing could not achieve such surpluses without large American deficits. The sudden appearance of China as a net exporter of cars and, from 2023, the world’s largest exporter of the same, indirectly indicates the growing trade deficit of the EU with that country.

Faced with the resistance of their leading companies, as well as the academic public and international institutions, political elites in the West slowly began to see all the risks of a trade and technological war with China. (although it is desirable to go further in relaxing bilateral relations by transforming “de-risking” into focused and rational policy-making). Namely, it is reasonable to diversify the supply of energy and vital raw materials and components, but to do the same with a supply

of Taiwan's advanced chips is hardly feasible, as is an attempt to squeeze Chinese competitive industrial products from Western markets.

Bearing in mind the mentioned numbers, that is, the trends, the question that arises is how the global economy should be managed. The IMF and the World Bank, bastions of G7 influence in an increasingly divided world, as it is nowadays, will not be able to do that. It seems that the reality should be recognized and the quotas in the IMF and the World Bank should be adjusted, thus recognizing the huge changes in the global economic power. In addition, the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO) should be revitalized in exchange for China's renunciation of using its own treatment in the WTO as a developing country (in order to circumvent the anti-state support rules that typically restrict industrialized nations). The key is to find a way of global coordination, and this will mean recognizing the importance of organizations that Beijing and its allies are creating, such as BRICS, which is on its way to becoming globally relevant.

Overview of related literature

Studies dedicated to decoupling and trade fragmentation have been very present in academic literature in recent years, even becoming a top topic of leading international organizations. For example, one of the most recent IMF studies (IMF, 2023, 91), published at the institution's the 2023 spring session, has warned of the downsides of friend-shoring and growing geo-economic fragmentation, which could reshape the locating of foreign direct investments – FDI (the fragmentation of which would negatively impact the world economy in return). It is emphasized that FDI flows have slowed down significantly and that they are increasingly concentrated among geopolitically aligned countries (this is especially true for strategic sectors). It is warned that in the long term, the fragmentation of FDI (which is a consequence of the creation of geopolitical blocs) may generate large losses in income, especially for developing countries. The IMF, as usual, calls for multilateral arrangements and the maintenance of global integration as the best ways to reduce the economic costs associated with the increasingly pronounced geo-economic and FDI fragmentation. By the way, the term "geo-economic fragmentation" was coined by a group of

experts within the IMF to describe the reversal of global economic integration (Aiiar et al., 2023).

A lot of studies deal with the costs of decoupling, that is, the trade, and especially the technological war between Washington and Beijing. The group of authors suggest that the harm to the US caused by tariffs is widespread, significant, and counterproductive to Washington's goal of 'disciplining' Beijing (Manak, Cabanas, & Feinberg 2023). When it comes to costs, they are significant (\$48 billion), borne by American consumers and companies (Lee & Smith, 2023). Nobel laureate Michael Spence indicates that global supply chains (GVC), which become less elastic and more expensive with decoupling, will be more susceptible to inflationary pressures, and the task of curbing price growth will fall to a greater extent on central banks (Spence, 2023). This will affect the growth of interest rates and consequently increase fiscal pressures, while population aging and the trend of slowing productivity will further worsen conditions on the supply side.

Citing an IMF study (Aiyar et al., 2023), the executive director of that institution, Kristalina Georgieva, states that the long-term cost of trade fragmentation could range from 0.2% of world GDP to 7% in a pessimistic scenario (Georgieva, 2023).

In the working paper, the authors address the channels of influence of trade and technological fragmentation on global growth (Cerdeiro et al. 2021). It was shown that, among other things, trade flows decrease as countries impose higher non-tariff barriers (which reduces demand for high-tech imports, hindering consumption and investment growth); inadequate sectoral allocation is created (which leads to inefficiencies such as excess capacity); global diffusion of knowledge is prevented (which prevents innovation and domestic productivity).

Since commercial banks are critically important for financing international trade and lending to the real economy, the impact of geopolitically generated shocks to globalization could also have negative repercussions on credit potential. Therefore, a number of authors also dealt with this topic, indicating that the reduced activity of banks can increase the shocks produced by protectionist trade policies (at the domestic and international levels), by transmitting financial stress through lending and liquidity flows (Federico et al. 2020). Namely, if

banks affected by negative trade events were to reduce credit activity, the effects of the initial shock to the real economy could be amplified. Thus, shocks due to trade fragmentation could affect the reduced total offers of loans through banks. Additionally, the decline and redistribution of bank credit supply can reinforce trade fragmentation and potentially slow down firms' adjustment to trade shocks (Buch, Goldberg & Imbierowicz, 2023).

Geo-economic fragmentation of the world economy

Geoeconomic fragmentation refers to disruptions in the flows of trade, capital (FDI), and migration (IMF, 2023, 91). The trade war, and then the attempt to contain China in the domain of high technology by the West, led by Washington, is the most important, but not the only, generator of geo-economic fragmentation. Namely, the trends of slowing down or stagnation of globalization have been present since the 2008-2009 Great Recession.

Just as growing global economic integration has affected the global economy through multiple interconnected channels, so geo-economic fragmentation is likely to have similar effects, but in an inverse way. Namely, for several decades, international trade has acted as a catalyst for reducing income differences between countries, greatly reducing global poverty and lower prices, especially for low-income consumers. Cross-border migration has provided significant benefits to both people and firms, generating an increase in efficiency in the distribution of labor among countries at different levels of income and productivity (e.g. through remittances). Capital flows, especially FDI, provided developing countries with a source of external financing, contributing to greater efficiency of domestic enterprises, as well as technological diffusion, i.e. productivity growth.

Geo-economic fragmentation calls into question all these acquired benefits. Transition costs are likely to be significant, as it takes time and effort to reconfigure supply chains, with short-term costs due to trade fragmentation likely to be much higher. Since they are further from the so-called technological frontiers, developing countries lose disproportionately when access to technology is difficult. Productivity losses due to less diffusion of knowledge could accumulate, increasing

the long-term costs of technological decoupling. In any case, the costs will be higher the deeper the fragmentation.

In addition to trade and FDI fragmentation, there is also a noticeable downward trend in financial globalization measured by global cross-border banking loans. Against these negative trends, trade in services is growing constantly strongly; on average increasing by 4% in the period 2010–2021 (UNCTAD, 2018).

Signs of slowing down of globalization

Diversification of supply chains (friend-shoring, reshoring) is already well underway, not only because of US-Chinese competition, but also because of the need to increase resistance due to climate change, pandemics, wars, and the increased use of economic sanctions. The latest forecasts of the WTO (2023) indicate that the trend of slowing globalization is intensifying, as this organization is projecting a slowdown in the growth of world trade volume to a modest 1.7% in 2023, mainly due to a slowdown in global demand. Also, in the report of the International Trade Chamber (ICC, 2023, pp. 11–20), it is indicated that globalization continues to slow down, as trade tensions between the US and China, the pandemic, and the war in Ukraine have led to an increase in protectionist measures (primarily export controls, the scope of subsidies, and investment restrictions).

A particularly worrying dynamic is the growth of investment barriers, a trend that could accelerate in the near future. The process of investment restrictions is linked to the growing “concern” for national security. Countries implementing FDI screening generate as much as 63% of global FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2022).

Given the growing investment barriers, the strong slowdown in FDI flows is not surprising. Namely, global FDI declined from an average of 3.3% of GDP in the 2000s to 1.3% in the period 2018–2022 (IMF, 2023, pp. 7–11).

Despite all the above-mentioned challenges, globalization in a broader sense remains resilient. However, US-China trade relations are showing signs of separation. Namely, the share of US imports from China fell to 16.6% in 2022 from 21.6% in 2017, while exports to China

decreased to 7.3%, from 8.4% of total exports in 2017 (although the increased dollar amounts create the wrong picture). Altman & Bastian (2022) show that the share of almost all bilateral flows (FDI, migration, scientific cooperation) between the US and China has declined since 2016. However, there are no reliable signs of decoupling in non-high-tech industries, implying that 'decoupling' 'takes place in GVCs related to "strategic" (high-tech) sectors.

The cost of geo-economic fragmentation

Economic losses from fragmentation can be considerable. The global cost of fragmentation increases with the degree of fragmentation, that is, with the number of affected sectors and countries. Costs include higher import prices, segmented markets, and reduced access to technology. According to several studies, if the loss due to technological decoupling is calculated, global costs could reach up to 12% of the world GDP, which is equivalent to the combined GDP of Germany and Japan. Countries from the Asia-Pacific region would be most affected by fragmentation because they have a high level of international trade (ICC, 2023, pp. 11–20).

Increasing geo-economic fragmentation requires businesses to adapt quickly, as reconfiguring supply chains takes time. This implies that the short-term costs of trade fragmentation may be much higher than the long-term costs.

Analysts, such as William Pesek, believe that the trade war between Washington and Beijing is MAD – mutually assured destruction, in the economic sense (Pesek, 2023). But perhaps the worst is yet to come – the so-called investment war. Explicitly restricting American investments in Chinese stocks would strongly reduce the market valuation of companies from the US, while significantly reducing the technological diffusion that predominantly goes from America to China.

What is not realistic is that geo-economic fragmentation will lead to the complete disintegration of the world market (or its strict division into blocs), since there are no valid (geopolitical) reasons why Western countries stopped importing the vast majority of consumer goods from China (Shearing, 2023). Instead, the trade will be reduced in areas

perceived in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing as strategically important (batteries, biotechnology, high-tech). Additionally, while some types of capital flow between the US and China will be reduced, this will not mean a complete halt in FDI, portfolio investment, or lending between the two economies.

Discussion – Washington’s new economic paradigm on the horizon?

Washington’s drive to contain China’s technological growth carries the risk of a new Cold War and the division of the world into two or more global trading blocs. The White House is also trying to preserve global hegemony by changing the paradigm. Also, Washington is slowly moving towards transforming the paralyzed WTO.

The Biden administration wants to turn away from the so-called neoliberal economic ideas — free trade abroad and austerity at home — that have driven economic policy since the late 1970s. If neoliberalism supported the interests of the global elite — the core idea of Biden’s new policy is internationalist because it would be based on supporting workers regardless of nationality. All this remains overly optimistic, especially since the key and the most difficult question remains: how to reform a global economic system that is essentially designed to privilege the interests of capital over labor (Bade, 2023).

For decades, global trade has been a “race to the bottom”: corporations sought higher profits by moving to countries with lower wages and fewer regulations, which contributed to inequality, environmental degradation, and populist rebellion. Realizing the new reality, policymakers in Washington (both left, right, and center) came to the conclusion that they should moderate their desires for free trade and provide greater support to domestic industry in order to respond to national security risks (Bade, 2023).

Conclusions

It is clear that the leaderships of the world’s two largest economies have prioritized national security, willingly forgoing the benefits of open trade and investment. Underlying their parallel positions is the logic of

economic exhaustion: Beijing and Washington estimate that they can maintain their policies longer. Xi believes that the predicted economic growth trends are still favorable and that China can close the GDP gap with the US in the next decade. Of course, he surely knows that a more security-focused economic strategy will reduce domestic growth due to the loss of access to Western markets and technology. But the US and its allies are playing a similar game and will bear high costs, as economic growth rates in the West will also decline. Since productivity in China is still much lower than in the US, this means there is more room for productivity growth, which will make China's growth rates higher than America's. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that the US economy will grow at an average rate of 2.4% in 2024–2027 and 1.8% in 2028–2033. A research team from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences optimistically estimates that China's growth will average between 5% and 5.5% this decade and around 4%–4.5% in the 2030s. However, the costs of a security-oriented development strategy are likely to be much higher for China than for the US (Pei, 2023).

Most in both Washington and Beijing know that separation is a highly suboptimal and dangerous course. However, in both the US and China, voices of dissent are either ignored or stifled, as policymakers in both countries have fully embraced the logic of economic decoupling. As the position of developing countries is weak and the EU is disunited to have a strong voice, there is no one to make a detour from the current path of decoupling and fragmentation (Spence, 2023). Hopes are pinned on de-risking, which has at least in the discourse replaced the more aggressive approach of decoupling, and which rests on three broad pillars: reducing dependence on China, limiting technology exports to China, and encouraging Western companies to trade in the huge Chinese market. It is a coherent policy, but it will be failure, if the risk is an actual war between the US and China, possibly over Taiwan (Rachman, 2023). In that catastrophic event, it will matter less that Western corporations will have to leave China (and that for many of them such as Apple or Volkswagen it could mean bankruptcy), but the fate of the world as we know will take priority.

Washington, along with its allies, is at the beginning of a new type of strategic competition, one with few precedents in contemporary

international relations. Since the leadership in Beijing believes that their country is practically locked in a long-term geopolitical and ideological competition with the “global west”, which it sees as the main threat to internal and external security, the White House should remove any possible misperception of American intentions, and clarify the US policy, especially concerning Taiwan (Medeiros, 2023). As Francesco Sisci observes, although they are at a dangerous crossroads between war and peace in a world still ruled by Washington, it is not too late to mitigate the considerable risks with a better understanding of competition and war (Sisci, 2023).

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
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Figure 1.

Merchandise exports in 2022 of selected G20 countries to China and G7 (as % of their GDP)



Note: The figure was taken from the website of the Financial Times (<https://www.ft.com/content/c8cf024d-87b7-4e18-8fa2-1b8a3f3fbba1>)

Figure 2.

China's trade and manufacturing surplus as a share of the country's GDP 2000-2022.



Note: The figure was taken from the private Twitter account
(https://twitter.com/Brad_Setser/status/1651254166323445762/photo/1)

Trgovinsko-tehnološki rat Vašingtona protiv Pekinga i posledična geoekonomска fragmentacija: potencijalne posledice i rizici za globalnu ekonomiju

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Sažetak

Cilj rada je ocena mogućih posledica i rizika za globalnu ekonomiju usled sve izraženije geoekonomске fragmentacije, koja je dominantno uslovljena trgovinsko-tehnološkim ratom SAD protiv Kine. Oslanjujući se na nalaze referentnih studija, zaključujemo da bi se „decoupling“ i trgovinska fragmentacija mogli manifestovati preko nekoliko glavnih kanala. To su, pored ostalog: usporavanje rasta globalne trgovine, smanjene migracije, redukovane SDI, zabrane transfera određenih visokih tehnologija. U nameri da ostvarimo primarni cilj rada, sugerisali smo pragmatične načine da se sačuva što veći deo benefita proistekao iz trgovinske otvorenosti, odnosno međunarodne ekonomске saradnje. Pre svega, pored intenzivnije komunikacije glavnih globalnih ekonomskih aktera u kojoj bi se uložio dodatni trud za kompromisna rešenja na liniji argumentacije akademske zajednice i eksperata u referentnim međunarodnim institucijama, treba revitalizovati rad vodećih multilateralnih organizacija davajući veći značaj u njihovom rukovođenju zemljama u razvoju, posebno Kini. Na kraju, argumentujemo da, i pored svih rizika, nije realno da će geoekonomска fragmentacija voditi znatnijem smanjenju većine vidova ekonomске saradnje na globalnom nivou, budući da nema valjanih (geopolitičkih) razloga zbog kojih bi zemlje Zapada prestale da uvoze cenovno i kvalitativno konkurentne proizvode iz Kine. Umesto toga, kooperacija će primarno biti redukovana u limitiranom broju visoko-tehnoloških sektora, koji su percipirani u Vašingtonu, Briselu i Pekingu kao strateški značajni.

Ključne reči: geoekonomска fragmentacija, decoupling, trgovinsko-tehnološki rat, Kina, SAD.

Reporting in Daily Newspapers in Serbia and Republic of Srpska Immediately After Acts of Violence: A Case Study of the Mass Murder at Vladislav Ribnikar Primary School

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Abstract

On the first day after the mass murder, a qualitative content analysis was conducted on nine daily newspapers in Republic of Srpska and Serbia. It aimed to determine the existence of similarities in the reporting of daily newspapers in the two countries, compare the existing reporting with current media regulations and self-regulation, identify any violations, and provide recommendations for future, more ethical reporting, given that a number of ethical lapses were observed in the reporting. The analysis of this event has both scientific and societal justification because the event impacted all members of society, and one of the tasks of science is to provide concrete advice on how to report ethically, professionally, and in accordance with recommendations and existing norms. Ethical lapses in the media can have consequences during times of crisis, shock, disbelief, panic and concern, which were understandably triggered in the audience, given that an event of this nature had not been recorded in our societies before.

Key words: daily newspapers in Republic of Srpska and Serbia, journalistic ethics, media regulation and self-regulation, reporting in crises.

Reporting in Daily Newspapers in Serbia and Republic of Srpska Immediately After Acts of Violence: A Case Study of the Mass Murder at Vladislav Ribnikar Primary School

Journalistic Reporting in Situational Crisis and Media Responsibility

In the days following the mass murder, it was evident that neither society as a whole nor the media were prepared for violence of this magnitude. However, this does not diminish the responsibility that the media bears because "the first and foremost duty of journalists is to provide accurate, independent, and timely information upon which specific decisions and choices can be made, and appropriate conclusions drawn made when taking a certain stance" (Bataljević & Bataljević, 2012, p. 175). What occurred at Vladislav Ribnikar Elementary School escalated into a crisis because anyone who was in the killer's sights at that moment could have become a victim. This is because the event took place in a public location. "A crisis is typically fast-paced, involves many actors and requires decisions made under high stress and uncertainty. Swedish Emergency Management Agency [SEMA], 2008, p. 9). Media coverage during a crisis can lead to a phenomenon known as generalized imitation, i.e., similar events that will happen in the near future (Meindl & Ivy, 2017). We witnessed such events in the days following the first mass murder.

In the first hours following the Ribnikar School incident, there was a rush to identify "scapegoats" and unchecked causes. At one moment, a teacher who had given the suspect a failing grade was blamed; in another moment, it was the parents and eventually the peers who had allegedly bullied the suspect, and so on. Many details presented led to the public knowing everything about the event except for what was most relevant. Obtaining relevant facts would have served a protective function for the audience, who were in a state of shock. To reduce the possibility of prolonged stress, it is advisable to avoid repeated and continuous media coverage of events that cause discomfort and trauma, thus making recovery more certain (Holman et al., 2014, as cited in

Štambuk et al., 2021). For this reason, the "only acceptable reporting method in crisis reporting is the application of fact-based theory, which, while considering the pain of the victims, focuses on facts and information of public interest, rather than personal preferences and the irrational judgment of journalists" (Barović, 2011, p.125).

Due to media reporting during crisis events, which in many cases was not ethical, on 9 May 2023, the Department of Psychology at the Faculty of Philosophy formulated guidelines for reporting after crisis events. These guidelines argue that journalistic reporting should be responsible for contributing to community recovery. They should "educate the public to promptly recognize the conditions and behaviours of individuals that may escalate into violence, thus preventing such events; foster empathy for survivors and the families and friends of victims, aiding in recovery; encourage individuals to seek support from experts; encourage individuals to intervene if they notice that someone else may be at risk of committing a violent act, urging that person to seek professional help; promote solidarity and a sense of community" (Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2023, p. 2).

The National Media Regulations and Self-regulation in Serbia and Republic of Srpska Concerning Reporting on Violence

Perpetrators of violence are often referred to as "killers," "monsters," and "murderers" even before a court decision is made. Article 73 of the Law on Public Information and Media of the Republic of Serbia prohibits this practice unless the court reacts differently and issues a final decision (Law on Public Information and Media, Official Gazette of RS 83/2014, 58/2015 and 12/2016). Within the fourth part of the Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics², which deals with the responsibility of journalists, the third sub-clause prescribes the duty of journalists to respect the presumption of innocence (Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics¹, 2013). According to the Code, even in cases of

¹ The Code was adopted in 2006 and was supplemented with provisions on preventing corruption and conflicts of interest in 2013.

admission of guilt, the accused should be identified only by their initials, without accompanying photographs and descriptions, as well as without disclosing their residential address, social status, the names of close individuals, and other details as stipulated by the Code (Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). Respecting the presumption of innocence is also stipulated by Article 16 of the Press and Online Media Code in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Press and Online Media Code in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2022).

Apart from labelling, one of the significant shortcomings in the media is the direct disclosure of the identities of victims, witnesses, and even perpetrators of violence. Media professionals often defend themselves by arguing that revealing identities is in the public interest, using this argument to justify direct or indirect disclosure of identities. Indirectly revealing the identities of victims, witnesses and perpetrators often occurs through the disclosure of background information, which is considered a breach according to Article 8 of the Recommendations for court media reporters, except in a few specified cases outlined in Articles 8 and 9 (Recommendations for Court Media Reporters in Reporting on Investigations and Court Processes, 2006). This regulation provides media professionals with recommendations on what to do in cases where investigations and proceedings involve minors or when minors are victims of violence, as stipulated in Article 10 (Recommendations for Court Media Reporters in Reporting on Investigations and Court Processes, 2006). Other regulations, such as the Guidelines for Media on Dealing with the Police, also govern reporting on cases of violence involving minors. Namely, journalists are obligated to protect the identities of underaged victims and offenders until the police decide to disclose their names, as stipulated in Article 8 (OSCE, 2007). The same article specifies that information about violence victims can be revealed when "permission is obtained from the immediate family or after formal identification" (OSCE, 2007).

Nondisclosure of identity is considered a part of preserving the dignity of the victim, which is also prescribed by recommendations regarding the treatment of gender-related content in the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 2 of these recommendations requires "the portrayal of all individuals in an equal and non-stereotypical manner, with

full respect for their uniqueness and human dignity" (Recommendations for Media on the Treatment of Gender-Related Content and the Use of Gender-Sensitive Language in the Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006). Personal dignity protection is also mandated by Article 79 of the Serbian Law on Public Information and Media. Article 80 of the same law also prescribes a prohibition on disclosing additional information about a person, which reads, "Information from private life, or personal records (letters, diaries, notes, digital records, etc.), records of appearance (a photograph, cartoon, film, video, digital record, etc.), and voice records (audio, gramophone, digital records, etc.), cannot be published without the consent of the person to whom the information from private life pertains, or the person whose words, appearance or voice are contained if it can be inferred which person it is during publication" (Law on Public Information and Media, Official Gazette of RS, 83/2014, 58/2015 and 12/2016). The second paragraph of the same article states that "a minor must not be made recognizable in information that may infringe on their rights or interests." However, Article 82 of the same law emphasizes that "information from private life or personal records may exceptionally be published without the consent of the person referred to in Articles 80 and 81 of this law if, in the specific case, there is a public interest in disclosing the information." Furthermore, the fifth paragraph of Article 82 emphasizes that publication without consent is possible if it is "in the interest of justice, national security, or public safety" (Law on Public Information and Media, Official Gazette of RS, 83/2014, 58/2015 and 12/2016). The Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, in section 4, concerning the responsibility of journalists, mandates, among other things, the protection of the dignity of children and victims (sub-paragraph 5).

Within this same section 4 of the Code, journalists must protect the victims' identities and not disclose their identities. Additionally, statements from witnesses should not reveal the victim's identity (sub-paragraph 3, paragraphs 4 and 5, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). Journalists are required to respect privacy, dignity, and integrity. Therefore, "when reporting on accidents and criminal acts, it is not allowed to publish the names and photographs of victims and perpetrators that identify them" (section 7, sub-paragraph 1, paragraph 1, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). "Also, it is not allowed to

publish any data that could indirectly reveal the identity of either the victim or the perpetrator before the competent authority officially announces it" (section 7, sub-paragraph 1, paragraph 1, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). "The journalist must be aware of the power of the media and the possible consequences for the victim or perpetrator if their identity is revealed". "In particular, they must consider the gravity of potential consequences in case of any errors or incorrect assumptions in reporting (section 7, sub-paragraph 1, paragraph 2, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). "Even if competent state authorities release information revealing the privacy of the perpetrator or victim, the media must not convey that information" (section 7, sub-paragraph 1, paragraph 3, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). Furthermore, "when reporting on events involving personal pain and shock, a journalist must adapt their questions to reflect the spirit of empathy and discretion" (section 7, sub-paragraph 3, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). "Photographers and camerapersons are required to treat victims of accidents and crimes with respect and empathy when taking photographs" (section 7, sub-paragraph 3, paragraph 1, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013). The journalist must ensure that a child is not endangered or exposed to risks due to the publication of their name, photograph, or image showing their face, home, the community they live in, or recognizable surroundings (section 7, sub-paragraph 4, Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2013).

Under Article 17 of the Code of Conduct for Print and Online Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "journalists and editors shall exercise special caution towards victims and/or witnesses in reporting on investigations and legal proceedings in cases of war crimes, sexual offences, peer violence and domestic violence, and, in particular, must not reveal their identity" (Code of Conduct for Print and Online Media in BiH, 2022). Sub-paragraph 16 of the BH Journalists' Code of Ethics emphasizes that journalists should protect human privacy from unjustified or sensationalistic exposure in public. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the Code underscores the need for special responsibility when "reporting on accidents, family tragedies, illnesses, children and minors, in legal proceedings, respecting the presumption of innocence, integrity, dignity

and feelings of all parties in dispute" (Code of Ethics for Bosnian and Herzegovinian Journalists, 2004).

Article 18 of the Code of Conduct for Print and Online Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates that "journalists and editors shall protect the identity of a child in proceedings where public access is otherwise excluded" (Code of Conduct for Print and Online Media in BiH, 2022). "Journalists and editors shall not directly or indirectly identify children under 18 in cases where children are victims, witnesses or accused in criminal proceedings" (Code of Conduct for Print and Online Media in BiH, 2022). Journalists shall not disclose the minors' full identity except in cases of substantial public interest (Article 15, Code of Conduct for Print and Online Media in BiH, 2022). Sub-paragraph 17 of the BH Journalists' Code of Ethics specifies that "journalists shall not interview or photograph a child (up to 15 years of age) about their life or the lives of other children without the presence of a parent or another adult responsible for the child" (BH Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2004). The same sub-paragraph in its first paragraph prohibits interviews and taking photographs in schools unless approved by school authorities (BH Journalists' Code of Ethics, 2004).

Methodology

On the first day after the massacre (4 May 2023), an analysis of the content of nine daily newspapers from Serbia and Republika Srpska was conducted. Daily newspapers were selected for the examination because their role, compared to other media, has always been to provide a broader context, details and explanations of causes and consequences. The analysis aimed to identify similarities in the reporting of daily newspapers in two countries connected primarily by cultural proximity and mutual influence in all fields. Furthermore, it aimed to detect ethical violations that could have far-reaching consequences for society as a whole and provide answers to the question of how well journalistic regulations are respected in everyday news reporting concerning tragic events. A qualitative content analysis of nine daily newspapers was conducted immediately on the first day after the massacre, as it was precisely on that day that the public closely followed the media minute by minute, seeking answers to the newly arisen questions that caused

fear, confusion, and nervousness among everyone. The daily newspapers whose content was analysed are *Nezavisne novine*, *Glas Srpske*, *Euro Blic*, *Večernje novosti*, *Informer*, *Kurir*, *Politika*, *Alo!* and *Srpski Telegraf*.

Results

In the very first hours after the event, journalists rushed to report details of the incident and the perpetrator of the crime in a sensationalist manner, often neglecting the essence and background of the crime. This horrific act has been shown to be primarily a product of dehumanization and alienation of people from each other (See more: Bjelajac, 2014), with the multiplication of contemporary threats in the context of human security (Bjelajac, 2017). Furthermore, the lack of security culture on the internet, from which the perpetrator "drew" ideas for the crime (See more: Bjelajac & Jovanović, 2013), suggests that effective strategies for the safety of young people on the internet must be established (See more: Bjelajac, Matijašević, & Dimitrijević, 2012).

When analyzing this event, we can perceive that the focus was on the perpetrator rather than the victims. In some instances of reporting, the victims were mentioned in terms of numbers, such as in the example where the victims were referred to as eight students and a security worker, seven girls, one boy and one guard (*Glas Srpske*, 4 May 2023). In the journalistic reporting of the mass murder during the analysis of daily newspapers, specific patterns were observed to be repeated, and these patterns included the following: an unprecedented massacre in recent history, a heinous act for the first time in Serbia, and the greatest tragedy in recent Serbian history (as listed in *Politika*, 4 May 2023); an unprecedented tragedy for Vračar and Belgrade, a cold-blooded and meticulously planned multiple murder, a bloody rampage, a brutal crime and a heinous act happening for the first time in our history, a shocking crime (as listed in *Glas Srpske*, 4 May 2023). In the edition of *Informer* dated 4 May 2023, this event was labelled as the worst massacre in the history of Serbia, an unprecedented crime, a killing spree and massacre. In the edition of *Nezavisne novine* dated 4 May 2023, this event is described as a horrific crime, a bloody feast, a crime unprecedented in our region. The daily newspaper *Alo* dated 4 May 2023, marked this event as one of the darkest days in our history, a

horrific massacre, an unprecedented crime in Vračar, a massacre unlike any Serbia remembers, a bloody rampage, a bloody feast. The edition of *Kurir* dated 4 May 2023, described this event as a bloody feast, the worst crime in the history of Serbia, an unprecedented massacre in a school in the Serbia, a bloody drama, a massacre. *Večernje novosti* dated 4 May 2023, labelled this event as a bloody feast, an unfortunate event, an unprecedented massacre in recent history. The daily newspaper *Euro Blic*, in the edition dated 4 May 2023, characterized the event as a tragedy on Vračar, an unparalleled tragedy, something terrible that happened, a monstrous step, a bloody rampage, a bloody massacre, and as a horrific crime unprecedented in our region. Additionally, certain patterns were observed regarding the school where the violence occurred, some of which are: prestigious capital educational institution, one of the most desirable ones due to its location and because many children of public figures attend it (*Euro Blic*, 4 May 2023).

One of the most reputable schools in the capital and at the national level, a school that until yesterday was considered one of the safest (*Politika*, 3 May 2023).

What is common to all daily newspapers is that they all had at least one photograph, and most often more, from the crime scene in their reporting. In this regard, the most common images include grieving parents and acquaintances, the police, ambulance vehicles, and scenes of candlelight vigils and paying respects to the victims. Common to most daily newspapers in Serbia is at least one statement from a psychologist. Psychologists serve as relevant sources in providing expert analyses and interpretations of the event that stirred unrest among all people. Their reports significantly contributed to relieving the justified tension that arose among everyone. Some of the recurring facts in most of the analysed daily newspapers are precisely the information and details presented at the emergency press conference held by the state leadership, as well as statements from officials at that conference. Many daily newspapers reported on the measures to combat violence proposed by the president. It was repeated that the father of the boy suspected of murder took his son to a shooting range, what the boy said during his arrest was reiterated, the chronology of events was emphasized, the fact that Kosta is not criminally responsible, the previous case of violence

from the acting school, and the address by His Holiness Serbian Patriarch Porfirije. This is justified because the public sought clarification of the situation from that aspect. So, many daily newspapers quoted the words of the suspect immediately after his arrest, but some newspapers went a step further by publishing them on the front page. Those were the striking words of the boy after his apprehension, in which he stated that he was a psychopath and that's why he committed the murders (*Informer*, 4 May 2023, *Alo!*, 4 May 202, *Večernje novosti*, 4 May 2023). *Nezavisne novine* did not sensationalize the boy's statements after his arrest. On the front page of *Kurir* (4 May 2023), it is mentioned that the boy shot like in video games. The statements of delegates, ambassadors, and politicians from the region regarding the tragedy and expressions of condolences are among other facts frequently reiterated in many newspapers. Some newspapers also reported statements from world leaders regarding this event. Additionally, plenty of daily newspapers also took note of the coverage of this event in international media.

During the analysis, observed was direct or indirect disclosure of the identity of the victims, the perpetrator and witnesses. We remind you that the disclosure of the identity of victims, witnesses, and in some cases also the perpetrators is considered a journalistic offence, which is explained in more detail in Recommendations for Court Media Reporters in Reporting on Investigations and Court Processes, Guidelines for Media Interaction with the Police, the Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, the Code for Printed and Online Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other regulations. We have provided more detailed information on this issue in the part about media regulations and self-regulation.

Večernje novosti (4 May 2023) revealed on the second page the names, surnames, and ages of all the deceased children and the identities of most of the injured children and the teacher. On the front page, *Informer* (4 May 2023) published the names and initial letters of the surnames of all known victims and their ages. In the same daily newspapers, there is a blurred sketch containing the names and surnames of the potential victims that the perpetrator planned to kill. The sketch with the names and surnames of potential victims is fully accessible on the front page of *Večernje novosti* (4 May 2023). The sketch representing a hit list, as stated in the photo caption, was

published in the daily newspaper *Alo!* (4 May 2023), in which the initial letters of the names and surnames of the children that the perpetrator planned to kill remained visible. In *Kurir* (4 May 2023), a photograph of the sketch with potential victims was published, but it was blurred. In *Nezavisne novine* (4 May 2023), the victims are identified as eight students and a security guard, while six little ones and a teacher were wounded.

To present all individuals in a "fair and non-stereotypical manner, with full respect for their uniqueness and human dignity" is mandated by the Recommendations for Media on Handling Gender Issues and the Use of Gender-Sensitive Language in the Media of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006). In the analysed daily newspapers, there was noticeable stereotyping of parents and the murder suspect. *Informer* (4 May 2023) also mentions the boy's mother, a pathologist, who is referred to in the text as the former wife of a renowned radiologist, for whom colleagues have words of praise. That the suspect's father was a prominent radiologist was immediately mentioned on the second page of *Večernje novosti* (4 May 2023) in a separate and noticeable section, alongside which his unblurred photograph in a white coat was displayed. The suspect was also stereotyped as the son of a renowned radiologist. On the same page, it was mentioned that the boy's mother was a lecturer at the Faculty of Biology and that Kosta has a 10-year-old half-sister from his father's second marriage. The daily newspaper *Alo!* (4 May 2023), also mentioned on the front page that the boy's father was a well-known Belgrade doctor. On the second page, it was cited that his mother worked at the Faculty of Biology and that the boy came from a prestigious family. The media found a connection that the boy's father had once worked at the Institute for Cardiovascular Diseases "Dedinje" and took a statement from the director of that institution (*Kurir*, 4 May 2023). In *Euro Blic*, the arrested father was also portrayed as a well-known doctor.

According to the Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics, the Law on Public Information and Media of the Republic of Serbia, and the Code for Printed and Online Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina, journalists are obligated to respect the presumption of innocence and avoid labelling the suspect before the court issues its verdict. On the front page of the daily newspaper *Politika*

(4 May 2023), the suspect was characterized as a seventh-grade student, thirteen year old, identified by his first name and the initial letter of his last name. He was described as the perpetrator of mass murder, the culprit of the tragic event, an exemplary student, and a friend, "a student with no observed mental or any other emotional problems that would suggest such evil" (words of the head of the Belgrade police department). The daily newspaper *Glas Srpske* (4 May 2023) identified the suspect as a seventh-grade student, thirteen year old, a juvenile killer with his full name and surname. He was also characterized as an excellent student representing the school at competitions. In *Večernje novosti* (4 May 2023), the suspect was characterized on the basis of the words of the official as the best student who was avoided by everyone. In the same daily newspaper, the suspect was identified by his first name, the initial letter of his last name, and his age as a seventh-grader, the perpetrator of the massacre. Among other things, he is described as someone who "trained basketball, karate, went to acting classes" according to the president, and was interested in robotics and wanted to be an astrophysicist (*Srpski Telegraf*, 4 May 2023). In *Informer* (4 May 2023), the suspect is described as a deranged boy, a seventh-grade student, a mentally disturbed boy, the best student everyone avoided, and a juvenile murderer. In *Nezavisne novine* (4 May 2023), professional ethics were upheld, and the journalist did not reveal the suspect's identity, referring to him as a school student and a thirteen-year-old. The daily newspaper *Alo!* (4 May 2023) identified the suspect by initials and age and as a seventh-grade student. In these newspapers, the suspect is described as a calm, reserved, and polite boy, an excellent student who practised karate and attended a music school, according to acquaintances. On the front page of *Kurir* (4 May 2023), the suspect is described as a 13-year-old boy and a suspected minor, thus respecting the presumption of innocence. However, on another page, he is labelled a murderer (an example from the caption under one of the accompanying photos: "moment of surrender of the murderer"). Then, the presumption of innocence is respected again, and on another occasion, the suspect is referred to as the arrested boy. In these daily newspapers, the suspect is also identified as a seventh-grade student and a minor, a prodigy, an excellent and talented student, and a

successful athlete. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), the suspect was portrayed as calm and an excellent student, described as a 13-year-old teenager by his full name and last name, both as a killer and as a seventh-grade student, with outstanding grades and results in various competitions, and was also labelled as a killer and a deranged teenager.

Some of the accompanying photos from the second to the tenth page of the daily newspaper *Srpski telegraf* (4 May 2023) are a close-up of the suspect's face with blurred eyes, a symbolic photo of a pistol and blood, photos of people from the event in tears, the moment of arrest, a picture of the suspect's father, a screenshot from the GTA video game, the latest photo of the suspect from Facebook, pictures of the Chief of the Belgrade Police, the Minister of Internal Affairs, a photo of a former volleyball player, a picture of the deceased security guard, a photo of a geography teacher at school who is noted for "carrying bloody children in his arms," a photo of the killer's lawyer, a photo of the President of Serbia, a photo of Patriarch Porfirije, the Minister of Health wiping away tears with a handkerchief at a press conference, a photo of the Minister of Trade, a picture from the press conference regarding the event, and photos of politicians from the region expressing condolences. The entire series of reporting in *Srpski telegraf* (4 May 2023) in the "topic of the day" section is marked as "Serbia in Mourning Clothes". Photos from the scene are featured in *Informer* and on pages eight and nine, with one of them focusing on a weeping woman. In *Nezavisne novine* (4 May 2023), two photos were published. The first shows upset parents, and the second is an authentic photo with police and ambulance cars. There's also a photo capturing the moment of the boy's arrest, a photo excerpt from a press conference, a photo of the boy with a blurred face, and a photo depicting the murder plan. These photos were published without captions. The latest photo of the boy on Facebook was also featured in the daily newspaper *Kurir* (4 May 2023). However, it's not mentioned here what it means, only that he wanted to become an astrophysicist, with a note that he loved playing the game "Counter-Strike," as stated by a source from *Kurir*. Photos of the wounded history teacher and the boy suspected of multiple murders are blurred in the daily newspaper *Kurir*. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), on pages eight and nine, there are seven authentic photos from the scene featuring

frightened and tearful parents and children. It's positive that the children's eyes are blurred. *Euro Blic* praises the history teacher, but the accompanying photo is inappropriate for this situation, as it's a selfie of her from a trip.

The daily newspaper *Politika*, in its edition of 4 May 2023, dedicated seven pages to this event, which is ethically desirable because the journalists attempted to provide the broader context to the public and answer questions such as "How did the gun end up in the hands of a minor?" as one of the headlines reads, and "How to understand the crime committed by a child?", in which a school psychologist and the president of the Executive Board of the Serbian Psychologists' Society is interviewed. The reporting in this issue concludes by reminding readers of school shootings as a common phenomenon in the United States and recalling a similar crime that occurred on 11 May 2021 in Russia when a former student killed seven students and two teachers and injured 32 people. It is ethically commendable that in the daily newspaper *Politika*, in the statement from the psychologist (on page eight), the issues that are the subject of this report are addressed. The psychologist stated: "It is important to emphasize that the way the media reports can influence what will happen later with the victims of this crime, as well as with society as a whole. The advice is to report with as little sensationalism and speculation as possible and without value judgements about the act itself." *Informer* (4 May 2023) dedicated 12 pages to this event, including the front page, which is also focused on this event. Quantitatively, daily newspapers in Serbia have allocated more pages to this crime than daily newspapers in the Republic of Srpska. This is understandable because the daily newspapers in the Republic of Srpska have reported on this violence based on cultural proximity factors since the event did not occur in the Republic of Srpska. In addition to its front page, the daily newspaper *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023) covers this crime on seven more pages. The first two pages focus on events in Republic of Srpska, and below them, there is a cartoon related to this event, which, as a genre, was not noticed in other daily newspapers during the research. The cartoon relates to the days of mourning in Serbia.

Besides the ethically sound aspects observed in the reporting on the day after the violence, there was also a presence of sensationalism

in the newspapers. The sensationalistic approach is present in the daily newspaper *Politika* (4 May 2023) in a headline that reads, "Disbelief, Anxiety and Wailing," describing a situation from the crime scene as follows: "And then, a cry is heard. A woman screams and tries to pass through the police cordon. Her child is in school. There's no news; they haven't heard from the child. The phone is ringing, but no one is answering." The source is then mentioned as "someone says," accompanied by a stereotypical portrayal of the deceased security guard: "Everyone loved him. He had time for every student. He was beloved, like a parent to the school children." The police statement about the victims is described as "horrifying," and the emotions of a student's grandmother, who was on duty that day, are conveyed with the sentence, "You wouldn't wish such pain on even an enemy." Additionally, the grandmother of the student is also mentioned as a former teacher at the school, an older woman who, due to shock, wore two different socks. An unethical headline was also observed in *Glas Srpske*. It reads "Serbia in Mourning Clothes (4 May 2023). Unethical accompanying photos alongside the text were noted in the following daily newspapers: *Glas Srpske* (4 May 2023), two weeping women are pictured with the caption, "Terrible Consequences of Tragedy."

Politika (4 May 2023), there is an image of a weeping man with the caption, "Yesterday at the Entrance to Emergency Service of Serbian Clinical Centre."

Politika (4 May 2023), there's a photo of three weeping women embracing each other with the caption, "Weeping Relatives of Students in Front of the School Where the Mass Murder Occurred." *Kurir* (4 May 2023), a subheadline "Grandmother Faints After Terrible News," with a note that the grandmother fell down the stairs due to shock. In the same daily newspaper on the same day, there's another subheadline: "Mother Cries My Son Has Died," and the text reads "No one remained immune to the wailing and cries, while one of the parents started shouting, 'They're dead, they're dead!' In the daily newspaper *Informer* (4 May 2023), there are ten photos from the scene showing grieving family members (on pages four and five of the newspaper). There is a photo of the boy from Facebook presented as a photomontage. The reporter writes: "It could be inferred from the photo that the boy was consumed

by some evil... just at first glance, this profile picture from the social network indicates that the boy has serious psychological problems."

The scene in front of the school is described as eerie and distressing, similar to a state of war. There's a detailed description of the grandmother's reaction upon learning that she lost her granddaughter, the cries of parents, speculations about the motives behind the violence (despite these being still mere speculations), the boy's facial expression, the type of weapon used to commit the crime and the number of bullets it can hold. All these unnecessary details, promised in the headline, represent sensationalism in reporting on the violence. Sensationalistic constructions such as "the murderer poured a rain of bullets) are also present in *Nezavisne novine* (4 May 2023). In the daily newspaper *Alo!*, some details have been revealed, such as the fact that the murdered girl was the daughter of a well-known Red Star coach. This was also revealed in *Večernje novosti* (4 May 2023), where it is mentioned that the murdered girl was the daughter of the well-known volleyball coach Dragan Kobiljski. Former volleyball player Željko Tanasković gave a statement about the family's condition. Alongside the text, there is a picture of the grieving Dragan Kobiljski's wife, Nina Kobiljski, receiving the news of the tragedy. In addition to the fact that the child of a coach was among the victims, other details related to the violence in the daily newspaper *Alo!* (4 May 2023) include: Two girls managed to escape while the boy was reloading. The security guard was shot from a 14-metre distance. The boy was a passionate fan of the game "Fortnite" (sourced from "some claim," though unverified sources should not be referred to in reporting on such a tragedy). Dreams of the slain children about their future careers, such as "Ema dreamed of being a musician and a mother of three." A priest visited Tiršova Hospital and stayed there for half an hour. The mother of one of the deceased girls was "literally carried out of the hospital... the woman could barely stand on her feet, she was as pale as a ghost, and security and police were holding her up so she wouldn't fall." A child who witnessed the massacre couldn't stop screaming and grabbing their hair (based on one mother's statement). The son of the Minister of Trade attends the school and was in the same shift when the violence occurred. *Kurir* (4 May 2023) reported that the minister's child attends that school, and everyone is shocked. The front

page of *Alo!* is entirely sensational, from the headline 'Serbia in Tears' to the revelation of the security guard's identity right on the front page, along with details about the weaponry and the boy's parents.

'Mother, don't wait for me any longer' is the headline of the article in *Večernje novosti* (4 May 2023), with the subheading 'When she heard Emma was a victim, the grandmother fainted'; 'No, I won't admit it! I can't accept it! Nooo! It's not true! Tell me it's not true. Tell me, please – a mother cried out when she received the worst news. Let me get into the school, open up, let me in, let me in!!! Open up!' ... she clutches her head with her hands and screams... 'barely any photojournalist raised their camera.'" How? "It seems that even the camera lens would shatter before such despair ... 'The mother grabs her head and lets out a wail; it's a terrible image, like an embrace that will be in vain to yearn for.'" A sensationalistic headline is also present in *Nezavisne novine* (4 May 2023), which reads, "Bloody Rampage in School, Student Massacres Classmates and Guard," with accompanying text on the front page, "Serbia and the Region Shrouded in Grief After Horrific Crime at Vladislav Ribnikar Primary School in Belgrade." Unnecessary details such as "the attacker's gaze was frozen," as stated by "the mother of one of the students who escaped unharmed," as reported in *Kurir* (4 May 2023), are superfluous. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), sensational reporting is evident, demonstrated by sensationalistic elements such as the word 'massacre' marked in large red letters across an entire page, the increasing number of casualties, which is referred to in the text as the realization of the darkest fears. These sensational elements are accompanied by statements from Emergency Medical Service doctors who said they cried and trembled. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), inappropriate language is prevalent. Phrases such as "police cars and emergency teams with sirens and flashing lights were darting in all directions," "dozens of ambulances and police cars quickly gathered in front of Vladislav Ribnikar Primary School," and "tearful moms, dads, grandmas, and grandpas were trying to reach their children" are used. Sensationalistic headlines present in *Euro Blic* include statements such as: "Numerous children of celebrities were in school at the time," "My fear intensified only when my child returned home," "I was lying beside my deceased friend's body, pretending to be dead," "I witnessed the

security guard collapsing to the ground,” and “It was a fellow student who shot my granddaughter.”

In the early days of reporting, sources in news articles are often other media outlets. For example, the text from *Glas Srpske* (4 May 2023) mentions that “according to certain media reports, the assailant targeted history teacher because she had previously given him a failing grade.” In news articles, the same sources often appear in multiple places. For example, the Serbian Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, Zoran Pašalić, is mentioned as a source in *Euro Blic* and *Politika*. The headlines in both newspapers are almost identical (“Final warning to society” in *Glas Srpske* and “Ultimate warning to our society” in *Politika*). Furthermore, both *Glas Srpske* and *Politika* feature the same selected statements from the emergency press conference, with a particular emphasis on ‘the cancerous, destructive influence of the internet, video games and so-called Western values,’ as stated by Branko Ružić, the Minister of Education, who resigned a few days after the tragedy.” In daily newspapers on that day, the appearance of the same interviewees is noticeable (such as the student Evgenija and the mother of the boy who played dead during the shooting, featured in *Informer*, *Euro Blic* and *Večernje novosti*). *Informer*, in addition to official sources, included numerous public figures and their comments on the violence, ranging from writer Dušan Nedeljković, whose child attends the same school, to showbiz personalities who are in no way connected to the case and are not relevant or qualified to provide comments on the topic. Some of the personalities whose comments are featured include Dušica Jakovljević, Nataša Aksentijević, Marija Mikić, Ana Sević, Anastasija Ražnatović, Jelena Karleuša, Slađa Alegro, Sloba Radanović, Nikolina Pišek, Jovana Jeremić and Ana Stanić, who appears as a source in *Euro Blic* as well. “The reactions of Lepa Brena, Sloba Radanović, Dušica Jakovljević, Neda Ukraden, Nikolina Pišek, Nikola Rokvić, Goca Tržan and Ana Sević also appear in *Kurir*. The eighth and ninth pages of *Informer* (4 May 2023) are dedicated to expert sources who commented on the event. Among them are two sociologists, two lawyers, a representative from the Forum of Primary and Secondary Vocational Schools, a criminologist, two psychologists, a psychiatrist and the director of a psychiatric clinic. Positive trend in the reporting of that daily newspaper

is that it mentions the phone number for psychological help. In *Nezavisne novine* (4 May 2023), the same sources appear; for example, the mother of the boy who survived by pretending to be dead, writer Dušan Nedeljković, and the statement by Veselin Milić that the sketch looks like from video games. These statements are also repeated in other media outlets, which is expected since they are from the press conference. The same sources from *Nezavisne novine* appeared in *Alo!* on 4 May 2023. Details about the weapons were also presented in *Nezavisne novine* and are integral to Minister Gašić's statement. In *Alo!* (4 May 2023), as in other media outlets, the girl Evgenija is mentioned as a source. Dušan Nedeljković is mentioned as a source in *Kurir* and *Večernje novosti*. He stated that this boy was bullied, and his child attends this school. On the sixth and seventh pages of *Večernje novosti* (4 May 2023), two psychologists, a medical doctor, and a sociology professor are featured, which is ethically appropriate. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), among the public figures whose children attend this school, Zoran Kesić, Ana Stanić, Mirko Janketić and Duško Savanović are mentioned. Evgenija, a student who was on the scene, was interviewed. The student from the "classroom of horror," as journalists called it in *Euro Blic*, was also interviewed, and his mother relayed his words, stating that he told her that Kosta killed them all. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), sources include neighbours and one of the workers near the building where the boy's family lives. One said, "The boy has always been polite and well-behaved but has always been withdrawn." The same person mentioned that his father was a well-known doctor. Therefore, the statement from the sources includes stereotyping. In *Euro Blic* (4 May 2023), journalists took statements from parents who are reported to have spoken through tears. The same statements from neighbours about the boy being withdrawn and shy are represented. Neighbours' reactions are also recorded in *Kurir*, which includes a statement from Dejan Ristić, whose child attends the same school (4 May 2023).

Conclusion

Research has established that newspapers in Serbia and Republika Srpska report in a similar way. Positive trends were also observed, but also a number of ethical failures in reporting in both

countries. When a violent or tragic event occurs, especially of such magnitude, it is inevitable that the media audience wants to acquire additional information to draw conclusions and, above all, to get answers as to why something happened. The audience seeks further information to avoid further and more profound consequences. In this regard, the media and journalists must work in the public interest and deliver information in line with all the values and principles of journalism. However, more often than not, the situation arises where the media and journalists cater to public interest. Catering to the public interest, the media have sensationalized reported from the day the murders were committed and in the following months, emphasizing the perpetrator and his family and placing the victims in the "background." When the resources for reporting on the perpetrator were exhausted, the focus shifted to exploiting the suffering of the victims' families. In some situations, the exploitation of the perpetrator's life and the victims' suffering happened in parallel. During the first days of the tragedy, most citizens were familiar with all the information about the event, much of which was unreliable, irrelevant, or partially accurate. All the details from the media contributed to a sense of collective nervousness, fear, panic and disbelief. An analysis of the mentioned daily newspapers showed that witnesses to the accident and students and their families provided statements to the media in the early hours and at moments of massive shock. Later, their statements were shared and disseminated through a chain effect in many media outlets. The audience quickly sought new information to alleviate the feelings of insecurity, panic, and fear. However, in many cases, media reporting only boosted panic, mainly through the unnecessary repetition of details. Regarding potential causes of the violence, daily newspapers featured comments from singers, athletes, actors, and other public figures who were given media space but were not relevant sources to discuss the committed violence. In the absence of experts as relevant sources on the first day who could potentially provide explanations for the case, journalists, racing to publish information, continuously cited new causes of the violence every few hours. Some of the details of the mass murder that added extra nervousness and could have been omitted from reporting include audio recordings of the gunfire, video recordings of the arrest, distressful

scenes filled with tears and the pain of families who lost their loved ones, exposing them to additional victimization, sketches with a list of students, some of whom were alive, details about the movements of the perpetrator, disclosure of the personal life of the perpetrator, and endangering the dignity of the perpetrator, victims and witnesses, as well as their families. Indeed, numerous phenomena existing in society, such as the presence of a segment of youth celebrating a violent individual as a hero on platforms like Instagram, TikTok, and other social media, must be brought into the media as a reflection of our society. However, media reporting on violence requires special treatment while adhering to the profession's codes and regulations. Additionally, what must be taken into account is the fact that our region has never witnessed such a case, and even the relevant institutions, politicians, media, and journalists were not adequately prepared because no one could have ever imagined that such things would start happening here. The events that occurred in the days following the analysed mass murder confirmed the theories of generalized imitation discussed in the first chapter of the work. This further complicated the understanding and analysis of each of these individual events. Understanding the events was also hindered by the fact that, from the very first day, the mass murder was linked to other tragic events that had previously shaken the public. For example, statements from individuals like Igor Jurić, whose daughter had tragically died, were featured in the daily newspapers. Every event requires journalists to investigate its background, but this investigation should not involve additional stereotyping, sensationalism, spectacularization, or dramatization. In the future, it would be desirable to leave the media space to experts who can analyse phenomena that society has never faced before. Journalistic reporting should adhere to laws, codes and regulations that promote a more ethical portrayal of tragedies. There should be a more decisive multi-sectoral approach to problematic issues, and efforts should be made in advance for their prevention.

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Mora da postoji granica razaranja tradicionalnog [There must be a limit to the destruction of the traditional]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 3.

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Operisani su stabilno [They were operated stably]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 3.

Organizovana stručna psihološka pomoć [Organized professional psychological help]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 5.

OSCE. (2007). Smjernice za medije u ophođenju s policijom [Guidelines for media on dealing with the police]. <https://bhnovinari.ba/bs/2007/11/10/smjernice-za-medije-u-ophodenju-s-policijom/>

Otac ga vodio u streljanu da vežba pucanje [His father took him to the shooting range to practice shooting]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 2.

Otac mu je divan čovek [His father is a wonderful man]. (2023, maj 4.).
Kurir, 8.

Ovde je izveden 'američki scenario' [Here is the 'American scenario'].
(2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 8.

Ovo je najstrašnije iskustvo u karijeri [This is the scariest experience of my career]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 9.

Ovo je poraz svih nas [This is a defeat for all of us]. (2023, maj 4.). *Glas Srpske*, 3.

Ovo se u Beogradu nikad nije desilo [This has never happened in Belgrade]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 8.

Palili sveće za žrtve [They lit candles for the victims]. (2023, maj 4.).
Euro Blic, 4.

Pašalić: Krajnje upozorenje našem društvu [Pašalić: A final warning to our society]. (2023, maj 4.). *Politika*, 8.

Patrijarh: Molim za osudu promocije nasilja u javnosti [Patriarch: I am asking for the condemnation of the promotion of violence in public]. (2023, maj 4.). *Politika*, 6.

Po uzoru na igricu GTA [Modeled after the game GTA]. (2023, maj 4.).
Srpski telegraf, 3.

Pobio drugare pa zvao policiju: ja sam psihopata [Killed friends and called the police: I'm a psychopath]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 2-3.

Policija blokirala ulice [The police blocked the streets]. (2023, maj 4.).
Euro Blic, 6.

Poslednje upozorenje društvu [A final warning to society]. (2023, maj 4.). *Glas Srpske*, 3.

Poznavao sam čuvara [I knew the guard]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 8.

Preporuke za medije o tretiranju rodnih sadržaja i upotrebi rodno osjetljivog jezika u medijima Bosne i Hercegovini [Recommendations for media on the treatment of gender-related content and the use of gender-sensitive language in the media in bosnia and herzegovina]. (2006). Vijeće za štampu u Bosni i

Hercegovini, Udruženje/Udruga BH novinari, Društvo novinara BiH, Udruga hrvatskih novinara u BiH, Udruženje novinara RS u saradnji s Udruženjem Q, Gender centrima Vlada RS i FBiH, te Agencijom za ravnopravnost polova BiH.

Preporuke za medijske izvještače sa sudova u izvještavanju o istragama i sudskim procesima [Recommendations for court media reporters in reporting on investigations and court processes]. (2006). Vijeće za štampu u Bosni i Hercegovini, Udruženje/Udruga "BH Novinari", Društvo novinara BiH, Udruga hrvatskih novinara u BiH, Udruženje novinara Republike Srpske u saradnji sa Asocijacijom izvještača sa sudova u BiH.

Pribojavali smo se ovakve nesreće [We were afraid of such an accident]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 8.

Pričajte sa decom! Pričajte! Pričajte! [Talk to the kids! Talk! Talk!]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 6.

Profesori-heroji spasavali decu [Professors-heroes saved children]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 6-7.

Proverite da li je ubica trpeo nasilje [Check if the killer suffered violence]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 13.

Psiholog: Ovo se dešava često u SAD, ne u Srbiji [Psychologist: This happens often in the USA, not in Serbia]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 9.

Pucanj pravo u glavu [A straight shot to the head]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 5.

Pucao iz 'češke zbojevke' [Shot from the 'Czech zbojevka']. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 4.

Pustite me da budem sa svojim anđelom! [Let me be with my angel!]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 5.

R. H. (2023, maj 4.). Ključno je pitanje kako se pištolj našao u rukama maloletnika [The key question is how the gun ended up in the hands of a minor]. *Politika*, 7. (novinar/ka je označen samo inicijalima)

Ranjenima brz oporavak [Speedy recovery to the wounded]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 4.

Razgovor sa psihiyatrima [Conversation with psychiatrists]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 7.

Razgovor sa psihiyatrom [A conversation with a psychiatrist]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 4.

Redovi za doniranje krvi [Lines for donating blood]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 7.

Regovanja poznatih na tragediju [Famous people's reactions to the tragedy]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 9.

Roditelji besni: odakle detetu oružje!? [Parents are furious: where did the child get the weapon!?]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 5.

Ružić: Poguban uticaj igrica i interneta [Ružić: The pernicious influence of games and the Internet]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 9.

Ružić: poguban uticaj interneta [Ružić: the pernicious influence of the Internet]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 6.

Sa Srbijom tuguje i RS [The RS also mourns with Serbia]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 5.

Saosećamo sa Srbijom [We sympathize with Serbia]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 11.

Saučešća iz regionala i EU [Condolences from the region and the EU]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 9.

Saučešće gradonačelnika [Condolences of the mayor]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 5.

Saučešće je preslaba reč [Sympathy is too weak a word]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 11.

Simić Miladinović, M. (2023, maj 4.). Niko nema pravo da pretresa ranac učenika [No one has the right to search a student's backpack]. *Politika*, 6.

Slabost reči [Weakness of words]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 6.

Sladojević, D. (2023, maj 4.). Krvavi pir u školi, učenik ubio drugare i čuvara [A bloody feast at school, a student killed his friends and a guard]. *Nezavisne novine*, 2-3.

Stevanović, J. (2023, maj 4.). Školske pucnjave česta pojava u SAD [School shootings are common in the US]. *Politika*, 9.

Stradao čuvar kojeg su svi voleli [The guardian whom everyone loved died]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 10.

“Strah me uhvatio tek kada mi je dete došlo kući” [“Fear gripped me only when my child came home”]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 8.

Strašan zločin [A terrible crime]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 6.

Suočiti se sa ovim problemom [Face this problem]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 6.

Suze, cveće i sveće na mestu tragedije [Tears, flowers and candles at the scene of the tragedy]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 7.

Sve ih je pobio, sve: moj sin je legao i pravio se mrtav, tako je preživeo! [He killed them all, all of them: my son lay down and pretended to be dead, that's how he survived!]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 4.

Svetski lideri i zvaničnici uputili saučešće [World leaders and officials sent condolences]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 9.

Svetski mediji iz minuta u minut o tragediji u Beogradu [World media minute by minute about the tragedy in Belgrade]. (2023, maj 4.). *Politika*, 8.

Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). (2008). *Crisis communications handbook*. Summary and translation of the Swedish “Handbok i kriskommunikation”. NRS Tryckeri, Huskvarna.

Školski čuvar prvi nastradao [The school guard was the first to die]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 2.

Šok što su žrtve deca [Shock that the victims are children]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 4.

Šta se desi u glavi dečaka pa postane hladnokrvni ubica? [What happens in the boy's head to become a cold-blooded killer?]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 7.

Štambuk, M., Martinčević, M., Rezo Bagarić, I. (2021, February, 17). Zašto je važno kako mediji izvještavaju u kriznim situacijama? [Why is it important how the media reports in crisis situations?]. Zagrebačko psihološko durštvo.

<https://zgpd.hr/2021/02/17/zasto-je-vazno-kako-mediji-izvjestavaju-u-kriznim-situacijama/>

Tanasković: Ubijena kćerka trenera Zvezde [Tanasković: The daughter of the Zvezda coach was killed]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 4.

Teško naći reči utehe [Hard to find words of comfort]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 4.

Tragedija koju niko ne treba da doživi [A tragedy that no one should have to experience]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 11.

Tragedija u Beogradu udarna tema svetskih medija [The tragedy in Belgrade is the hot topic of the world media]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 9.

Traume neće olako nestati [Traumas will not go away easily]. (2023, maj 4.). *Glas Srpske*, 3.

Trenirao košarku, išao u muzičku školu i školu robotike, htio da bude astrofizičar [Coached basketball, went to music school and robotics school, wanted to be an astrophysicist]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 3.

Tri dana žalosti u Srbiji [Three days of mourning in Serbia]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 7.

Trodevna žalost u Srbiji [Three-day mourning in Serbia]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 5.

Tužna vest za sve [Sad news for everyone]. (2023, maj 4.). *Informer*, 10.

U mislima sa žrtvama [In thoughts with the victims]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 6.

U muklom bolu slušam o katastrofi [I hear about the disaster in excruciating pain]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 9.

Ubica bio žrtva vršnjačkog nasilja [The killer was a victim of peer violence]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 2.

Ubijena i čerka poznatog trenera [The daughter of a famous trainer was also killed]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 2.

Ubijeni čuvar Dragan Kostu voleo kao sina [The murdered guard Dragan Kosta loved like a son]. (2023, maj 4.). *Srpski telegraf*, 4-5.

Učiteljica heroj za primer [Hero teacher for example]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 5.

Udarna informacija [Shocking information]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 7.

Uhapšen i otac dečaka! [The boy's father was also arrested!]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 3.

“Unuka mi je upucao niko drugi nego drug iz odelenja” [“My grandson was shot by none other than a classmate”]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 8.

Upozorenje celom društvu [A warning to all society]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 7.

Urgentni centar: dečak sa povredama vrata životno ugrožen [Emergency center: boy with neck injuries, life-threatening]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 5.

Užasne vesti [Terrible news]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 6.

Vest obišla planetu [The news toured the planet]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 7.

“Videla sam kako čuvar pada na pod...” [“I saw the guard fall to the floor...”]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 9.

Vodio ga u streljanu [Took him to the shooting range]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 3.

Vršnjak ga udario u usta [A peer punched him in the mouth]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 2.

Vučić: Ne pamtimo veću tugu [Vučić: We do not remember a greater sadness]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 10.

Zajedno tugujemo [We grieve together]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 5.

Zaključali se u Sali za fizičko [They locked themselves in the gym]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 5.

Zakon o javnom informisanju i medijima [Law on public information and media], "Sl. glasnik RS", br. 83/2014, 58/2015 i 12/2016.

Zarić, Z. (2023, maj 4.). Moja unuka je unutra, ništa ne govore, umirem od brige...[My granddaughter is inside, they don't say anything, I'm dying of worry...]. *Alo!*, 4.

Zločin kakav ne pamtimo [A crime we don't remember]. (2023, maj 4.). *Večernje novosti*, 4.

Zločin pripremao mesec dana, imao i spisak žrtava! [He prepared the crime for a month, and had a list of victims!]. (2023, maj 4.). *Euro Blic*, 6.

Znali smo kad smo videli suze [We knew it when we saw tears]. (2023, maj 4.). *Alo!*, 4.

Žrtve: Prvo likvidirao čuvara škole kako ga on ne bi sprečio da počini pokolj [Victims: First killed the school guard so he wouldn't stop him from committing the massacre]. (2023, maj 4.). *Kurir*, 4-5.

Izvještavanje dnevnih novina u Srbiji i Republici Srpskoj neposredno nakon izvršenog nasilja: studija slučaja masovno ubistvo u OŠ "Vladislav Ribnikar"

Jovana Mlinarević

Fakultet političkih nauka, Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, Bosna i Hercegovina

Sažetak

Prvog dana nakon izvršenog masovnog ubistva sprovedena je kvalitativna analiza sadržaja devet dnevnih novina u Republici Srpskoj i Srbiji. Cilj analize bio je utvrđivanje postojanja sličnosti u izvještavanju dnevnih novina u dvije države, upoređivanje postojećeg izvještavanja sa važećom medijskom regulativom i samoregulativom, utvrđivanje eventualnih prestupa i pružanje preporuka za buduće etičnije izvještavanje, s obzirom na to da se uočio niz etičkih propusta u izvještavanju. Analiza ovog događaja ima i naučnu i društvenu opravdanost jer je događaj uticao na sve članove društva, a jedan od zadataka nauke jeste da pruži konkretnе savjete kako izvještavati etično, profesionalno i u skladu sa preporukama i važećim normama. Etički propusti u medijima mogu izazvati posljedice u stanju krize, šoka, nevjerice, panike i zabrinutosti koja je bila probuđena kod publike što je razumljivo s obzirom da događaj ovakvog tipa nije zabilježen u našim društvima ranije.

Ključne reči: dnevne novine u Republici Srpskoj i Srbiji, novinarska etika, medijska regulativa i samoregulativa, izvještavanje u kriznim situacijama

AUTHORS' GUIDELINES (starting from 2024)

The journal Kultura polisa [Culture of Polis] publishes papers resulting from the latest theoretical and empirical scientific research from a wide range of social sciences. When writing papers, authors should refer mainly to the results of scientific research that have been published in scientific journals. The Editorial staff of the Journal reserves the right to adjust the manuscripts to the editorial rules and policies of the journal.

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Language requirements

Papers are published in English language (United States). Domestic authors, in addition to the text in English, should also submit the paper in Serbian, and Latin alphabet. On occasion, a paper may be published in Serbian, with the prior explicit approval of the Editor-in-Chief. Papers in both languages must fully meet the standards of proofreading, i.e. grammatical and spelling correctness, which speeds up the process of selection of papers. If the submitted papers do not meet the stated standards, they will not be considered for publication.

Paper structure

The paper should have the following structure: names and affiliations of author(s) (name and surname, address of their organization/institution and e-mail address of the author for correspondence), title, abstract

(150-250 words), keywords (4-6), text, list of references. All structure elements must meet the Conditions for editing scientific journals, which are published as Annex 1 to Pravilnik o kategorizaciji i rangiranju naučnih časopisa [Rulebook on categorization and ranking of scientific journals („Službeni glasnik RS“, broj 159 od 30. decembra 2020)].

Name(s) of author(s)

One paper can have a maximum of three authors. The surname(s) and initial(s) of the author(s) should be written in their original form (with Serbian diacritical marks, diacritical marks used in other world languages or diacritical marks in alphabets of national minorities and ethnic groups). The surname(s) and initial(s) of the author(s) name(s) are written without stating one's position and title.

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Full (official) name and seat of the institution/organization where the author is employed at should be stated, and, occasionally, the name of the institution where the author conducted their research. Independent researchers and authors to whom scientific research is not their primary profession should also indicate their status. In complex organizations, the overall hierarchy of that organization is stated. In the hierarchy of organizations, at least one must be a legal entity.

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The title gives the first impression of the work which is why it is important that it describes the content of the article as faithfully as possible, but also attracts attention and provokes interest to read that manuscript. It is in the interest of the journal and the author to use words suitable for indexing and searching. Try to be concise and write the title of your paper in as few words as possible.

Title case capitalization

(<https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/capitalization/title-case>)

APA Style uses two types of capitalization for titles of works (such as paper titles) and headings within works: title case and sentence case.

In title case, major words are capitalized, and most minor words are lowercase. In sentence case, most major and minor words are lowercase (proper nouns are an exception in that they are always capitalized).

major words: Nouns, verbs (including linking verbs), adjectives, adverbs, pronouns, and all words of four letters or more are considered major words. minor words: Short (i.e., three letters or fewer) conjunctions, short prepositions, and all articles are considered minor words.

In title case, capitalize the following words in a title or heading:

- the first word of the title or heading, even if it is a minor word such as "The" or "A"
- the first word of a subtitle the first word after a colon, em dash, or end punctuation in a heading major words, including the second part of hyphenated major
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Lowercase only minor words that are three letters or fewer in a title or heading (except the first word in a title or subtitle or the first word after a colon, em dash, or end punctuation in a heading):

- short conjunctions (e.g., "and," "as," "but," "for," "if," "nor," "or," "so," "yet")
- articles ("a," "an," "the")
- short prepositions (e.g., "as," "at," "by," "for," "in," "of," "off," "on," "per," "to," "up," "via")

Use title case for the following:

- titles of articles, books, reports, and other works appearing in text

In the book *Train Your Mind for Peak Performance: A Science-Based Approach for Achieving Your Goals*

In the article "Turning Frowns (and Smiles) Upside Down: A Multilevel Examination of Surface Acting Positive and Negative Emotions on Well-Being"

- titles of tests or measures, including subscales

Beck Depression Inventory-II

- all headings within a work (Levels 1–5; these are also bold or bold italic)
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the Results section

- titles of periodicals (these are also italicized)

Journal of Latin Psychology

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- table titles (these are also italicized)
- figure titles (these are also italicized), axis labels, and legends

Abstract

An abstract is a short informative presentation of the content of an article that allows the reader to quickly and accurately assess its relevance. It is in the interest of journals and authors that abstracts contain terms that are often used to index and search articles. Elements of the abstract are the aim of the research, methods, results and a brief conclusion. The abstract may also contain other elements – national, regional, cultural context, the social background of research, national significance of the research, etc.

Keywords

Keywords are terms or phrases that thematically, theoretically, methodologically, disciplinary, subdisciplinary and in other relevant ways

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The text of the paper should be in Word document format, as follows:

- font: Verdana;
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Thank-you note

The name and number of the project financed from the budget, i.e. the name of the program within which the article was written, as well as the name of the scientific research organization and the ministry that financed the project or program, are stated in a special note after the conclusion, before the list of references.

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If the article was presented at a conference in the form of an oral statement in a previous version (under the same or similar title), that piece of information should be stated in a special note at the bottom of the first page of the article. A paper that has already been published in a journal or a collection of papers cannot be published in another journal under a similar title nor in an amended form, in terms of evaluating scientific research results.

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The journal *Kultura polisa* uses the APA citation style, 7th edition, which includes citing bibliographic parentheses according to the author-date system in the text, as well as a list of references with bibliographic data after the text of the paper.

Direct quotations (verbatim – word for word) must be shown in quotation marks (note the quotation marks for the English language: ALT 147/ALT148). When quoting a text that is not in the original language of the work in which it is cited, no quotation marks are used, because there is no direct match of the words in the search engine, but the source of the citation must be indicated, as in all other cases. If a direct citation is longer than 40 words, no quotation marks are used – such a citation must be in a text block, which is indented by 0.5 inches, with the source cited before the block or at the end of the block, before the last punctuation mark. The spacing in the block is 1.5. Example:

self-regulating consensus rules governing the platform, and finally a personalized article selection mechanism for users – personalized journalism.

In the case when there were a small number of publishing houses on the journalistic market, they behaved monopolistically.

The press had authority over setting agendas, and readers had no choice but to receive the news that the press decided was important to them. At that time, the press called readers 'the masses' and treated them as one mass (Figure 1). A mass by definition is not able to choose the news according to personal wishes (Kim & Yongik, 2018).

When they took positions, it was very difficult for the competition to enter the market, so they

The list of references (References) begins on a new page after the text of the Conclusion. Reference sources are arranged without numbering,

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Examples:

Lee, B., Rumrill, P., & Tansey, T. N. (2022). Examining the role of resilience and hope in grit in multiple sclerosis. *Frontiers in Neurology*, 13, Article 875133. CC BY.

<https://doi.org/10.3389/fneur.2022.875133>

Smith, H. (2019). Monetizing movement. In M. Graham, R. Kitchin, S. Mattern & J. Shaw (Eds.), *How to run a city like Amazon, and other fables* (pp. 570-605). Meatspace Press.

https://issuu.com/meatspacepress/docs/how_to_run_a_city_like_amazon_and_other_fables

If non-Latin alphabet material is cited in the English text, references should be transcribed into the Latin alphabet. In APA style, the list of references must be displayed in alphabetical order, which would not be possible if the references were in another alphabet. When citing sources written in another language, the title of the source (article/book/book chapter, etc.) in the list of references should be translated into English in square brackets immediately after the original title, without using italics in square brackets. The title of a journal or an edited book (collection), as well as the name of the publisher, must also be written in the Latin alphabet, but not translated. If there is an official English translation, it can be used, especially in cases where it provides a better understanding of the topic or publication.

Below are the rules and examples for inputting bibliographical data in the list of references and in the text. For each type of reference, the citation rule is given first, followed by an example of a citation in the list of references and bibliographic parenthesis.

Bibliographic parentheses are usually put at the end of the sentence, before the punctuation mark, and contain the author's surname, year of publication and the corresponding page number(s), according to the following example: (Bjelajac, 2017, pp. 15-17).

Monograph (Book)

Single author

Surname, initial (s) of the name(s) (if the author uses a middle name, first write the initial of the personal name, space, then the initial of the middle name). Year of publication in parentheses. *Title*. Publisher (without stating the seat of the publisher, unless the seat is an integral part of the name of the publisher, such as the University of Belgrade).

Bjelajac, Ž. (2017). *Bezbednosna kultura – umeće življenja* [Security culture – The art of living]. Univerzitet Privredna akademija u Novom Sadu: Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe u Novom Sadu.

(Bjelajac, 2017, p. 25)

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. Free Press.

(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 65)

Two authors

Author Surname, Initial(s)., & Author Surname, Initial(s). (Year). *Title*. Publisher.

Despotović, Lj., & Jevtović, Z. (2010). *Geopolitika i mediji* [Geopolitics and media]. Grafomarketing.

(Despotović & Jevtović, 2010, pp. 34-36)

Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2019). *The light that failed*. Allen Lane.

(Krastev & Holmes, 2019, pp. 23-24)

Three or more authors

Author Surname, Initial(s)., Author Surname, Initial(s)., & Author Surname, Initial(s). (Year). *Title*. Publisher.

Milisavljević, B., Varinac, S., Litričin, A., Jovanović, A., & Blagojević, B. (2017). *Komentar Zakona o javno-privatnom partnerstvu i koncesijama: prema stanju zakonodavstva od 7. januara 2017. godine* [Commentary on the Law on public-private partnerships and concessions: According to the state of legislation from January 7, 2017]. Službeni glasnik & Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.

(Milisavljević et al., 2017, p. 37)

Editor / compiler / translator instead of author

If there is an editor instead of an author, insert the editor's name in the place of the author's, followed by (Ed.) or (Eds.) for more than one editor.

Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P., Ochoa Espejo, P., & Ostigoy, P. (Eds.). (2017). *The Oxford handbook of populism*. Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser et al., 2017)

Same bibliographic parenthesis, multiple references

Different authors – References separated by semicolons.

(Stepić, 2015, p. 61; Knežević, 2014, p. 158)

Same author, different years - State the author's surname, and then the years of publication of different references in the order from earliest to most recent and separate them with a comma, i.e. a semicolon when stating the number of pages.

(Stepić 2012, 2015) or (Stepić 2012, p. 30; 2015, p. 69)

Different authors, same last name – Some authors have the same last name, if this happens the initials (s) of the author should be added in all citations, even if the year of publication is different.

(Subotić, D., 2010, p. 97), (Subotić, M., 2010, p. 302)

(Williams, A., 2009), (Williams, J., 2010)

Book / Proceedings – Chapter

Author of chapter Surname, Initial(s). (Year). Title of chapter. In Editor of book Initial(s). Editor of book Surname (Ed(s).), Title of book (Edition if not first., Page numbers). Publisher.

Stepić, M. (2015). Pozicija Srbije pred početak Velikog rata sa stanovišta Prvog i Drugog zakona geopolitike. In M. Stepić & Lj. P. Ristić (Eds.), *Srbija i geopolitičke prilike u Evropi 1914. godine* (pp. 55–78). Gradska biblioteka u Lajkovcu & Institut za političke studije u Beogradu.

(Stepić, 2015, p. 61)

Lošonc, A. (Ed.). (2019). Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism. In D. M. Vukasović & P. Matić (Eds.), *Discourse and politics* (pp. 23–46). Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade.

(Lošonc, 2019, p. 31)

Journal article

Regular edition

Author of chapter Surname, Initial(s). (Year). *Title of journal/periodical, Volume*(Number), page range. DOI (if available)

Gaćinović, R. (2020). Sistem kao izraz uređenosti određene delatnosti u društvu [The system as an expression of the orderliness of certain activity in society]. *Kultura polisa*, 17(41), 247–258.

(Gaćinović, 2020, p. 253)

Bjelajac, Ž. Đ., Dašić, D., & Spasović, M. (2011). EU environmental policy and its criminal law framework. *Medjunarodni problemi*, 63(4), 567–582. <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP1104567B>

(Bjelajac et al., 2011, p. 571)

Special issue or special section in a journal

Editor Surname, Initial(s)., Editor surname, Initial(s)., & Editor Surname, Initial(s). (Eds.). (Year). Title of the special issue [Special issue]. Journal title, volume(issue). DOI broj (if available)

Bjelajac, Ž. Đ., & Filipović, A. M. (Eds.). (2020). Pedofilija – Uzroci i posledice [Pedophilia – Causes and consequences] [Special Issue]. *Kultura polisa*, 17(1).

(Bjelajac & Filipović, 2020).

Campbell, K., Lustig, C., & Hasher, L. (Eds.). (2020). Aging and inhibition: The view ahead [Special issue]. *Psychology and Aging*, 35(5).

(Campbell et al., 2020)

If you are citing an article within a special section or issue (rather than the entire issue or section), use the format for a journal article. You do not need to include the title of the special section or issue.

Delibašić , V. (2020). Krivičnopravna zaštita dece od seksualnih zloupotreba [Criminal protection of children from sexual abuse]. *Kultura polisa*, 17(1), 53-67.

(Delibašić, 2020, p. 58)

Blog

Author Surname, Initial(s). (Date in full). Title of the blog post. *Name of the blog*. URL

Lee, C. (2010, November 18). How to cite something you found on a website in APA style. *APA Style Blog*.

<http://blog.apastyle.org/apastyle/2010/11/how-to-cite-something-you-found-on-a-website-in-apa-style.html>

(Lee, 2010)

The author of the blog may use a screen name, if this is the case then use the screen name in place of the author.

If the author is not indicated on the blog, the name of the blog is used, as well as when quoting a reference with a corporate author.

JCU Library News. (2019, May 28). Reading challenge reviews: Football heroes and tragic. *JCU Library News*.

<https://jculibrarynews.blogspot.com/2019/05/reading-challenge-reviews-football.html>

(JCU Library News, 2019)

Encyclopedias and dictionaries

Unknown author

Surname, Initial(s). (Ed(s).). (Year of Publication). *Title of encyclopedia/dictionary*. Volume (if there is more than one). Publisher Name. URL (if available)

Manning, M. J., & Wyatt, C. R. (Eds.). (2011). *Encyclopedia of media and propaganda in wartime America*. ABC-CLIO.

(Maning & Wyatt, 2011)

Title of entry. (Year of Publication). In Editor's initial(s). Last Name. (Ed(s).). *Name of encyclopedia or dictionary* (edition if given and not the first edition). Publisher Name. URL

Nirvana. (2001). In S. Sadie (Ed.). *The new Grove dictionary of music and musicians* (2nd ed., Vol. 17). Macmillan Publishers.

(Sadie, 2001)

Known author(s)

Author's Last name, First Initial. Second Initial if Given. (Year of Publication). Title of entry. In Editor's First Initial. Second Initial if given. Last Name (Ed.), *Name of encyclopedia or dictionary* (edition if given and is not first edition., p. or pp. page number or numbers). Publisher name. DOI or URL if given

Bowman, S., & Johnson, S. (2007). Age stratification and the elderly. In K. Christensen & D. Levinson (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of community: From the village to the virtual world*. SAGE Publications.

<https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412952583.n7> (Original work published 2003)

(Bowman & Johnson, 2003/2007)

Corporate or group author

Name of Institution or Group. (Year of Publication, or n.d. if unknown). *Name of encyclopedia or dictionary* (edition if given and is not the first edition) prvo. Publisher Name. DOI of URL if available.

Oxford University Press. (n.d.). *Zombie*. In *Oxford English dictionary*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved January 4, 2020, from <https://oed.com/view/Entry/232982> (Oxford University Press, n.d.)

Doctoral dissertation

Surname, Initial(s). (Year of Publication). *Title of dissertation: subtitle*. [Description, Name of University: Faculty (if necessary)]. Name of archive or website. URL

Filipović, A. (2016). *Paradigma kulturološkog pozicioniranja video igre* [The paradigm of cultural positioning of video games]. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univerzitet umetnosti: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti].

(Filipović 2019, 145–147)

Axford J.C. (2007). *What constitutes success in Pacific Island community conserved areas?* [Doctoral dissertation, University of Queensland]. UQ eSpace. <http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:158747>

(Axford, 2007)

Newspaper or magazine article

Known author(s)

Author Surname, Initial(s). (Full date of publication). Title of Article. *Title of newspaper or magazine*, page numbers. (for printed edition). URL (for online edition)

Avakumović, M. (2019, December 8). Platni razredi – 2021. godine [Salary classes – 2021]. *Politika*.

<https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/443548/Ekonomija/Platni-razredi-2021-godine>

(Avakumović, 2019)

Unknown author(s)

Title of article: subtitle, if it is given. (Full date). *Title of newspaper or magazine*, page numbers (for printed edition). URL (for online edition)

Get on board for train safety. (2012, June 17). *Toronto Star*, A14.

In text – (“one two or three words from the title”, year, page numbers)
 (“Get on board”, 2012, p. A14)

Corporate as author

Name of Institution [acronym, if necessary]. (Year of Publication). *Title* (edition, if it is not the first). Name of Publisher (not if the same organization is the author and the publisher).

Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije [Ministry of European Integration of the Republic of Serbia [MEI]]. (2018). *Vodič za korišćenje EU fondova u Srbiji; IPA II (2014–2020. god)* [Guide to the use of EU funds in Serbia; IPA II (2014–2020)].

First citing

(Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republike Srbije [MEI], 2018)

Next citings

(MEI, 2018)

National Fire Protection Association. (2009). *Fundamentals of fire fighting skills* (2nd ed.). Jones and Bartlett.

First citing

(National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2009)

Next citings

(NFPA, 2009)

Legal acts

Constitution and laws, decisions of state bodies and institutions

Author [Abbreviated form as needed]. (Year of adoption). *Name of the act*. (Name of the official gazette and number with numbers of amendments). Publisher (if the author and the publisher are the same, then this is omitted). URL

Narodna skupština Republike Srbije [Narodna skupština]. (2006). *Ustav Republike Srbije* [Constitution of the Republic of Serbia]. (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 98/06).

https://www.srbija.gov.rs/view_file.php?file_id=2391&cache=sr

First citing

(Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, 2006, Art. 33)

Next citings

(Narodna skupština, 2006, Art. 25)

Narodna skupština Republike Srbije. (2019). *Zakon o osnovama sistema obrazovanja i vaspitanja* [Law on the Fundamentals of the Education System]. (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 88/2017, 27/2018 – dr. zakon, 10/2019 i 27/2018 – dr. zakon). Paragraf.

https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_osnovama_sistema_obrazovanja_i_vaspitanja.html

(Narodna skupština republike Srbije, 2019, Art. 17, para. 4)

(Narodna skupština, 2019, Art. 23)

National Institute of Mental Health. (1990). *Clinical training in serious mental illness* (DHHS Publication No. ADM 90-1679). US Government.

(National Institute of Mental Health, 1990)

Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije [Zaštitnik građana]. (2012, October 22). Mišljenje br. 15-3314/12 [Opinion No. 15-3314/12]. https://www.osobesainvaliditetom.rs/attachments/083_misljenje%20ZG%20DZ.pdf

(Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije, 15-3314/12)

(Zaštitnik građana, 15-3314/12)

Legislative acts of the European Union

Legislation type and Number of Legislation. *Name of the act*. EU Body/Agency. Official Journal of the European Union. Series, Issue Number. URL.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. *Laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member states of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers*. The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, L 55.

<http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj>

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

European Union treaties and founding agreements

Name of the act [Acronym if necessary]. (Year). Official Journal of the European Union. Series, Issue Number. URL

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU]. (2012). Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390.

http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/oj.

(TEU, 2012, Art. 3)

International treaties of the United Nations

Treaty Title [Acronym or abbreviated name]. (Date of signing or entering into force). Registration in the UN – UNTS number, registration number from the website *United Nations Treaty Collection*:

<https://treaties.un.org>. URL

Marrakesh agreement establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement]. (1994, April 15). UNTS 1867, I-31874.

<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867/volume-1867-A-31874-English.pdf>

(Marrakesh Agreement, 1994)

Court practice*Court practice in the Republic of Serbia*

Legislation type and name of the court [acronym of the court], case number and date. Name and number of the official gazette or other publication in which the judgment was published – if applicable. URL

Odluka Ustavnog suda Republike Srbije [USRS] [Decision of the Constitutional court of the Republic of Serbia], IUa-2/2009 od 13. juna 2009. Službeni glasnik RS, br. 68/2012.

(Odluka USRS, IUa-2/2009)

Rešenje Apelacionog suda u Novom Sadu [ASNS] [Decision of the Court of appeals in Novi Sad], Ržr-1/16 od 27. aprila 2016. godine.

(Rešenje ASNS, Ržr-1/16)

The case law of the International Court of Justice

Types of decisions can be Order, Judgment, Jurisdiction Judgment, Merits Judgment, and
Advisory Opinion.

Name of the case (Parties, often abbreviated), type of hearing, type of decision (if applicable), I.C.J. Rep. Year of the reporter (volume, if applicable) (date of the decision), first page of the decision (if published), page and paragraph referenced (if applicable).

Legality of use of force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures Order, I.C.J. Rep. 1999 (June 2), p. 826.

(Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom, 1999)

Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2002 (I) (Feb. 14).

(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, 2002)

Legality of the use by a state of nuclear weapons in armed conflict, advisory opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1996 (July 8), p. 66.

(I.C.J. Rep. 1996)

Jurisprudence: European Court of Justice (ECJ) & Court of First Instance (EFI)

Cite cases introduced before January 1, 1989 by "Case", case number [number/year of filing], name of the parties (italicized and separated by "v"), year of decision (in square brackets), title of the reporter ("ECR"), volume (if necessary), and page and paragraph referenced:

Case 120/88. *Commission v Italy* [1991]. ECR I-621.

(Case 120/88)

Cite cases introduced after January 1, 1989 by "Case", followed by "T" (for the Court of First

Instance) or "C" (for the European Court of Justice), case number [number/year of filing], name of the parties (italicized and separated by "v"), year of decision (in square brackets), title of the reporter ("ECR"), volume, and page and paragraph referenced:

Case T-224/95. *Tremblay and Others v Commission* [1997]. ECR , II-2215.

(Case T-224/95)

Case C-242/95. *GT-Link* [1997]. ECR , I-4449, para. 36.

(Case C-242/95)

Jurisprudence: European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)

Cite cases decided on or after November 1, 1998, by *name of parties* (italicized and separated by "v") [type of decision (note: a judgment on the merits has no designation), or, if decided by the Grand Chamber, [GC]], case number, section(s) referenced, date (optional), and abbreviated title of the reporter in which the case is published (ECHR), year, and volume:

Brumarescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, §§ 52-53, ECHR 1999-VII.

(Brumarescu v. Romania, 1995/1999)

Messina v. Italy (dec.), no. 25498/94, ECHR 1999-V.

(Messina v. Italy, 1994/1999)

Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 13, 25 July 2000, ECHR 2000-IX.

(*Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom*, 1996/2000)

Akman v. Turkey (striking out), no. 37453/97, ECHR 2001-VI.

(*Akman v. Turkey*, 1997/2001)

Jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals

Look at:

https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Final_GFILC_pdf.pdf

Video – Sharing website (e.g. You Tube, Vimeo)

Video

Author surname, initial(s) [Screen name]. (Year, month day). *Title of video* [Video]. Source. URL

University of Sheffield Library [uniSheffieldLib]. (2019, January 30). *Information and digital literacy workshops* [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lm7bLmbKOok0>

(University of Sheffield Library, 2019)

Radiohead (2009, April 22). Radiohead – No surprises [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5CVsCnxyXg>

(Radiohead, 2009)

Video channel

Author surname, initial(s) [Screen name]. (n.d.). Tab name [Source]. Retrieved date, from URL

Universitiy of Sheffield Library [uniSheffieldLib]. (n .d). Home [YouTube channel]. Retrieved August 12, 2020, from

<https://www.youtube.com/user/uniSheffieldLib>

(University of Sheffield Library, n.d.)

Website (Internet page)

Author Surname, Initials. or Name of organisation. (Date Year, Month day). *Title of webpage*. Site name (if not the same as the Name of organisation). URL

Binding, L. (2020, July 21). *River Thames has higher density of microplastics than other major European rivers*. Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/river-thames-has-higherdensity-of-microplastics-than-other-major-european-rivers-12033067>

(Binding, 2020)

World Health Organisation. (2018, May 18). *Assistive technology*. <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/assistive-technology>

(World Health Organisation, 2018)

(WHO, 2018)

Tables and figures

Tables and figures are attached as an appendix at the end of the article, starting from a new page after the list of references. The title of a table/figure is written above it, and below the word Table/Figure with a number indicating the order in the text, with one space – spacing 1.15, space 6pt Before and After – alignment justify, without indenting the text, according to the following example:

Table 2

Title

Figure 1

Title

Below the table/figure, with one space – line spacing 1.15, space 6pt Before – a note is added. There are three types of notes – those describing the contents of a figure that cannot be understood from the figure title, an image and/or legend alone (e.g., definitions of

abbreviations or explanations of asterisks used to indicate certain values), and those attributing copyright. Examples:

Note. The map does not include data for Puerto Rico. Adapted from 2017 poverty rate in the United States, by U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 (<https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2018/comm/acs-poverty-map.html>). In the public domain.

Note. Number of studies = 120, number of effects = 782, total N = 52,578. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

Note. Lyamouri-Bajja et al. (2012, p. 57).

Tables and figures help authors present a large amount of information to readers in an easier and more understandable way. The tables show numerical values and/or textual information arranged in rows and columns. An image is an illustrative presentation of information using charts, diagrams, infographics, drawings, photographs, etc. In order for the tables and figures to help readers understand your work more easily, the data in them needs to be presented in a way that readers do not need to read the text to understand.

Use the tables feature of your word-processing program to create a table. Do not use the tab key or space bar to manually create the look of a table. The parameters being compared should not be displayed in the same column. Use the same font type in the tables as in the rest of the article. Do not use vertical borders to separate data. For the necessary clarity of the display, it is enough to use horizontal edges at the top and bottom of the table, below column headings, and if necessary, to separate a row containing totals or other summary information from other rows in the table. Use spacing between columns and rows and strict alignment to clarify relations among the elements in a table. If a table is longer than one page, use the tables feature of your word-processing program to make the headings row repeat on the second and any subsequent pages.

Make sure the axes shown are clearly visible and the images are sharp enough. The legend is entered inside the edges of the figure. Use graphics software to create figures in APA Style papers – the built-in graphics features of your word-processing program (e.g., Microsoft Word or Excel) or special programs such as Photoshop or Inkscape.

Special cases of citing references

Citing the second and each subsequent edition

Surname, Initial(s). (Year of publication). *Title* (edition note). Publisher.

Gaćinović, R. (2018). *Mlada Bosna* (drugo dopunjeno i izmenjeno izdanje) [Young Bosnia, (2nd edition)]. Evro Book.

Multiple references by the same author

1) *Same author, different years* – Sort by year of publication, starting from the earliest.

2) *Same author, same year* – Arrange in alphabetical order of the initial letter of the reference's name. In addition to the year of publication, put the initial letters of the alphabet, which are also used in bibliographic parentheses.

Gaćinović, R. (2018a). Vojna neutralnost i budućnost Srbije [Military neutrality and the future of Serbia]. *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti*, 14 (1), 23–38. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.1412018.2>

Gaćinović, R. (2018b). *Mlada Bosna* (drugo dopunjeno i izmenjeno izdanje) [Young Bosnia (2nd edition)]. Evro Book.

(Gaćinović, 2018a, p. 25), (Gaćinović 2018b)

3) *The same author as an independent author and as a co-author* – First list the references in which he is an independent author, and then those in which he is a co-author.

4) *The same author as the first co-author in several different references* – Arrange in alphabetical order the surname of the second co-author.

Pollitt, C., Birchall, J., & Putman, K. (1998). *Decentralising public service management*. Macmillan Press.

Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, J., & Smullen, A. (2005). *Agencies: How governments do things through semi-autonomous organizations*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Special cases of citing bibliographic parentheses

Exceptions to citing bibliographic parentheses at the end of a sentence

Citing the author's surname within the sentence – Put the year of publication in brackets after stating the surname, and the page number at the end of the sentence in brackets.

According to Bjelajac (2017), ... (30).

Citing the author's surname within the sentence before the citation from the reference – After citing the surname, state the year and page number in the bibliographic parenthesis, and then cite the citation.

As Bjelajac (2017, p. 45) states: “ ... ”

Fukuyama (1992, p. 57) explicitly states: “ ... ”

Citing the same reference several times in one paragraph – If the same page or range of pages is cited, enter the bibliographic parenthesis at the last citation or at the end of the paragraph before the punctuation mark. If different pages are cited, state the reference when quoting the specific page for the first time, and then, until the end of the paragraph, put out only different page numbers in parentheses. If the next citation refers to the same reference as the previous citation, do not enter the author's name in parentheses, but only the year and page.

(Bjelajac, 2017, p. 34)

.....

(2017, p. 46)

Do not use "the same", "ibid", or "op. cit." for multiple citing of a reference.

Citing the terms "see", "compare", etc.

Enter these expressions in bibliographic parenthesis.

(see Bjelajac 2017, p. 153)

(Stepić, 2015; compare Knežević, 2014)

Secondary referencing

This is when you reference one author who is referring to the work of another, and the primary source is not available. *Secondary referencing should be avoided if possible.*

If you have only read the latter publication you are accepting someone else's opinion and interpretation of the author's original intention. You cannot have formed your own view or critically appraised whether the secondary author has adequately presented the original material.

You must make it clear to your reader which author you have read whilst giving details of the original.

Use 'as cited in' if the author has cited the work of another, e.g.

(Chomsky, 1999 as cited in Đurić & Stojadinović, 2018, p. 47)

If the author has directly quoted from an original piece of work then you would use 'as quoted in' e.g.

„Tom prilikom neoliberalizam se od strane najvećeg broja njegovih protagonisti najčešće određuje kao politika slobodnog tržišta“ (Chomsky, 1999, p. 7, as quoted in Đurić & Stojadinović, 2018, p. 47).

In the references, list only the secondary reference.

Đurić, Ž., & Stojadinović, M. (2018). Država i neoliberalni modeli urušavanja nacionalnih političkih institucija [The state and neoliberal models of collapsing national political institutions]. *Srpska politička misao*, 62(4), 41–57. <https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.6242018.2>

Same bibliographic parenthesis, multiple references

Different authors – Separate references with semicolons.

(Stepić, 2015, p. 61; Knežević, 2014, p. 158)

Same author, different years – Give the author's last name, and then the year of publication of the various references in order from earliest to most recent, and separate them with a comma, i.e., a semicolon when stating the number of pages.

(Stepić 2012, 2015) or (Stepić 2012, p. 30; 2015, p. 69)

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(Subotić, D., 2010, p. 97), (Subotić, M., 2010, p. 302)

(Williams, A., 2009), (Williams, J., 2010)

Application of spelling rules

Align the papers with the spelling rules of the English language.

Please, pay special attention to the following:

- Some well-known foreign expressions should be written only in the original language in italics, e.g.: *de iure*, *de facto*, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, *sui generis*, etc.
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